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I. INTRODUCTION
International ocean shipping is at the intersection of many nations'
domestic and international economic policies. While theoretically it is
one of only a few truly international industries, inasmuch as its activities
occur primarily outside the boundaries of any nation state, in practice
many nations consider the industry to be essential to the competitiveness
of their exports in international markets and thus subject it to some do-
mestic policy regulation. In recent years, the dual nature of the shipping
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industry has become apparent to United States policy makers, as third
world and certain industrialized nations have tended to enter into bilat-
eral agreements or place certain cargo restrictions on their trade. At the
same time the United States has assumed a greater dependence on inter-
national trade for its economic well-being.
The United States liner industry, both in its competitive rate struc-
ture and in the competitiveness of United States based flag companies,
has been declining for at least the past decade. This decline has
prompted policymakers to propose that the United States liner confer-
ence system be deregulated. Generally, two themes underlie these pro-
posals: an elimination or weakening and streamlining of the regulatory
powers of the Federal Maritime Commission (the United States is one of
the few nations with a regulatory agency exclusively devoted to regulat-
ing the conference system), and a strengthening of the conferences' anti-
trust immunity. Because such legislation is antithetical to traditional
concepts of United States domestic competition policy, previous Con-
gresses failed to enact reform legislation. On March 20, 1984, however,
President Reagan signed the Shipping Act of 1984, which comprehen-
sively restructured the United States maritime laws. While this Act
culminates seven years of attempted maritime reform by the Congress, it
is compromise legislation, merely a step toward a more fundamental re-
thinking of United States maritime policy. The Act authorizes the crea-
tion of a Presidential Advisory Commission at the end of this decade that
will ascertain the need to further strengthen the conference system and
reform the United States regulatory policy.
This article addresses one of the concerns of opponents to such re-
form measures: the protection of shippers' interests through the creation
of shippers' councils. These councils, which would enjoy an antitrust
exemption that would permit them to either consult or negotiate general
service and rate issues with conferences, exist in a number of other na-
tions. United States proponents of these councils generally perceive
them as a countervailing power to strong conferences, supplanting, to a
certain degree, the role of the antitrust laws in protecting the interests of
shippers and ensuring economic efficiency in the conference system. Af-
ter a survey of current industry conditions, this author concludes that
1) the proposals previously considered by the Congress are inadequate
for the creation of these councils; 2) based upon prior experience under
similar legislation, these councils would probably not form even if given
antitrust immunity; and 3) reliance on the creation of export trading
companies under the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, combined
with the shippers' associations provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984,
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will achieve essentially the same goals as the shippers' council concept,
thus negating any need for additional legislation.
A. Background
Any analysis of the feasibility of shippers' councils in the United
States must commence with an identification of the market in which they
are to operate. Tramps, independent liners (independents), and liner
conferences (conferences or shipping conferences) are the primary com-
ponents of regulated ocean transportation. A tramp is an independent
carrier which contracts with shippers for the individual carriage of
goods. It does not confine itself to one trade and therefore does not need
to offer a fixed schedule or publish tariffs. In contrast, a liner serves a
fixed trade, offering scheduled services and published tariffs. Its legal
status is that of a common carrier.1
Liner service has several attributes common to regulated transporta-
tion industries, which conference advocates argue preclude the industry
from operating as a classical competitive market. Foremost among these
characteristics are high fixed costs and high initial capital costs.2 In ad-
dition, because liners must be large, they must have a fixed capacity.
This factor distinguishes them from other transportation modes.3 The
requirement that liners adhere to fixed schedules often has resulted in
liners having to sail without utilizing their full capacity.4 In a competi-
tive market, this underutilization of capacity, coupled with an inability to
reallocate resources, can lead to "cut-throat" competition and destruc-
tive price wars, with consequential bankruptcies and disrupted market
service.5
The English developed the concept of liner conferences in the 1870s
1 See G. SLETMO & E. WILLIAMS, LINER CONFERENCES IN THE CONTAINER AGE: U.S. POL-
ICY AT SEA 7-12 (1981); D. Marx, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS (1953); see generally,
Agman, Competition, Rationalization, and the United States Shipping Policy, 8 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1
(1976); Comment, The Sinking Shipping Industry, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 99 (1983).
2 SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 136-38; SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
AND TRANSPORTATION: THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1983, S. REP. No. 3, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 3].
3 SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at xxix; S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 9; HOUSE COMM.
ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES: The Shipping Act of 1983, H.R. REP. No. 53, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14 (1983).
4 SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at xxix.
5 HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERS: REPORT ON STEAMSHIP AGREE-
MENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRADE, H.R. DOC. No.
805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 416-17 (1914) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER REPORT]; Farthing,




to compensate for the adverse effects of competition.6 A liner conference
is a cartel of shipowners in a trade the primary purpose of which is to
rationalize services and productive output by eliminating competition
within the trade. Rate and service stability is achieved by group consul-
tation on rates, service schedules, market shares, and revenue pooling.
In the majority of trades, but not the United States trades, the conference
will be "closed" inasmuch as it limits the number of members in the
trade. To ensure that it maintains its market position, the conference
also may utilize the tools of deferred rebates or dual rate contracts as
tying arrangements to ensure shipper loyalty to the conference. The use
of these tools will seriously limit the opportunity for a competitor to
enter the trade, because many of its potential customers are already com-
mitted to the conference.7
B. Regulation of Liner Conferences and the Monopoly Price Problem
From the standpoint of broad economic policy, there are four important
objectives which the Congress has sought to meet since the middle part of
the nineteenth century. They are a logical and efficient control over entry, a
resulting price that bears a relationship with cost, stimulation of efficiency,
and stimulation of innovation. These four economic objectives are not par-
ticularly debatable. They are either accomplished by an effective regulation
scheme or they are accomplished by competition. To think that they can be
accomplished in a vacuum is naive or dangerous.
8
Most of the tools used to achieve the liner conference goals of limit-
ing competition and rationalizing prices would constitute per se viola-
tions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts if the industry did not enjoy an
antitrust exemption for its activities.9 Although some segments of the
6 The first formally organized steamship conference was established in 1875 to serve the trade
from the United Kingdom to ports in Calcutta. The English shipowner who originated the concept
was said to be "quite pleased with the results." Bennathan & Walters, Shipping Conference An
Economic Analysis, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 93 (1972); Llorca, Anti-trust Exemption of Shipping Con-
ferences, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 287 (1975); INDEX TO TiE LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE STEAM-
SHIP CONFERENCE/DUAL RATE LAW, S. Doc. No. 100, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 205 (1962).
7 See Hanson, Regulation of the Shipping Industry: An Economic Analysis of the Need For Re-
form, 12 J. L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 973 (1980).
8 H.R. REP. No. 935, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980) (statement of Andrew Popper, Dean,
American University School of Law, before the House Monopolies Subcommittee, reprinted in Re-
port on Omnibus Regulatory Reform, Revitalization, and Reorganization Act of 1980) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 935].
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). For example, under the following cases interpreting section 1 of the
Sherman Act liner conference activities would be per se illegal: United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (horizontal agreements to discuss or fix prices); United States v. Topco
Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (allocation of production or markets); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (revenue pooling and use of tying arrangements); Standard Oil of Cal. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). But cf., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961) (requirements contracts). See also Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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government and industry favor an aggressive application of the antitrust
laws to the shipping industry, 10 Congressional and Executive branch
studies have rejected this approach repeatedly, concluding that principles
of comity preclude the unilateral imposition of domestic competition
laws upon an international industry." Thus, since 1916, United States
policymakers have granted liner conferences an antitrust exemption sub-
ject to government regulation by the Federal Maritime Commission in an
attempt to create an alternative to competition.' 2
Unfortunately, principles of international comity also have limited
the United States' ability to regulate the liner conference system.
Although the original proposals suggested that the Interstate Commerce
Commission regulate the conference system, both the Shipping Act of
1916 and its amendments in 1961 created a separate independent agency
to exercise a pre-implementation review of conference agreements and to
monitor potential industry abuses."' Under a 1968 Supreme Court deci-
sions, the Federal Maritime Commission ("FMC") could grant an anti-
trust exemption only for those agreements that the proponents proved to
be within the "public interest". ' In addition to using a regulatory
agency to monitor conference activities, the United States' method of
conference regulation differs from that of other nations inasmuch as it
sanctions a much weaker form of conference. United States law permits
only "open" conferences, which mandate that conferences cannot limit
their membership or size. 5 In addition, United States trade conferences
could utilize only weak tools, such as dual rate contracts, to develop
10 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Report on the Regulated Ocean Shipping Industry (1977)
[hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT]; cf Hearings on S. 1593 Before the Sub-
comm. on Merchant Marine of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 287 (1981) (testimony of Clifford M. Sayre, E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.) [hereinafter
cited as Gorton Hearings].
11 See ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 5, at 416; Letter from Brooks Hays, Asst. Sec. of State,
to Senator Engle (August 15, 1961), reprinted in INDEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE/DUAL RATE LAW, supra note 6, at 228-29; Letter from President Carter
to Hon. John Murphy (July 20, 1979) (recommending an interagency task force), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 935, supra note 8, at 29; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES (Jan. 22,
1979) Ch. 13, at 280-86 [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
ANTITRUST LAWS]; REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL ON CHANGES IN FEDERAL MARI-
TIME REGULATION, GAO/PAD-82-11 (7/2/82) 33 [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
12 See Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
13 ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 5, at 419-20; REPORT ON SHIPPING ACT of 1916, H.R.
REP. No. 659, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 27-32 (1916).
14 Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968);
see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261 (1968).
15 Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814.
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shipper loyalties. 16 Stronger methods of market foreclosure, such as de-
ferred rebates and fighting ships, are illegal in the United States trades.
17
Despite these limitations on conference market power, other methods of
encouraging economies of scale in the liner industry, including revenue
pooling agreements, service coordination, and rate agreements, were per-
mitted under the Shipping Act of 1916.18 Thus, the Act struck a balance
between promoting conference efficiencies and preventing conference dis-
crimination against competitors, shippers, and ports.
Although there have been radical differences in the proposed solu-
tions, a general consensus that the United States regulatory scheme has
failed exists.' 9 The United States trades suffer from overtonnaging. This
overtonnaging impedes attempts to rationalize services and costs. 20 Re-
cent studies estimate that rate differentials between United States imports
and exports may be as great as thirty-two percent.21 Perhaps more
alarming is a finding that transportation rates from the United States to a
third country are often 100 percent higher than comparable rates from a
competitor country to the same destination.22 Some exporters have cited
16 Under a dual rate contract a conference will establish tariffs consisting of rates at two levels.
The lower rate is charged to merchants who agree to ship their cargoes on vessels of members of the
conference only and the higher rate is charged to merchants who do not so agree. Shipping Act, 46
U.S.C. § 813a. This practice is ostensibly illegal under the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C.S.
§ 10(b)(5), (6) (Supp. 1984) having been replaced by service and loyalty contracts. See infra note 61.
17 Section 814 of the Shipping Act renders the following tools of predatory market foreclosure
illegal: deferred rebates, fighting ships, retaliation against shippers by concerted refusals to deal, and
charging unjustly discriminatory rates against any shippers. 46 U.S.C. § 813. In addition, sections
16 and 17 of the Shipping Act prohibit activity that would discriminate against shippers or ports. 46
U.S.C. §§ 815-16. These activities are now prohibited in U.S. foreign commerce under section 10 of
the Shipping Act of 1984. 46 U.S.C. § 809 (Supp. 1984).
18 Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
19 See, DEPARTMENT OF JusTicE REPORT, supra note 10; Fawcett & Nolan, United States
Ocean Shipping: The History, Development, and Decline of the Conference Antitrust Exemption, 1
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 537 (1979). But see GAO REPORT, supra note 11.
20 Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 120-21 (testimony of C. Jonathan Benner, General Coun-
sel, Federal Maritime Commission); Great Britain, Committee of Inquiry into Shipping: Report,
Chmn, The RL Hon. The Viscount Rochdale, HMSO ((MND 4337), London, 1970) 125-26, par. 436
[hereinafter cited as Rochdale Report].
21 Rate differentials between the United States and European inbound and outbound rates were
32 percent higher for United States outbound rates and 302 percent higher for freight rates for the
export of competing commodities, as compared with Japan. Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., A
STUDY OF OCEAN RATE DISPARITIES, FINAL REPORT, JUNE 1978 1-3 (prepared for the Depart-
ment of Transportation) [hereinafter cited as the Booz ALLEN REPORT], excerpts reprinted in Om-
nibus Maritime Bill: Hearings of H.R. 4769 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., part II, 447-48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Omnibus Hearings]. Floor Debate,
128 CONG. REc. H6910 (daily ed., Sept. 13, 1982) (statement of Rep. McCloskey).
22 Booz ALLEN REPORT, Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 447-48; see also Study by the
University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology Hearings on HR. 11422 before the Subcomm.
on Merchant Marine, House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 297
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these rate differentials to justify shipping their Latin American destined
goods through Europe first, because the overall cost is less than shipping
directly to Latin America.23 Similarly, a recent survey of small and me-
dium sized manufacturers ranked high transportation freight rates as one
of the greatest impediments to the export of their goods.2 4
A decline in the role of United States flag ships in the liner trades
has accompanied this problem of surplus capacity and higher rates. The
number of United States firms involved in liner shipping during the past
decade declined from nineteen in 1970 to nine in 1981 25 In addition, the
percentage volume of United States liner import and export trade carried
in United States bottoms is 27.5 to 30 percent, while the total percentage
of United States exports moving by United States flag ships is 5 per-
cent.26 (For comparison purposes, the United Nations recommends a 40
percent market share for flag carriers in any given trade.)27 This decline
has national defense as well as economic ramifications, as the need for a
strong merchant marine during the 1982 Falkland Islands War well
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Closed Conference Hearings] which suggested that rationalization of the
United States trades could result in a reduction of costs by 28 percent.
23 Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 218 (testimony of Edgar Vierengel, Ingersoll-
Rand Co.).
24 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, Report on U.S.
Exports: Hearings on S. 2520 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 251-53 (1978).
25 GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at iii (Executive Summary).
26 Hearings on H.R. 4374 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) (opening statement of Rep. Biaggi) [hereinafter
cited as Regulatory Reform Hearings]; Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 167 (statement of Council
of Flag Ship Operators) (citing 1979 MARAD statistics). For comparison purposes, the Industry
and Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce found that between 1960 and 1977, U.S.
market shares among 14 major free world trading nations dropped from 21 percent to 14.2 percent
for a 32 percent decline. Shares of world exports by manufacturers, the segment of the market
carried primarily in liner ships, declined over 18 percent from 23 percent to 18.6 percent. See Closed
Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 211 (statement of New York Chamber of Commerce).
The GAO Report, however, disputes conclusions that the liner industry has declined. Instead,
it argues that the decline in United States flag vessels and ranking of the United States fleet reflects
significant changes in ship technology. It argues that the decline of United States companies has
corresponded with a rise of the United States position as the leading containership country in the
world. In addition, it disputes the figures cited above and argues that the average annual United
States flag share of ocean liner cargoes, whether measured by dollar value or average annual tons, is
currently a 30 percent share. This would constitute only a 5 percent market share decline since
1956, the year containerships were introduced. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 11-17.
27 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Code
of Conduct for Liner Conferences, Final Act and Annexes, at 27, U.N. Doc. TD/Code/l1/Rev. 1
(May 9, 1974) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Code of Conduct]. Previous legislative investigations
have attempted to develop alternative methods for the United States to achieve a 40% market share
in its trades. See Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 109; see also H.R 4519, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 3447, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). But see Maritime Agreements Act of 1983, S.1617,




Analysts differ as to why the United States regulatory scheme has
failed.29 Neutral observers cite the radical technological changes exper-
ienced by the industry since the 1960s and the emergence of a strong
Communist Bloc fleet which is able to engage in price cutting through
state subsidization of its operating costs as reasons for this failure.30
These problems, however, have afflicted the industry world-wide and,
although they perhaps have aggravated the situation, they cannot ac-
count for the fundamental problems the United States trades face.
Competition advocates, primarily the Department of Justice, con-
tend that the conference system has caused the industry's problems.
They argue that the conferences abuse their antitrust exemption by using
it to restrict market entry, discourage innovation, and price at the cost
level of their least efficient members.3' Conference proponents respond
28 See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 32-33. See also 129 Cong. Rec. S 1680 (daily ed., Feb. 24,
1983) (statement of Sen. Inouye); Hearings on H.R. 11878, Before the Subcomm on Monopolies and
Commercial Law, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of Albert
E. May, Council of American Flag Ship Operators) [hereinafter cited as House Judiciary Hearings].
But see id. at 7 (statement of John H. Shenefield).
29 See supra nn.19 & 26.
30 The technological changes in the industry consist of "containerization", which has affected all
modes of transportation and has contributed to the increasing use of intermodal transportation.
Prior to the 1960s, most goods were shipped as breakbulk, cargo which is loaded as single discrete
units aboard a carrier. Each transhipment required an individual handling of the goods. Container-
ization is a process where discrete units are consolidated into one container which can then be loaded
and unloaded as a single unit. Prior to the advent of containerization, as many as three days of a
ship's time could be spent in port loading and unloading. The containership, in contrast, spends
only eight hours time in port, the rest being used more productively in actual transit. The disadvan-
tage of containers is their greater capital costs, which conference proponents cite as a justification of
rationalization. Unlike these commentators, the General Accounting Office argues that the current
nature of the United States shipping trade merely reflects the industry changes which follow natu-
rally from the new technology. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 12; see supra note 26. See also
Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the Container Revolution, I J. MAR. L. & COM. 203
(1970); Tombari, Trends in Oceanborne Containerization and its Implications for the U.S. Liner In-
dustry, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 311 (1979); Agman, supra note 1, at 42.
Several legislative proposals have been introduced and enacted addressing the problem of Soviet
Bloc "controlled carriers". The most recent legislation was the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-483, which gave the Federal Maritime Commission authority to review and disapprove tariffs
of controlled carriers if they cannot cost justify their rates. See Remarks of Comm. Leslie Kanuk
before the Propeller Club, Port of Baltimore, Jan. 10, 1979, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 601, 603-07
(1979); Zerby, Ellsworth, & Schmitt, Dumping of Non-factor Services" Some Implications of Recent
Experiences With Controlled Economy Shipping, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 37 (1982). This authority
is continued in the Shipping Act of 1984. See 46 U.S.C. § 808 (Supp. 1984). Additional legislation
aimed at alleviating some industry problems include the Shipping Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-25, 93 Stat. 71 (1979). See generally Comment, The Sinking Shipping Industry, supra note 1,
at 112-13.
31 See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (statement of James C. Miller III, Chair-
man, Federal Trade Commission); Regulatory Reform Hearings supra note 26, at 187 (statement of
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that the industry's high fixed costs and the open conference system have
created the industry's problems, because this system allows other trades
to "dump" their surplus capacity into the United States trade, thus caus-
ing overtonnaging and inefficiency. Rationalization through strong con-
ference cohesion is difficult to achieve because limited member
conferences are not permitted. In addition, conference proponents argue
that the shipper loyalty and conference cohesion practices permitted by
the Shipping Act are insufficient for true rationalization.
32
Despite this inability to consistently attribute root causes, commen-
tators have uniformly cited the performance of the Federal Maritime
Commission as a major factor contributing to the industry's decline.
Pro-competition advocates criticized the agency for inadequate supervi-
sion of the industry for anticompetitive abuses and for what they claim
John R. Arwood); see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 10, which argued that the
United States North Atlantic trade consisted not of different conferences but of one superconference
acting in a collusive manner. This allegation was reinforced by a plea of nolo contendre by several
major liner corporations in June of 1979. United States v. Atlantic Container Lines, Crim. No. 79-
00271 (D.D.C. file 1979). A copy of the grand jury indictment is reprinted in Hearing on S.47 and
S.504 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-87 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Judiciary Hearing] (attachment to testimony of Thomas E. O'Neill, National Association of
Beverage Importers). See also In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). However, the attitude of the Department of Justice may be different under the
Reagan Administration. See Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 49 (statement of Rep.
McCloskey). But see 129 CONG. REc. S1576 (daily ed., Feb. 23, 1983) (statement of Sen. Metzen-
baum). See also House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 6 (statement of John H. Shenefield);
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28 (statement of the National Association of Beverage
Importers).
32 GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 8-9. For example, the Booz ALLEN REPORT'S explanation
for the difference in shipping rates was that marginal revenue costs had to be compensated for by
higher rates because liner trade ships must sail at a 50-60 percent capacity rather than the 80 percent
capacity achieved in most other trades. This lack of efficiency arguably was a result of the ocean
conference system, which inhibited rate setting practices utilized in other trades and the existence of
shippers' councils in other countries. (Currently, there are 360 conferences world-wide with 120 in
the U.S. trades.) Booz ALLEN REPORT, supra note 21, at I-1, 1-3. There are, however, opposing
viewpoints as to the reasons for rate differentials. For example, the Department of Justice disputed
the Booz ALLEN REPORT conclusion that the rate differential was based on an open conference
system. Instead, the report attributed the differential to the differences in the value/density charac-
teristics of the cargo in the United States export trade as opposed to the import trade. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, STAFF STUDY OF Booz, ALLEN, & HAMILTON STUDY ON OCEAN RATE
DISPARITY, reprinted in Omnibus Hearings, Vol. I, supra note 21, at 195-208 [hereinafter cited as
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STUDY]. Similarly, an argument has been made that rate differentials
reflect an overall different conceptual approach to export trading by competitors, not a difference in
the operating characteristics of the United States industry. Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note
26, at 480 (statement of Richard A. French, Proctor and Gamble). See also Bennathan & Walters,
supra note 6; Ellsworth, Competition or Rationalization in the Liner Industry?, 10 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 497 (1979); Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 1-6 (statement of Sen. Gorton); H.R. REP. No.
53, Pt. I, supra note 3, at 7.
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was its pro-approval posture in reviewing conference agreements.33
Some of these criticisms may be structural, however, inasmuch as the
Commission's statutory powers are weak compared to those of domestic
regulatory agencies. Moreover, the Commission has been frustrated in
its investigatory functions by the enactment of blocking statutes by other
countries, which, among other things, have limited the Commission's
ability to exercise its subpoena powers. 34 Indeed, pro-conference advo-
cates argued that these limits on the FMC's powers resulted in a dispro-
portionate enforcement of United States laws against United States flag
carriers by both the FMC and the Department of Justice. This discrimi-
natory enforcement, coupled with an inefficient and lengthy FMC ap-
proval process, allegedly inhibited United States flag carriers from
implementing rationalization agreements because they feared that they
might violate United States antitrust laws and thus weaken their ability
to compete with other members of the trade who might be protected by
favorable legislation in their home countries. As would be expected, con-
ference advocates suggested that a strengthened antitrust exemption for
conference activities might resolve this problem.35
An additional external event which will have a continued influence
on United States policy in regulating the conference systems is the world-
wide trend toward either closed conferences or bilateral trade agreements
33 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 10; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE
REvIEw OF ANTTrRUST LAWS, Ch. 13, supra note 11, at 278; Hearings on S.47 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1983) (statement of
Prof. George Garvey) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. See House Judiciary Hearings supra
note 28, at 8-9 (statement of National Association of Beverage Importers).
34 The FMC has experienced most of its enforcement problems in subpoena and discovery ac-
tions against foreign based liners. This has not been limited merely to shipping matters, but applies
to related antitrust activities as well. For example, the British have enacted the "Clawback Act of
1980". To date, twelve countries have enacted blocking statutes against FMC subpoenas. Omnibus
Hearings, vol. I, supra note 21, at 404 (statement of National Maritime Council). Also see Regula-
tory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 14 (statement of Peter Luciano, Executive Director, Trans-
portation Institute); 129 CONG. Rc. S1676-77 (daily ed., Feb. 24, 1983) (statement of Sen. Gorton);
S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 7-9; Gordon, Extraterritorial Application of US. Economic Laws:
Britain Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAW. 151 (1980); Note, Shortening the Long Arm of American
Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. REv. 213,
268-72 (1982); Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for
Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 201, 208-09 (1982).
35 S. REp. No. 3 supra note 2, at 6-11; 129 CONG. REc. S1487 (daily ed., Feb. 22, 1983) (state-
ment of Sen. Gorton); SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1982, S. REP. No. 414, 97th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 414]; See James, Rebating on the High Seas, 47 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 174 (1974); Fitzsimmons,
Antitrust and the Shipping Industry: Interpretation of the Shipping Act of 1916, 12 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L
L. & POL. 115 (1979). But see GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at iv, 16; House Judiciary Hearings
supra note 28, at 10 (statement of Prof. George Garvey).
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which impose a cargo preference scheme on a trade.36 Developing na-
tions have adopted the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Confer-
ences, which became effective on October 6, 1983 and contains a 40-40-
20 cargo allocation scheme.37 Under the UNCTAD Code, each trading
partner may reserve 40 percent of the trade's cargo to its flag carriers.38
The remaining 20 percent is allocated to third flag and independent carri-
ers.3 9 The United States has refused to endorse the Code under the doc-
trine of free competition, but third world nations consider the control of
transportation costs to be crucial to the development of their export
based domestic industries. The EEC, which initially opposed the agree-
ment, ratified it in 1982, thus implementing the document on a world
wide basis.' One potential effect of the implementation of the
UNCTAD Code may be that the surplus tonnage precluded from a 40-
40-20 trade will gravitate primarily toward the United States and the
remaining open conference trades. Thus, the overtonnaging situation
which currently exists may be aggravated while the potential markets for
United States flag carriers may become more limited.41
The Shipping Act of 1984 responds to these varied pressures. The
Act is procedural in nature and does not represent a major shift in regu-
latory philosophy. Rather, the Act is a compromise between confer-
ences, shippers, and pro-competition advocates.42 The Act retains the
open competition system, but eliminates the 1968 Svenska presumption
against conference agreements.43 Under the new Act, (modelled upon
36 Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 312 (statement of Peter Luciano, Executive Director,
Transportation Institute); H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 3, at 6-8; Lopatin, The UNCTAD Code of
Conduct for Liner Conferences." Time for a United States Response, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 355, 356
(1981).
37 See note 27.
38 UNCTAD, A Code of Conduct for the Liner Conference System, at 23, TD/O4/Rev. 1
(1972).
39 Id.
40 See Council Regulation E.E.C. No. 954/79 of May 15, 1979. "When a sufficient number of
EEC member states have signed and ratified the convention, the criteria of 25 percent of world liner
tonnage as of 1973 will be satisfied, so as to bring the Code into effect." McIntosh, Antitrust Impli-
cations of Liner Conferences: Alternatives to the Regulation of Liner Trades with Emphasis on the
European Approach, 1980 LLOYDS M.L.J. 139, 143; Bredimas, The Common Shipping Policy of the
EEC, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 9, 29-30 (1981); Rose, New Lines for Conference Lines, 1982
LLOYD'S M. & COMM. L.Q. 636 (1982); See supra note 36, and House Judiciary Hearings, supra note
28, at 8 (statement of Peter Klein, Sea-Land Industries).
41 Lopatin, supra note 26; Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 169 (testimony of Peter
Finnerty, Sea-land Industries).
42 130 CONG. Rac. H1292 (daily ed. Mar. 6 1984) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi).




the pre-merger notification provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act),'
conference agreements are effective forty-five days after filing with the
FMC, unless the Commission determines that the agreement is "likely,
by a reduction in competition, to produce an unreasonable reduction in
transportation service or an unreasonable increase in transportation
cost."'45 In addition, the Commission may no longer disapprove of such
agreements but must instead seek injunctive relief in federal court."
Such authority rests exclusively with the FMC. Third parties, including
the Department of Justice, are not entitled to intervene in the initial pro-
cedural process without Commission approval.4 7
These procedural changes create a presumption in favor of confer-
ence agreements.48 The activities permitted under such agreements, such
as price fixing, revenue pooling, and deciding to "control, regulate, or
prevent competition," remain substantially the same as those permitted
under the Shipping Act of 1916.49 Such activities are immunized from
the antitrust laws if they are specifically authorized by an agreement or
undertaken or entered into with "a reasonable basis to conclude" that
(a) they are entered into pursuant to an agreement on file with the FMC
and in effect when the activity took place, or (b) they are within the class
of agreements exempted by the FMC from the filing requirements of the
Act." Certain enumerated activities, however, are prohibited by the
Act. The prohibited activities include: engaging in group boycotts and
predatory practices; 51 engaging in certain forms of rebating and unjust
44 CONFERENCE REPORT, SHIPPING Acr OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 600, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30
1984) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 600].
45 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C.S. § 6 (g) (Supp. 1984).
46 1CL § 6(h); see, H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 31-37.
47 H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 32. Id. at 32.
48 This is accomplished by putting the burden of proving unreasonableness on the Commission.
In determining whether conference agreements have anticompetitive effects, the Commission is in-
structed to give limited weight to the market shares of the parties participating in the concerted
action, to consider competition from other transportation modes, and to balance anticompetitive
effects against any benefits resulting from the contested action, such as an increased trade advantage
for the United States. The Conference Committee noted that anticompetitive effects will exist only if
the net result of the agreement "will be an unreasonable increase in costs to shippers, or an unreason-
able reduction in the frequency or quality of service available to shippers." Although the Committee
Report states that "unreasonable" is to be regarded in a "commercial context," it does not impose a
per se condemnation of any proposed conference activity, nor does it authorize the FMC to engage
in a type of public utility rate making analysis. Included in possible benefits of such agreements are
such factors as the carriers' ability to meet competition, problems of rate instability and over-capac-
ity, issues of United States foreign policy and comity, and any efficiency-creating aspects of the
agreement. L at 33-37; see also 130 CONG. REc. S1572 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984) (remarks of Sen.
Gorton).
49 46 U.S.C.S. § 4(a)(6) (Supp. 1984).
50 Id § 7(a)(2).
51 L § 10(c)(l)-(4).
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and unfair discrimination;52 giving unreasonable or undue preference or
advantage to particular persons, localities, or description of traffic or sub-
jecting them to any unreasonable refusals to deal;13 and retaliating
against any shipper because the shipper has patronized another carrier or
filed a complaint.
54
Technically, the Sherman Act could be invoked if a prohibition
against a concerted boycott or predatory action were violated. The Ship-
ping Act of 1984, however, gives the Federal Maritime Commission pri-
mary jurisdiction to enforce all of its provisions." Consequently, the
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission may not investi-
gate or prosecute antitrust violations that are prohibited by the Shipping
Act without first clearing their action with the FMC. The Conference
Committee's report clearly states that "antitrust agencies would become
involved only in cases where an enforcement vacuum has occurred."56
In addition, private parties are precluded from bringing antitrust actions
for conduct prohibited by the Act. Instead, complaints for a violation of
the Act may be filed with the Commission, which will investigate the
complaint and may award reparations for actual injury and, in some in-
stances, may award double damages.5 The Commission also may assess
civil penalties for violations of the Act.58
Several new provisions were added to the Shipping Act of 1984 in an
effort to compensate shippers for the greater certainty and immunity
from the antitrust laws which the Act conferred on the conferences.59
First, the Act provides that the conference system will remain open and
that conference members are entitled to a right of independent action on
filed conference rates. This right of independent action will allow confer-
ence members to remain flexible.6 ° Second, the act permits conferences
52 Id. § 10(b)(1)-(4).
53 Id. § 10(b)(1)-(14).
54 Id. § 10(b)(12).
55 130 CONG. REC. S1574(daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Gorton).
56 H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 28-29.
57 Id. 46 U.S.C.S. § 11 (Supp. 1984).
58 Penalties for violations of the Act may not exceed $5,000 for each violation unless the viola-
tion was wilfully and knowingly committed, in which case the amount of the civil penalty may not
exceed $25,000 for each violation. Each day of a continuing violation constitutes a separate offense.
In addition, for violations of certain provisions of the Act, the Commission may suspend a common
carrier's tariffs, or right to use tariffs, for up to twelve months. A common carrier acting under a
suspended tariff is subject to an additional penalty of up to $50,000 for each shipment. Id § 13(c).
59 130 CONG. REc. S 1573-74 (daily ed., Feb. 23, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Gorton).
60 46 U.S.C.S. § 5(b)(8) (Supp. 1984) provides that all conference agreements must allow mem-
bers of the conference to take independent action on any rate or service item required to be filed in a
tariff under section 8(a) of the Act upon not more than ten calendar day's notice to the conference.
Under the Shipping Act of 1916, there was no right of independent action for members of confer-
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and shippers to enter into service contracts, which must be filed with, but
need not be approved by, the Federal Maritime Commission. 61 Third,
the Act entitles shippers to form and participate in shippers'
associations.6 2
These shippers' protections were designed so that shippers might
utilize service contracts to obtain rate and service stability from the con-
ferences. The Act, by ensuring a right of independent action in tariff
rates, arguably permits shippers to force conference members to deviate
from established tariff rates. Whether this right will be exercised remains
to be seen, but it is interesting to note that Congress did not confer a
similar right to shippers in regard to service contracts. Instead, confer-
ences can prohibit their members from entering into individual service
contracts with shippers.63 Thus, the 1984 Act gives conferences ultimate
control over the one major tool given to shippers to negotiate more
favorable shipping terms. This is a major defect in the Act.
Ultimately, the Shipping Act of 1984 must be viewed as an interim
measure. It has addressed two of the major concerns of the conferences:
uncertainty of their status under the antitrust laws and regulatory delay
at the FMC. The Act does not, however, fully address the fundamental
issues in United States liner conference policy: whether open or closed
conferences should be authorized in the U.S. trades and the prevention of
overcapacity of the trades in a world governed by the UNCTAD Code of
Conduct and bilateral national cargo reservation agreements. The Ship-
ping Act of 1984 has recognized that these basic policy issues have not
been resolved and has authorized the creation of a Presidential Advisory
Commission on Conferences in Ocean Shipping which, in conjunction
ences, but there was a right of independent action for conferences participating in interconference
agreements. 46 U.S.C. § 814. The right of independent action has long existed for members of
domestic transportation rate bureaus. Generally, it is perceived as a cartel-destabilizing tool. See 49
U.S.C. § 10706(a).
61 46 U.S.C.S. § 8(c) (Supp. 1984). A service contract is defined as "a contract between a ship-
per and an ocean common carrier or conference in which the shipper makes a commitment to pro-
vide a certain minimum quantity of cargo over a fixed time period, and the ocean common carrier or
conference commits to a certain rate or rate schedule as well as defined service level-such as, as-
sured space, transmit time, port rotation, or similar service features." Id. § 3(21). It should be
distinguished from the dual rate contracts permitted under section 14(b) of the Shipping Act of 1916
(46 U.S.C. § 813(b), now repealed) and loyalty contracts (contracts by which a shipper obtains lower
rates by committing all or a fixed part of its cargo to a carrier or conference) which are permitted
only to the extent allowed by the antitrust laws. Id. § 3(14), § 10(b)(9), § 20(a).
The Federal Maritime Commission has proposed that service contracts include time-volume
and time-revenue contracts, but has taken the interesting position that loyalty contracts should be
rejected as per se violations of the new Shipping Act unless the parties also file a Department of
Justice Business Review Letter of approval when filing the loyalty contract with the Commission.
62 46 U.S.C.S. § 3(24) (Supp. 1984); see infra nn.179-89 and accompanying text.
63 46 U.S.C.S. § 4(c)(7) (Supp. 1984); H.R. RaP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 29-30.
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with the Federal Maritime Commission, the Department of Justice, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Transportation, will
provide recommendations to the Congress in 1990 for further regulatory
reform of the industry."4 This Commission will study two fundamental
issues: whether the liner conference system should be strengthened even
further and whether the protections afforded shippers by the new regula-
tory scheme are adequate." This latter topic is the subject of the rest of
this article.
II. STRENGTHENED CONFERENCES AND THE PROTECTION OF
SHIPPERS' INTERESTS: THE CONCEPT OF SHIPPERS'
COUNCILS
The current condition of the United States shipping trades and the
recent decline in United States exports, made it imperative that changes
be made in United States regulation of liner shipping. Recently, Con-
gress considered proposals which tended to strengthen the conferences'
antitrust exemption, allow closed conferences, or both.6 6 These bills,
64 46 U.S.C.S. § 18 (Supp. 1984). The Advisory Commission itself will be created in 1989. The
federal agencies involved in the Commission's report are authorized to collect data as of the date of
enactment of the 1984 Act.
65 H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 42-44.
66 The 95th through 98th Congresses saw the introduction of proposed legislation which would
authorize closed conferences and shippers' councils. None of the proposals passed both Houses of
Congress, although S.2585 passed the Senate during the 96th Congress, an H.R. 4374 passed the
House during the 97th Congress.
Extensive reference is made to legislative materials related to these earlier bills. This informa-
tion remains relevant because the earlier bills also addressed the same issues that S.1593 and H.Rt
4374 were designed to resolve. Indeed, H.R. 4374 had its genesis in the provisions of H.R. 11422
and H.R. 4769. The latter was reintroduced as H.R. 6899. HousE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON H.R. 4374, H.R. REP. No. 611, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 611]. Similarly, S. 1593 arose from S.1460, S. 1462, and S. 1463,
which had been revised as S.2585, which passed the Senate but failed to pass the House (as H.R.
4769, H.R. 6899). Senator Inouye subsequently introduced an essentially identical bill, S.125, built
upon the same principles. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 13-14; 130 CONG. REc. H1291 (daily
ed., Mar. 6, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi).
The chronology of the bills is as follows:
Senate Bills:
S.1460, S.1462, S.1463, 96th Cong., Ist. Sess. (1979);
S.2585, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1980);
S.125, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as the Inouye Bill];
S.1593, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as the Gorton Bill];
S.47, S.504, 98th Cong., 1st Sess (1983).
House Bills:
H.R. 11422, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as the Closed Conference Bill];
H.R. 4769, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as the Omnibus Bill];
H.R. 6899, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
H.R. 4374, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as the Regulatory Reform Bill].
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save for the Shipping Act of 1984, failed to pass both houses of the Con-
gress, primarily because of the traditional American anathema to con-
centrated power and because of the accompanying fear that conferences
may abuse their oligopoly power to injure competitors and discriminate
against small shippers.67
Shippers' councils have been proposed as a means of restricting con-
ference power in the United States.6" These councils, which already exist
in over 50 countries, are generally associated with the closed conference
system of regulation, although there has been some recent discussion of
creating them in order to assist in the rationalization of open confer-
ences.69 Essentially, shippers' councils are composed of a group of ship-
pers who deal with liner conferences on a collective basis. The British
Royal Shipping Commission of 1911 first recommended using shippers'
councils as a method of offsetting the power of liner conferences.70 More
67 128 CONG. REc. H6905 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1982) (statement of Rep. Edwards); Id. at H6908
(editorials of the Washington Post, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal); See H.R. REP. No.
53, supra note 3, at 76 (additional views of Congressmen Hughes and Sawyer).
68 See S.47, see. 7(d); 129 CONG. REc. S1779, (daily ed., Feb. 28, 1983) (comments of Sen.
Gorton); Comment, The Sinking Shipping Industry, supra note 1, at 116, 128-29.
69 Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 52 (statement of Rep. MeCloskey).
70 United Kingdom Commission on Shipping Rings, No. 4668, 4685 (1909). See Closed Confer-
ence Hearings, supra note 22, at 233 (statement of Bengt Jobin, European National Shippers' Coun-
cil); Fawcett and Nolan, supra note 19, at 541 n.13. Other methods of countering conference power
include central booking agencies, government agencies, bilateral trade agreements, and export trad-
ing companies. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Protection of Shipper Inter-
ests, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/174 (1978) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper
Interests].
A central booking agency is an agency which exclusively consolidates and allocates export ship-
ments as a sole national or regional exporters. It has apparently been successful in Sri Lanka but has
obvious inherent problems for an application in a country like the United States.
Government agencies could play three effective roles in increasing shippers' powers. First they
could continue to act under the current United States regulatory system, where the Federal Mari-
time Commission is authorized to review all conference agreements for potential abuses or injuries to
the United States economy and shippers. 46 U.S.C.S. §§ 5-6 (Supp. 1984). Second, the FMC could
act as a shipping investigation unit. The UNCTAD shippers' council proposals contemplate a
strong government unit which would investigate rates, trades, and general shipping conditions, and
provide shippers with this information to aid them in their shipping decisions. In a more radical
form this proposal contemplates a government agency which will actively intervene, negotiate, and
perhaps even dictate rate levels. See UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra at Part III.
Bilateral trade agreements between two countries are used to allocate market shares of a trade
to the flag carriers of the countries served by the trade. These agreements are an especially attractive
device for developing nations, some of whom, in the past, have unilaterally enacted cargo preference
laws, thus forcing the country at the other end of the trade to negotiate a reciprocal agreement.
Although critics of these agreements have opposed them on the grounds that they restrict free com-
petition, some studies have suggested that bilateral trade agreements result in more stable rates,
slower rate increases, and up to 25 percent lower rate increases than non-bilateral trades. With the
advent of the UNCTAD Code, the attractiveness of bilateral trade agreements may increase. See
Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 8 (Daschbach statement); Daschbach, Remarks
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recent proponents of the concept include the European Common Market
Nations and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment.7 Although UNCTAD has been particularly active in advocating
the creation of shippers' councils in developing countries, as part of a
comprehensive scheme to regulate conference power and develop export
industries, it has also been one of the most critical commentators on ex-
isting shipper council systems.72
The successful creation of a shippers' council will depend on both
the economic system in which it functions and the characteristics of the
country in which it has been formed. In theory, a council may be com-
posed of all exporters, or merely of those from a particular geographic
region or those dealing in a particular commodity.73 Similarly, these
councils may serve two possible functions. First, these councils may con-
sult with and inform liner conferences concerning shippers' service needs
and desired general rate levels. This model is best exemplified by the
European National Shippers Council ("ESC") and basically is an infor-
mation exchange system designed to aid conferences in their rationaliza-
tion efforts.74 Second, shippers' councils may serve to consult and
negotiate rates and services with the conferences. This model, predicated
on legal and economic theories similar to those of collective bargaining in
the area of labor relations and exemplified by a series of reports issued by
UNCTAD, recognizes and contemplates methods to offset abuses inher-
ent in a strong conference system.75
Before the Caribbean Shipping Association, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, (Oct. 23, 1979),
reprinted in I1 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 387, 393 (1980) (citing Department of Justice Report). See
generally MANALYTICS, INC., THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL SHIPPING AGREEMENTS IN THE U.S.
LINER TRADES (May 1979) (Report prepared for the Maritime Administration).
For a discussion of the role of export trading companies as a substitute for shippers' councils,
see section IV, infra. See also Letter from Alan Green, Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion, to Hon. Slade Gorton (Dec. 1, 1981), reprinted in Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 152 n.3.
71 Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 258 (statement of J.F. Muheim, European National Ship-
pers' Council); UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70; UNCTAD, Consultation
in Shipping, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/20/Rev. 1 (1967). In addition, similar concepts have been pro-
posed in the domestic transportation industries. See Popper, The Antitrust System: An Impediment
to the Development of Negotiation Models, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 283 (1983).
72 See UNCTAD Secretariat, The Effectiveness of Shippers' Organizations, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
C.4/154 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Effectiveness of Shippers' Organizations].
73 UNCTAD Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 16.
74 Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 252 (testimony of J.F. Muheim, European National Ship-
pers' Council).
75 Effectiveness of Shippers' Organizations, supra note 72, at 17. Analogous organizations en-
joying similar regulatory or antitrust exemptions exist in the domestic transportation industries. For
example, shippers who own rail cars which are leased to railroads may obtain an antitrust exemption
from the Interstate Commerce Commission to jointly establish and negotiate car hire rates with the
railroads. 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(5)(A) (1984); Shippers Equitable Compensation Action Committee,
365 I.C.C. 939 (1982). Shippers also may participate as "other persons" in truck and railroad rate
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A. The Strengthened Conference System
Deregulation in the liner industry means a reduced role for the Fed-
eral Maritime Commission, which until now has been primarily responsi-
ble for protecting shippers' interests.76 Unlike other transportation
industries, however, where deregulation means that application of the
antitrust laws will replace some of the functions previously performed by
regulatory agencies, in the liner industry deregulation means that there
will be a less active application of the antitrust laws. Although shippers'
councils ultimately were not included in the Shipping Act of 1984, recent
legislative proposals contemplated using them to substitute for the role
that the antitrust laws perform in the deregulated transportation indus-
tries.7 7 In order to understand how this substitution would occur, it is
necessary to examine the economic theory underlying the conference
system.
Proponents of a strengthened antitrust exemption for liner confer-
ences, especially advocates of a closed conference system, contend that
the nature of the industry is such that efficiency (or "rationalization"),
bureau discussions. Although not allowed to vote, they are permitted to have input concerning
rates. Similarly, shippers' associations may consolidate and arrange for joint shipments in order to
obtain volume discount rates without being subject to I.C.C. licensing regulations for freight for-
warders. See Popper, supra note 71. See also Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International
Buying Cooperation, 84 YALE L.J. 268 (1974); infra note 159; infra notes 169-179 and accompanying
text.
76 While the Federal Maritime Commission may protect shippers' interests in a general manner,
its effectiveness in protecting shippers in particular circumstances is uncertain. Although the Com-
mission is empowered to hear shippers' protests in specific cases, between 1975 and 1977, only 77
complaints were filed. Of these, the shippers' interests were upheld in 55 of these cases. Shippers'
fears of retaliation may explain why there has been only limited recourse to the FMC may be ship-
pers' fears of retaliation by the conferences. See 46 C.F.R. §§ 527; Letter from Richard Daschbach,
Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, to John Murphy, Chairman of the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Comm., Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 125. (Some commentators have
expressed concern that enactment of the streamlined provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984 will
aggravate this problem. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 12 (statement of Prof.
George Garvey)).
77 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 14-5 (statement of John H. Shenefield). Particular
emphasis should be placed on the reimplementation of the antitrust laws in the domestic surface
transportation industries. Concepts of economic competition have been embodied in recent deregu-
lation acts which promote individual contracts as opposed to tariffs and rate bureau agreements. See
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: A PROsPECTUS FOR CHANGE IN THE REGULATED RAIL-
ROAD FREIGHT INDUSTRY, (1978); Staggers Railroad Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980); Motor Carrier Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793
(1980); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). Nevertheless,
recent Congressional proposals, in spite of the domestic emphasis on competition as a means of
achieving transportation efficiency, have stressed regulatory reform in the shipping industry and
have suggested strengthening the conferences' antitrust immunity. H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note
66, at 20, Pt. 2; S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 9; See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at
2-3.
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including the reduction of surplus tonnage and lowered operating costs,
cannot be obtained without the coordination of efforts that only a limited
membership conference can achieve.7 8 They argue that due to the exist-
ence of actual or potential competition by independent liners the achieve-
ment of rationalization may occur without an accompanying danger of
monopoly concentration or pricing. Although liner capital costs are suf-
ficiently high so as to inhibit market exit, potential competition always
will exist because the liner capital costs are not so high as to preclude
market entry.7 9 Therefore, conference efficiency will have to be passed on
to the consumer, in this case importers and exporters, because a degree of
surplus capacity and potential and actual competition created by the pos-
sibility of market entry will require conference rates to remain at compet-
itive levels.80 Similarly, competition from independents will ensure that
conferences price at the level of their most efficient members and will
prevent the conferences from stifling technological innovation, since such
service innovation will be a major method of competition in a cohesive
conference system. 81
78 Essentially, rationalization is an euphemism for permitting cartel behavior. See House Judici-
ary Hearings, supra note 28 (statement of the National Association of Beverage Importers); see also
infra note 87. However rationalization of the United States North Atlantic trades has resulted in a
reduction of average vessels from 36 to 16, improved vessel utilization from 68 to 85 percent, a
corresponding cost saving of 200 million dollars, and a concommitant rate reduction of 28 percent.
UNIVERSITY OF WALES INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, LINER SHIPPING IN THE U.S.
TRADES 268 (1978). See also Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 202, 205 (statement of Dr. Henry
De La Trobe, Council of European and Japanese Shipowners Association). Some advocates of ra-
tionalization predict that it could result in a 25 to 45 percent rate reduction. Devanney, Livanos, &
Stewart, Conference Rate Making and the West Coast of South America, 9 J. TRANSP. ECON. 154
(1975). An earlier version of this study was cited in the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra
note 10, at 230-31. (See M.I.T. COMMODITY TRANSP. AND ECON. DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY,
72-1 TECH. REP. 67-69 (1972).) Other commentators cite opposing statistics which indicate that
conference routes may be responsible for rates which may be up to fifteen percent higher than rates
in equivalent non-conference routes. These commentators estimate that rationalization, as contem-
plated by S.47 and H.R.1878, may result in a twenty percent increase in rates, equivalent to a three
billion dollar a year increase in shipping expenses. 129 CONG. REC. S1489, (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1983)
(comments of Sen. Metzenbaum, citing testimony of Alan Ferguson, Chairman of the National Insti-
tute of Economics and Law). See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 4 (statement of James
C. Miller, III, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission).
79 Some conference proponents have cited these high exit costs as one reason for the destructive
price wars and state that they preclude conferences from achieving true monopoly power, since the
industry experiences an inelastic price demand for its services. Ellsworth, supra note 32, at 503-04;
see also Summary of UWIST Study Appendix D, Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at
396-97 (statement of Albert E. May, Council of American Flag Ship Operators).
80 Ellsworth supra, note 32, at 514-16; Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 401-03
(statement of Albert E. May, Council of American Flag Ship Operators). In addition to independ-
ents, it may also be argued that conferences face competition from tramps, other conferences serving
alternative routes, and from industrial carriers. See Comment, supra note 1, at 102.
81 See Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 277 (statement of John Evans, University of
Wales Institute of Science and Technology); But see id. at 30 (Department of Justice testimony).
Liner Conference System
6:373(1984)
Congress and UNCTAD in its Code of Conduct for liner confer-
ences have recognized the crucial role independent liners play in prevent-
ing monopoly pricing by conferences.82 Both houses of Congress
amended shipper loyalty contract provisions in the deregulation bills pre-
ceding the Shipping Act of 1984 to permit a greater percentage of goods
to be shipped by independents, while UNCTAD's 40-40-20 cargo reser-
vation scheme reserves 20 percent of each trade to independent, third flag
competitors.83 UNCTAD has expressed some hesitancy as to the effec-
tiveness of an exclusive reliance on independents as a check on confer-
ence power, however, and it has therefore actively endorsed the
formation of shippers' councils as complementing the use of independ-
ents.8 4 This hesitancy exists because there is evidence that competition
from independent liners may not provide an effective check on a strong
conference system. First, independents might set prices that are only
slightly below the rate levels of conferences.85 If this occurs, then ship-
pers will not benefit from conference efficiency because the conferences
will exercise price leadership for the independents at a near monopoly
pricing level. Similarly, if independents do follow conference rate levels,
then the conferences will have no incentive to set rates at the level of its
most efficient members, because the more efficient conference members
could utilize other tools to obtain market share and profits which reflect
their efficiency. Second, independents usually remain independent for
only a short period of time. Experience indicates that once an independ-
ent has obtained a share of the market, it will apply for and be granted
conference membership.86 Thus, independent liner competition may
provide only short term benefits.
The major problem with utilizing independent liners to ensure com-
82 See eg., H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 3, at 15-16 (independent action and loyalty contract
provisions of H.R. 1878); see also supra note 73.
83 For example, both S.47 and H.R. 1878 permitted the creation of loyalty contracts as part of
the proposals to deregulate and promote the rationalization of the shipping industry. In essence,
loyalty contracts are long term requirements contracts designed to tie a shipper to a particular car-
rier. S.47 passed by the Senate permitted these contracts to provide that 95 percent of all goods
shipped by a shipper tied to a loyalty contract had to be shipped through a particular carrier, or else
the contract was breached. 129 CONG. REc. S1830 § 7(a)(10) (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983). § 6 of H.R.
1878 was a similar provision. Several commentators have suggested that this figure is too high,
citing the recommendation of the British Shippers' Council that a 70 percent tying rate volume
would create greater assurances of independent carrier competition. House Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 28, at 6 (statement of James C. Miller, III); id. at 8 (statement of Prof. George Garvey);
see also supra note 73. The loyalty contract provisions (as contemplated by these bills) ultimately
were not incorporated into the Shipping Act of 1984.
84 See UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 7-8.
85 Id. at 33; Bennathan & Walters, supra note 6, at 111.
86 UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 33.
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petitive pricing by a conference system, however, is that the tools neces-
sary to ensure the level of conference strength required for
rationalization purposes may also give the conferences the ability to erect
market entry barriers, thus eliminating both potential and actual compe-
tition. According to the economic model currently favored by most na-
tions, conference stability and rationalization can be achieved only
through strong anticompetitive agreements which will bind members to
the conference and permit them to enter into strong ties with shippers.
87
Whether conferences bind shippers to them through service contracts,
loyalty contracts, or deferred rebates, strong shipper-conference ties may
effectively deter trade entry by independents. Accordingly, the argument
that strong conference power will not be subject to abuse because of com-
petition from independent liners may not be correct.
B. Consultative and Negotiating Shippers' Councils
Any legislation which strengthens liner conference powers must
contain a method for protecting shippers and conference competitors
from the concentrated oligopoly power of the conferences. However, any
system of protection will be primarily for small and medium sized ship-
pers88 because the conference proponents claim that rationalization of
the liner system can only be achieved through a system of price discrimi-
nation based on the volume and value of goods carried.89 It is generally
agreed that large shippers can effectively offset conference power on their
own, often to the detriment of weaker shippers to whom the conferences
charge higher rates in order to compensate for their contractual conces-
87 S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 11. The provisions of S.47 and H.R. 1878 provided the
most recent examples of rationalization tools. S.47, although not authorizing closed conferences, has
allowed conferences to fix rates, pool earnings, allocate market shares, limit volume, and engage in
preferential working arrangements. S.47, sec. 4. Conference agreements would have been automati-
cally effective forty-five days after filing, subject to suspension, review, and disapproval by the FMC
within 180 days of implementation. Disapproval would have occurred only if the Commission found
that the agreement failed to meet the membership and self policing requirements of the Act. S.47,
see. 5(b). Section 7 would have allowed long term shipper loyalty contracts to within a 15 percent
differential of other rates. See supra note 78 and infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text. With
the exception of the loyalty contract provisions of section 7 of S.47, these provisions basically were
adopted by the Shipping Act of 1984. See 46 U.S.C.S. §§ 5-6 (Supp. 1984).
88 SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 10; UWIST Study, supra note 79, at 399-401; H.R.
REP. No. 611, supra note 66, at pt. 1, 26, 28-29; House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 13
(statement of Prof. Garvey); see Bennathan & Walters, supra note 6, at 104, 110-15.
89 H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 66, at pt. 1; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 3-4
(statement of Alan Ferguson, National Institute of Economics and Law); Id. (statement of J. Patrick
Boyle, United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Association). Cf. Peippo, Developments in American Anti-
trust Law: Deregulation Under the Staggers Rail Act and the Implications for Canadian Railroad
Ratemaking, 27 MCGILL L. 504, 521-522.
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sions to the large shippers.9 " The protection of small shippers through
collective action of shippers' councils has been considered as a means of
offsetting this aspect of conference pricing.9 1 As previously mentioned,
these councils may either consult or negotiate with conferences in order
to protect their constituent shippers.
Negotiating and consultative shippers' councils may share certain
basic structural and functional characteristics. First, membership in the
council may have to be limited to exporters, because conferences have
demonstrated a tendency to refuse to deal with importers and there is a
greater risk of antitrust collusion if both the import and export trade is
under the control of one group.92  Second, a primary function of any
council will be to discuss service issues, including the frequency of sail-
ings, liner capacity, and surcharges, because stability of service and rates
may be more important to shippers than lower rates.93 To accomplish
this function some legal mechanism for the exchange of information
must be created. Third, a council must provide for both cohesion and
autonomy among its constituents. This cohesion would be reflected by
the topics discussed by the council and by the size of its constituency, i.e.,
whether it is organized on a national, local, or regional basis, as well as
whether the council is limited to a particular commodity or number of
exporters.94 In addition, a policy decision must be made as to whether
restriction on member size and on independent action by members will
be permitted. Finally, a council should operate under legal guidelines
which will protect non-members and members from discrimination by
90 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 3-4 (statement of J. Peter Boyle, United Fresh Fruit &
Vegetable Association); but see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 32, at 204 (suggests
that large shippers do not exercise countervailing power against conference rate setting). See also
infra note 235.
91 H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 66, at 26-27; S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 11-12; contra,
Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 31, at 39-40 (statement of Jay Angoff, Public Citizen's Con-
gress Watch).
92 Effectiveness of Shippers Organizations, supra note 72, at I, 7, 3. Although some shippers
have expressed their interest in a shippers organization which would deal with both the import and
export trades, Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 187-88 (testimony of Edwin A. Elbert,
American Importers Association), this same goal arguably can be accomplished by permitting na-
tional shippers at either end of a trade to meet and discuss shipping in that trade, thus leading to true
rationalization. Cf Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 256 (testimony of J.F. Muheim, European
National Shippers Council). In the past however, the Department of Justice has opposed similar
suggestions as being highly prone to anticompetitive abuses. Closed Conference Hearings, supra note
22, at 41 (testimony of Ky D. Ewing, Department of Justice).
93 S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 22-23; S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 9; Closed Conference
Hearings, supra note 22, at 195 (testimony of American Importers Association).
94 This would be facilitated by such provisions as section 5(f) of S.47 (as introduced) and sec. 5(f)
of S.1593. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 25; S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 30.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:373(1984)
council-conference activities.95
These basic characteristics are reflected in existing shippers' councils
but are not reflected in all of the recent proposals considered by the Con-
gress. Instead, congressional proposals which would create United States
shippers' councils have vacillated between the consultative and negotiat-
ing models.9 6 However, most proposals eventually reflect the more lim-
ited powers of the European Shippers Council consultative model
because of the political difficulties inherent in the creation of a strong
domestic shippers cartel.
1. The European Consultative Model
The European National Shippers Council ("ESC") is a consultative
group of fourteen regional (national) shippers' councils which meets to
discuss service and general rate issues.97 It consults as a single collective
group with three different types of organizations: with ports, with indi-
vidual liner conferences, and with the Council of European and Japanese
Shipowner Association ("CENSA").98 The ESC activities are non-bind-
ing on individual shippers. It permits individual shippers and regional
shippers' councils to negotiate their own specific rate levels. The ESC's
industry-wide effectivness is reflected in the nineteen joint recommenda-
tions with conferences that the ESC has entered into over the past dec-
ade.99 Common topics of agreement have included the creation of a
Code of Conduct; general service issues, including energy and port
surcharges; general rate levels; and methods of dispute resolution."
However, the ESC has been most successful at exchanging information
with conferences on cost data and financial conditions related to ship-
pers' service needs.101
The European Shippers Council has been less successful in obtaining
95 UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 33. See S. REP. No. 3, supra
note 2, at 35.
96 See S.47 as introduced (January 26, 1983) and as passed by the Senate (March 1, 1983), S.
REP. No. 3, supra note 2; S.1593 as introduced and reported, Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 7; S.
RP. No. 414, supra note 35; H.R. 4374 as introduced and as reported, Regulatory Reform Hearings,
supra note 26, at 4; H. REP. No. 611, supra note 66, at 1.
97 Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 252 (statement of J.F. Muheim). See generally, UNCTAD,
Consultation in Shipping, supra note 71, at 29-72.
98 Effectiveness of Shippers Organizations, supra note 72, at 8; see Omnibus Hearings, supra note
21, at 470-74 (statement of Robert Leggett, Joint Maritime Congress).
99 Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 237 (statement of Bengt Jobin, European Na-
tional Shippers Council); but see infra note 101.
100 Id. Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 256-58 (statement of J.F. Muheim).
101 Gorton Hearings, supra note 110, at 263 (statement of J.F. Muheim). However, even the
success of the ESC in this function should be questioned. Despite the 19 joint recommendations
entered into, only one half of the conferences have officially embraced the Joint ESC/CENSA Code
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a reduction in rates. Although a Booz, Allen, & Hamilton study suggests
that the ESC may be responsible for the rate differentials in the United
States trades, 10 2 a suggestion denied by the ESC itself,103 a primary criti-
cism of the ESC has been that it can not and does not perform a primary
shippers' council function and does not offset conference rate setting
power. 104 One report has concluded that the ESC has had no effect on
rate levels at all, attributing the rate differentials in the United States
trades to the different value of goods shipped in the import and export
trades. 105 Although part of this ineffectiveness may be attributed to the
fact that, until recently, the ESC concentrated on service issues, there is
also the possibility that the ESC cannot offset conference rates because it
is a broad based organization which has a non-binding relationship with
its members. 10 6  In order to obtain the size and the diversity of views
necessary to provide a broad basis of information to aid in conference
decision making, the ESC sacrificed both the group cohesion and nar-
rowness of interest necessary to negotiate rates effectively. Theoretically,
the ESC creates a situation whereby conferences will set rates in a realis-
tic manner which will ensure that ocean transportation rates will not
contribute to the decline of export competitiveness by providing a forum
for a full and mutual exchange of financial and cost needs. Nevertheless,
the fact still remains that some conferences refuse to consult with the
ESC and that in only one case in thirty nine, between 1975 and 1977, did
the ESC successfully oppose a general rate increase. 107
and Joint Recommendations. Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 238 (statement of Bengt
Jobin, European National Shippers Council).
102 Booz ALLEN REPORT, cited in Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 199-200.
103 Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 243 (statement of Bengt Jobin); see also infra
note 105.
104 Cf Effectiveness of Shippers Organizations, supra note 72, at 9, 12-13.
105 Department of Justice Staff Study, Analysis of the Booz, Allen, and Hamilton Study of Ocean
Rate Disparity, reprinted in Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 195, 204.
106 Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 263 (statement of J.F. Muheim); Closed Conference Hear-
ings, supra note 22, at 237, 239; cf. Effectiveness of Shippers Organizations, supra note 72, at 9, 12-
13.
107 Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 297 (statement of the Council of European and
Japanese National Shipowners Associations [CENSA]). CENSA cited this figure as a general sup-
port for the proposition that shippers' council are successful in negotiating rates. It argued that it is
now a generally accepted practice that conferences will substantiate claims for rate increases by
certified statements on cost increases supplied by independent accountants. In the same 1975-1977
period, 21 of the 38 other general rate increase requests made by the 26 conferences operating in the
non-United States trades were accepted in full. The remaining 17 requests were compromised, the
compromises ranging generally from 8 percent to 48 percent with an average of a 30 percent reduc-
tion in the requested increases. Id.
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2. The UNCTAD Negotiating Council Model
Consultative shippers' councils have been criticized for failing to
recognize the role that liner conferences play in inhibiting export devel-
opment.10 8 Although some of the recommendations for the negotiating
models were developed to assist developing countries in promoting their
export trade, the general provisions of a negotiating shippers' council
would appear to be relevant to a United States economy which is cur-
rently experiencing a trade deficit.109
The negotiating model of shippers' councils recognizes that
although large firms may not be inhibited by the fact that ten to twenty
percent of the total cost of a product marketed overseas is transportation
related, 110 smaller firms may be inhibited from entering into the export
trade because of high transportation costs. Its purpose therefore is to
assist small and medium sized shippers in achieving the economies of
scale necessary to negotiate specific rate agreements or to charter alterna-
tive modes of transportation in order to exercise bargaining strength with
conferences and to obtain lower rates.11 This negotiating strength will
be achieved through the consolidation of small volumes of shipments. 1 '
The aggregation of goods would give the councils the option of utilizing
conference volume discounts or independents and could be accomplished
either through the use of a single export brokerage house or through the
use of a strong governmental negotiating shipping agency. Both of these
approaches entail a governmental role, however, whereas the UNCTAD
council model contemplates the private formation of councils which
might be aided by a strong governmental investigatory agency which
would collect and disseminate industry information to councils and con-
ferences and would intervene in an effective manner when council-con-
ference negotiations become stalemated." 3
108 See supra note 104.
109 The deficit for 1983 was $69 billion. The United States merchandise trade deficit for the first
four months of 1984 stood at an annual rate of $126 billion. Washington Post, June 17, 1984, § G,
at 1, col. 4.
110 Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 171 (statement of George F. Avery, National
Industrial Traffic League); House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 8 (statement of John H.
Shenefield). Others have estimated ocean transportation rates as being eight percent of total export
costs, House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 3-4 (statement of Prof. George Garvey), and
between twenty to forty percent of the price of goods delivered overseas. Senate Hearings, supra
note 33, at 1-2 (statement of J. Peter Boyle).
111 UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 11-12.
112 Id., at 25-34.
113 Id. at 11-12. It may be that the shippers' council concept will not be successful without a
strong government intervention. One of the most successful councils, the Australian Council, is
predicated upon strong commodity based associations and an active government intervention in ne-
gotiations. UNCTAD, Consultation in Shipping, supra note 71, at 73-90; Closed Conference Hear-
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The negotiating councils model addresses two problems of closed
and strong open conference systems. First, the captive shippers issue is
resolved because economies of scale are created for the small shippers.
Second, the potential for monopoly pricing is reduced because the effec-
tive use of chartering independents by a shippers' council counters part
of the entry barrier problems inherent in a closed conference system. To
achieve these goals, however, a negotiating council must be composed of
a strong cohesive group of shippers. UNCTAD studies have concluded
that shippers' councils might have to be formed along commodity or re-
gional lines because group cohesiveness requires price adherence and no
independent action.1 4 Opponents of negotiating shippers' councils ob-
ject to this limitation on the composition of shippers' councils because an
economic requirement that a successful shippers' council organize only
where a strong mutual interest exists transforms the concept from an
information exchange to a cartel and presents a number of anticompeti-
tive dangers which may distort non-shipping markets. For example, a
shippers' council may be dominated by large shippers who act in a man-
ner similar to those carriers who serve as conference price leaders in a
trade, thus precluding any advantage of economies of scale to the small
shipper, since the negotiating power of the council may be dependent on
the leverage of the large shipper, who would act independently if the
council did not act in accordance with its needs.' 5 Similarly, a strong
negotiating council could utilize its power to discriminate against non-
members or utilize its anticompetitive powers against non-exporting
competitors in the domestic market. In addition, a shippers' council
might collude with conferences, and not negotiate rate reductions with
them. If this collusion arises, interconference agreements, third party
discrimination, rate rigidity, and the inhibition of technological innova-
tion will occur.
11 6
ings, supra note 22, at 215, 223-24; Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 126. See S.47, sec. 9(c) for a
Senate provision similar to this proposed provision, S. REP,. No. 3, supra note 2. See also infra notes
388-99; Davidow, supra note 75, at 287-91.
114 UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 7-8, 16-17; see also infra nn.157-
59 and accompanying text; infra nn.330-42 and accompanying text.
115 UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 22; H.R. REP. No. 611, supra
note 66, at 28; H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 3, at 20; Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at
249 (statement of Bengt Jobin, European National Shippers Council); 129 CONG. REC. S1779-80
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Gorton); House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 8
(statement of James C. Miller, III, Federal Trade Commission); House Judiciary Hearings, supra
note 28, at 14-15 (statement of John H. Shenefield).
116 See Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 30-31 (testimony of Ky Ewing, Dpt. Assist.
Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice); Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 147-48 (testimony
of Donald Flexner, Dept. of Justice); cf Davidow, supra note 75, at 276-78. See also infra notes 276-
338 and accompanying text.
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C. Past Legislative Proposals
Past legislative proposals have reflected these concerns about cohe-
sion and abuse,1 17 as well as the confusion as to whether negotiating or
consulting shippers' councils should be authorized. 18 In addition, the
potential for abuse has led to recommendations by the General Account-
ing Office that councils be authorized only in the context of a strength-
ened closed conference system and not in conjunction with an open
conference system." 9 In the midst of this confusion, it is generally
agreed that councils will require an antitrust exemption in order to be
created and negotiate with conferences. 20 This conclusion comes in re-
sponse to a uniform shipper complaint that the potential threat of anti-
trust enforcement has inhibited the development of shippers' councils.' 2
Although the validity of this argument is addressed infra, in section III
B, Congressional proponents of councils have adopted this as a funda-
mental aspect of their proposals.
The 95th through 98th Congresses have considered four basic forms
of shippers' councils. These proposals may be categorized as consulta-
tive, 122 negotiating, 123 small shipper joint venture, 124 and export trading
company modelled 125 shippers' councils. With the exception of the
amended proposals considered in the first session of the 98th Congress,
each version of the shippers' councils concept considered by the Congress
has revealed a uniformity of structure based upon a consultative ship-
117 See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 22-23; H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 66, at 33-34; S. REP.
No. 414, supra note 35, at §§ 12(a)(6), 12(b)-12(c); H.R. 6899, § 207(c) 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
H.R. REP. No. 935, supra note 11, at 7.
118 See S.47, § 4(c), as introduced, January 25, 1983, and as passed, March 1st, 1983; H.R. 4374
as introduced, August 4, 1981; reported from the House Merchant Marine Committee, May 10,
1982; and with House Judiciary Committee Amendments. H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 66, at 27-
28; See S.1593 as introduced, August, 1981 and Staff Working Draft Changes, January 28, 1982. S.
REP. 414, supra note 35, at 30.
119 GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 27; see also supra note 69.
120 H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 3, at 20; S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 22; H.R. REP. No. 611,
supra note 66, at 26; S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 29.
121 H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 66, at 26; see also Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 26
(testimony of Peter Ortiz, American Importers Association).
122 See H.R. 6899, §§ 206, 207(c), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 935, at 7, 24; See H.R. 4374, § 3
(as introduced) S.1593, §§ 4(c), 5(f) (as reported May 25, 1982); S.47, §§ 4(c), 5(f) (as reported
February 17, 1983), reprinted in Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 8-10.
123 See H.R. 11422, § 2, reprinted in Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 1; H.R. 4679,
§§ 203, 206-207, reprinted in Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 13, 17-20; S.125, §§ 102(23), 309,
reprinted in Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 42-112; S.1593, §§ 4(c), 5(d) (as introduced), re-
printed in Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 14, 16-17; H.R.1878, § 7(d) (as introduced, Mar. 3,
1983).
124 S.47, § 8(a)(9) (as passed), reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. S1830 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983).
125 H.R.4374, § 7(d) (as passed), reprinted in 128 CONG. REc. H6894-95 (daily ed. Sep. 13, 1982);
H.R.1878, § 7(d) (as introduced Mar. 3, 1983, and reported Apr. 12, 1983).
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pers' council model, but a hesitancy over the authorization of activities
which would be necessary tools for a negotiating shippers' council. This
hesitancy ultimately led the Congress to reject the shippers' council ap-
proach in favor of the more limited concept of shippers' associations.
L The Consultative Shippers' Council Proposals
The consultative shippers' council proposals are criticized primarily
because they provide weak antitrust immunity and because they permit
limited activity. The basic consultative shippers' council model consid-
ered by the past four Congresses is illustrated by certain provisions of
S.47 as introduced before the 98th Congress. S.47 would have permitted
shippers' councils to "(1) mutually consult and exchange information or
views regarding rates, charges, classifications, rules, practices, or serv-
ices; (2) agree upon common positions; and (3) consult and confer with
any ocean common carrier regarding general rate levels, charges, classifi-
cations, rules, practices, or services." 126
This authorization, while clearly contemplating that consultative
shippers' councils will provide a method of information dissemination
among shippers and conference members in order to permit a more in-
formed procedure for conferences to achieve a system of rationalization
which accounts for shipper input,1 27 fails to provide shippers' councils
with the legal tools needed for them to act upon the information obtained
by the councils.128 Instead, the shippers' councils members are appar-
ently left to act individually upon the mutually obtained information
when negotiating general or specific rates.1 29 There is a legal and eco-
nomic incongruity to this form of consultative shippers' council authori-
zation. While encouraging the development of common positions and
the exchange of information by shippers' council members through the
126 S.47, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(c) (1983).
127 S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 22; S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 29-30; H.R. REP. No.
935, supra note 11, at 70.
128 See Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 247, 248, 250 (testimony of Peter Finnerty, Sea Trans-
portation Committee of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce on S.1593).
129 Perhaps because of this potential exposure, the National Industrial Traffic League ("NITL")
has proposed the following alternative to a shippers' council mechanism. They have proposed that
an antitrust exemption be conferred on individual or collective groups of shippers to permit them to
participate in conference discussions. This exemption would be similar to the authority for shippers
and "other persons" to participate in domestic transportation rate bureau discussions under 49
U.S.C. § 10706(b)(2). Although the NITL's proposal would provide a forum in which shippers
could express their needs (and would arguably remove a need for federal regulation of 'shippers
activities), it would not provide the separate organizational structure whereby shippers could first
determine, on a collective basis, the position that they would present to the conferences. See Gorton
Hearings, supra note 10, at 233 (statement of Ralph N. Thayer, National Industrial Traffic League);
Popper, supra note 71; cf. United States v. Sugar Inst., 15 F. Supp. 817, 857-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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existence of an antitrust exemption, the consultative council legislation
refuses to permit council members to act on a collective basis to achieve a
negotiated basis for their common goals on conference rates and services.
Instead, individual council members are left in an uncertain legal posi-
tion as to whether they could act upon the information obtained from the
shippers' council in order to negotiate rate reductions and service
charges. The structural aspects of the consultative councils reinforce this
uncertainty. For example, most shippers' councils proposals have lim-
ited council participation to those shippers who have a direct financial
interest in the goods they ship. 130 In addition, these proposals provide
that membership must be voluntary and that members might act inde-
pendently.'31 Although the purpose of these provisions is to ensure that
shippers' councils do not abuse their antitrust exemption (these provi-
sions also arguably strengthen the councils' credibility with conferences
by ensuring that shipping concerns predominate the discussions),132 they
also clearly undercut the economic bargaining power that the councils
could achieve even on a consultative basis. Furthermore these councils
probably would not enhance the ability of individual shippers to achieve
countervailing power in their individual dealings with conference mem-
bers. 33 Given the voluntary nature of such councils, any shipper seeking
to utilize information obtained from a consultative shippers' council
would surely be inhibited by potential antitrust exposure arising from
allegations of collective group boycotts or conspiracies to restrain compe-
tition by those shippers who elected to not (or could not) participate in
shippers' councils, since the antitrust immunity of these councils merely
extends to the opportunity to "consult and confer."' 34 Thus, consulta-
tive shippers' councils created upon the authority contained in the con-
sultative council proposals would appear to be limited to exchanging
only the most general types of information, and there is a distinct possi-
bility that individual shippers would perceive the potential antitrust ex-
130 See S.1593, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(d)(1) (1981).
131 See proposed § 15(c)(2)-(3), H.R. 4374, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1981).
132 This prohibition also is intended to prohibit the participation of freight forwarders and other
middlemen in shippers' councils activities. See S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 28. By law, these
consolidators and forwarders of goods are not permitted to have a beneficial interest in the goods
they ship. The Shipping Act of 1984 changed the beneficial interest rule and permits these parties to
have a beneficial interest in the goods they ship. See infra notes 350-51 and accompanying text.
133 See Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 233 (testimony of National Industrial Traffic League).
134 See Letter, Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs,
U.S. Department of Justice, to Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House Committee
on the Judiciary (June 7, 1983), reprinted in REPORT ON H.R. 1878, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM.
H.R. REP. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1983) [hereinafter cited as McConnell letter]; cf Senate
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 31, at 38-39 (statement of Jay Angoff, Public Citizen's Congress
Watch); id. at 16 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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posure connected with these councils as sufficient justification for their
nonparticipation.
135
The membership inhibiting aspects of the consultative shippers'
councils proposals are further illustrated by the standards for Federal
Maritime Commission approval imposed on the councils by these bills.
For example, proposed section 15(c) of H.R. 4374 (as introduced) per-
mitted the FMC to confer an antitrust exemption on councils if those
councils, among other items,
(1) provide[d] a consultation process for the regular and orderly commu-
nication and exchange of information with conferences, for the resolution of
disputes, and for cooperation in curbing malpractices; (2) provide[d] rea-
sonable and equal conditions for admission and readmission; (3) provide[d]
that shippers [could] resign and rejoin the council without restriction or
penalty; . .. (6) prohibit[ed] members of a council from engaging in any
collective refusal to deal with any person; (7) prohibit[ed] discussion, agree-
ment, or concerted action by members of a council with regard to their
specific commodity rates, output, or marketing; and (8) prohibit[ed] the
council from routing or arranging for the transportation of traffic on behalf
of its members or from entering into any exclusive loyalty contracting dual
rate contract.
136
Indeed, even an individual with only a passing knowledge of the concept
of shippers' councils must question what purpose an antitrust exemption
could serve for the activity of a shippers' council organized along the
lines of H.R. 4374, as introduced, inasmuch as any activity by the mem-
bers of these councils would have to be of an extremely general nature in
order to avoid the prohibitions on collective group boycotts and the "dis-
cussion, agreement, or concerted action in regard to specific commodity
rates, output, and marketing."' 3 7 Aside from establishing a general set of
procedural rules (for example, perhaps a uniform bill of lading) and pro-
viding an umbrella under which shippers and conferences could ex-
change information that, in the domestic economy, only trade
associations could exchange, it is difficult to anticipate how such a coun-
cil's activities would escape an antitrust challenge. 138  Even the provi-
135 See Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 262-64 (answers of European National Shippers Coun-
cil to questions of Sen. Inouye).
136 H.R. 4374, § 3 (as introduced), reprinted in Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 8-
10.
137 Id. See Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 175-80 (testimony of Thomas E.
O'Neill, General Counsel, National Association of Beverage Importers).
138 See generally supra note 14. For example, of the four activities (discussion of general rate
levels, classes of rates, the influence of surcharges on rate levels, and the simplification of freight
bills) cited by the European National Shippers Council (ESC) as being ongoing topics of discussion
with conferences in the fall of 1982, Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 257 (testimony of J.F.
Muheim, ESC), only the simplification of freight bills would appear to present no potential antitrust
challenge, because although the ESC has advocated that specific rates be left to negotiations by
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sions which permit these councils to establish procedures to curb
malpractices (a device which proponents contemplated would create a
forum for initial shipper-conference arbitration of conference discrimina-
tory practices) would conceivably be open to challenge by noncouncil
members under a group boycott challenge. 139 Finally, it is difficult to
contemplate how members of a shippers' council could consult with con-
ferences over such a basic rationalization tool as establishing needed re-
gional service levels without potentially violating the prohibitions on
marketing and output discussions contained in the consultative council
proposals.' 40
2. The Negotiating Shippers' Council Proposals
The negotiating shippers' council proposals also conflict with United
States antitrust doctrine. 4 ' Although the provisions of most negotiating
council proposals avoid (by definition) the inherent conflicts of the lim-
ited consultative council proposals, these proposals in general have suf-
fered from a lack of specificity. The simplest form of negotiating council
is embodied in proposals which contain the same provisions as the con-
sultative shippers' council proposals previously examined, but which per-
mit councils to "consult and negotiate" as opposed to "consult and
confer."14 2 Some proposals discuss the concept in terms of "bargaining
with ocean common carriers," 4 3 but all sanction agreements approved
by the FMC which would allow the negotiation of general rate and ser-
vice levels.'"
individual shippers on commodity groups, it will be difficult to clearly delineate what constitutes a
general rate negotiation versus a specific rate negotiation. Even a general rate negotiation which
arguably could result in discrimination in regard to an individual shipper's specific rates would be
subject to the allegation of a violation of the antitrust laws.
139 The commercial resolution of disputes or industry malpractices is a major function of the
European Shippers Council model. One of the proposals of this function would be to eliminate
government intervention in the conference-shipper relationship, although the ESC advocates an ulti-
mate appeal and resolution of controversial decisions by the government. Gorton Hearing supra
note 10, at 257 (testimony of J.F. Muheim). However, without this right of government appeal, it
would appear that shippers' councils would still be subject to allegations of discrimination. See
supra note 17; See also Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 287-89 (testimony of John
Evans and Bernard Gardner, University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology).
140 See generally, Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, pt. I, at 536 (statement of Edgar A. Vier-
engel, New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry).
141 See supra note 123.
142 S.1593, § 4(c) (as introduced), reprinted in Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 14.
143 H.R. 4374, § 7(d) (Judiciary Committee version), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note
66, pt. 2, at 6.
144 H.R.I1422, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1978) ("negotiate"); H.R.4769, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 206(1) (1979) ("negotiate"); S.125, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(23) (1980) ("negotiation"); S.1593,
97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(c) (1981) ("negotiate"); S.47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c) (1983) ("negotiate
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These proposals, however, while resolving the economic issue as to
whether shippers will be permitted to develop a form of group counter-
vailing power, have often lacked the specificity as to the permissible ac-
tivity that would define the parameters of the shippers' council antitrust
immunity. While the proponents of these council provisions justify the
lack of specificity as being necessary to encourage a "free market" devel-
opment of different types of councils, 4 ' this deficiency has been per-
ceived by critics of councils as a broad umbrella which could potentially
justify anticompetitive activities. 14" Furthermore, council advocates ap-
pear to argue that the lack of specificity would inhibit council
formation. 147
While it must be admitted that some negotiating shippers' council
proposals have specified the types of issues that councils could negotiate
(for example, S.47, as introduced, authorized councils to negotiate and
enter into loyalty and service contracts with carriers, 148 and S. 125, a pro-
posal before the 96th Congress, conferred a presumption in favor of ap-
proval by the FMC on any conference agreements approved by a
shippers' council), 49 generally they do not reflect a total concept of the
regulatory scheme in which such councils will function. 150 In particular,
these proposals lack a concept of what the permissible parameters of ne-
time volume and service contracts"). None of these proposals, with the exception of S.47, as intro-
duced, would have permitted the councils to aggregate and enter into contracts for the shipment of
specific commodities. Supra S.47, § 4(c); see generally S. Rm,. No. 414, supra note 35, at 29. Simi-
larly, the proposals would not permit the negotiation of specific rate levels for specific commodities,
although some proposals, such as S.1593, did appear to contemplate the formation of councils on a
regional or commodity basis. Councils formed on a commodity basis, given the authority to "negoti-
ate general rate levels", arguably would have the authority to negotiate specific rate levels. Cf. S.
REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 30. Contra id. at 29.
145 Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 158 (testimony of W.J. Amoss, Jr., Council of
American Flag Ship Operators); cf. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 30.
146 Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, pt. I, at 417-18 (statement of W. James Amoss, National
Maritime Council); Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, pt. I, at 535-36 (statement of Edgar A. vier-
engel, International Traffic Committee, New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc); see
also Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 248 (statement of Peter Finnerty, Sea-Land Industries); cf
McConnell letter, supra note 134.
147 See generally Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, pt. II, at 455-75 (testimony of George F.
Avery and Frederic L. Wood, National Industrial Traffic League); Closed Conference Hearings,
supra note 22, at 173-74 (statement of George F. Avery, Jr., Export, Import, and Maritime Commit-
tee of the National Industrial Traffic League); H.IL 11422, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1978) (testi-
mony of Edgard A. Vierengel, International Traffic Committee, New York Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, Inc.); Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 271 (statement of American Importers
Association).
148 S.47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c)(4) (1983).
149 S.125, § 305(3), reprinted in Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 59.
150 This failure, while reflecting an uncertainty as to how shippers' councils will function in the
United States, also reflects an uncertainty as to the type of conference system the United States
desires to authorize. As stated in the General Accounting Office report, the closer the United States
405
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gotiating power are and what the government's role in regulating this
power will be.' While these bills appear to contemplate a system
whereby the Federal Maritime Commission would certify the areas of
negotiation where collective group action would be acceptable, the nego-
tiating council proposals have not clearly delineated a role for the Com-
mission outside that of what could be termed a certifier of shipper
"bargaining units," similar to the role of the National Labor Relations
Board in the labor law area.' 52
One commentator has suggested that a truly comprehensive negoti-
ating shippers' council proposal would be modelled on the system of la-
bor collective bargaining laws in this country, inasmuch as the concept of
shippers' councils is predicated upon a theory of countervailing power
which, in the United States, has only been sanctioned in the labor
laws. 153 For example, a system which consisted of conferences and nego-
tiating shippers' councils could impose a duty on conferences to submit
proposed rate and service charges to shippers' councils as mandatory
topics of negotiation, including a right of mandatory commercial arbitra-
tion by the FMC if a negotiating impasse were reached (recent proposals
merely required conference agreements to contain provisions to provide
for "consultation process" with shippers and with councils). 154 Simi-
moves toward adopting a closed conference system, the greater the need for shippers' councils be-
comes. GAO REPoRT, supra note 11, at 34-35.
151 See Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 264-74 (statement of American Importers Association).
152 See H.R. 1878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(d) (1983); supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text;
see also McConnell letter, supra note 134, at 42; Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 31, at 96
(statement of American Association of Exporters and Importers).
153 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-157; see also infra nn.155-99 and accom-
panying text; Letter from Donald L. Flexner, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, De-
partment of Justice, to Rep. John Murphy, Chairman of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries (Sep. 17, 1979), reprinted in Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 189, 192. But see Omni-
bus Hearings, supra note 21, at 455-56 (statement of Robert Leggett, Joint Maritime Council).
154 See S.47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ (5)(c)(4)-(6) (1983). Other proposals have contemplated a
mandatory right of final commercial arbitration by the Federal Maritime Commission, although
some shippers' council proponents, primarily those who contemplate councils as replacing the FMC
as the primary protector of shippers interests, have objected to these proposals. See H.R. 11422,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1978); cf Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 194 (testimony of
Edwin A. Elbert, American Importers Association). Other council proponents have opposed any
form of binding arbitration. See, Amoss, testimony, supra note 145, at 159. Although the labor laws
do not impose a right to final federal arbitration by a federal agency, they do strongly encourage
ultimate recourse to final, binding arbitration. In this context a statutory provision requiring
mandatory binding arbitration by a private source could accomplish the same goal. This arbitration
could be subject to FMC final review in order to ensure that all aspects of third party public interests
had been protected. See Labor Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf




larly, as under labor law case law, any authorizing statute could contain
provisions requiring conferences to reveal cost and financial data to ship-
pers' councils. 155 In time, the Federal Maritime Commission could de-
velop a body of case law in the role of final arbiter and certifier of shipper
council-conference negotiating issues similar to that developed by the
National Labor Relations Board.
156
Under this labor law analogy, a negotiating shippers' council would
need a mechanism to ensure group cohesion and membership adherence
to uniform bargaining positions. This could be accomplished by elimi-
nating some of the discretionary aspects of membership in a shippers'
council in a manner similar to compulsory participation in a union. An
example would be legislation that would permit council agreements
which contain no right of independent action or provide for a minimum
conference recognition time period before another council could be estab-
lished in a particular region or along certain commodity lines.'5 7 Provi-
sions such as these are several steps removed from the concepts of
shippers' councils that are embodied in even the strongest of negotiating
155 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967).
156 The labor laws also have developed a tripartite classification of bargaining topics: mandatory,
permissible, and forbidden. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958);
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). The
Federal Maritime Commission similarly could develop a body of case law designating mandatory,
permissible, and forbidden topics of discussion between conferences and shippers' councils, with the
initial foundation for categorizing the negotiability of a topic being the authorized and prohibited
activities of the authorizing legislation.
157 This concept is similar to the National Labor Relations Board's three year contract bar and
one year certification rules, whereby a certified representative bargaining unit union cannot have its
jurisdiction challenged by a rival union for at least one year (or three years in the case of an existing
contract) in order to allow the consolidation of union power and the strengthening of union bargain-
ing power. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (1951); Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 NLRB 927 (1947); NLRB,
THIRTY SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 50-52 (1972). But cf. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust
Policy, 95 HARV. L. Rv. 1521, 1547-48 (1982) for the view that similar organizations should be
allowed to exist only for a short time period in order to avoid potential anticompetitive abuses. This
cohesion could be achieved if the Federal Maritime Commission were to establish criteria for "bar-
gaining units" on a geographical or commodity basis, but with the units represented on a hierarchi-
cal basis with local, regional, and national (either one or several) shippers' councils. Presumably, as
the councils progressed from the local to the national level, the negotiating aspects of the shippers'
council would decrease while the consultative, information exchange aspects of the councils would
increase. This approach would not only facilitate the curtailment of possible antitrust abuses, but
also would enhance the power of regional or local councils to negotiate with conferences on the basis
of multiple trade conditions. See Closed Conference Hearings; supra note 22, at 223-224 (testimony
of Edgar A. Vierengel). This approach also would accommodate the views of a broad spectrum of
shippers. For example, in a survey of 130 shippers (48 responding), the National Maritime Council
found that 17% favored national shippers' councils, 35% favored regional councils, 17% favored
conference by conference councils, and 10% favored commodity based councils. Letter to Rep. Paul
McCloskey from C. William Neuhauser, National Maritime Council (Nov. 30, 1979), reprinted in
Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, vol. 2, at 139-42.
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shippers' councils proposals, such as H.R. 4769 of the 96th Congress.
158
Similarly, although all shippers' council proposals have been accompa-
nied by statutory requirements that conference agreements provide for
consultation with such councils, the proposals have fallen short of the
legal specifications needed to ensure rate negotiations, such as the
mandatory divulgence of relevant conference financial and cost data.
Nevertheless the Shipping Act of 1984, which will be discussed does
make it a prohibited act for conferences to refuse to negotiate with ship-
pers' associations." 9
3. Protection From Abuse of Power
Both the consultative and negotiating shippers' council proposals do not
contain adequate provisions for protecting against council abuses in the
domestic economy in a manner which would not inhibit council forma-
tion."6 Aside from limiting council membership to those shippers who
have a direct financial interest in the goods shipped and erecting vague
prohibitions based upon traditional antitrust doctrines, few shippers'
council proposals have stipulated the type of antitrust scrutiny to which
the councils should be subjected.161 There are two approaches to creat-
ing these safeguards. First, the anticompetitive activities that the coun-
cils could not engage in could be defined and then an antitrust immunity
for any other activity a council may engage in may be authorized by
158 H.R. 4769, as introduced, conferred an antitrust exemption on any shippers' council to "meet,
confer, and (1) negotiate with any ocean common carrier or conference regarding rates, practices,
and terms and conditions of service affecting ocean transportation; (2) exchange information with
ocean common carriers or conferences concerning traffic and transportation data; and (3) provide for
the analysis and distribution of (information)." H.R. 4769 §§ 201(15), 203, 206, 207(c), reprinted in
Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, pt. I, at 4-20.
159 See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 31, at 96 (statement of American Association of
Exporters and Importers). Some shippers' council advocates who have espoused the concept of
binding commercial arbitration of council-conference disputes have proposed a system of mandatory
council approval of proposed changes in conference tariffs and agreements. Proposed changes would
have to be submitted to councils accompanied with supporting data. Failure to reach an accord
would result either in binding commercial arbitration or in recourse to the Federal Maritime Com-
mission. See Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 174 (statement of George F. Avery,
National Industrial Traffic League); Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 265 (statement of Peter Or-
tiz, American Importers Association). Cf. Kintner, Romano, & Filippini, Cooperative Buying and
Antitrust Policy: The Searchfor Competitive Equality, 41 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 971, 983 (1973). The
Interstate Commerce Commission has similar authority to act as the final arbiter of car hire compen-
sation rates between shippers and railroads. 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(5)(B) (1984). See supra note 75.
Section 305 of S.125 presents the opposite side of this issue. Section 305 which would have conferred
a presumption in favor of Federal Maritime Commission approval of liner conference agreements
which had been favorably endorsed by all the shippers' councils operating in the affected trades.
S.125, § 305(3), reprinted in Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 59.
160 See generally Brodley, supra note 157, at 1538-52; infra notes 242-73 and accompanying text.
161 See infra notes 242-73 and accompanying text.
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statute. This approach reflects the approach of the consultative shippers'
council proposals, discussed above, which contained explicit prohibitions
on council activities and would arguably inhibit council formation under
a threat of antitrust litigation. 162 Second, those activities that a shippers'
council could engage in could be defined by statute and then a broad
antitrust exemption for any ancillary anticompetitive effects which were
merely incidental to the primary council function in utilizing conference
ocean carriage could be granted. 163 The acceptance of these domestic
ancillary effects would have to be universal, inasmuch as an effective
council, under a labor law analogy, would have to be able to represent
both importers as well as exporters, and be able to engage in group boy-
cotts, the aggregation of goods for volume shipments, and other activities
as an import-export broker.164 Despite an authorization of such ancil-
lary domestic anticompetitive effects, protection against anticompetitive
collusion not incidental to legitimate shipper council activities (either
among council members or between councils and conferences) could be
facilitated by legislative provisions that provide for tape recordings and
verbatim transcripts of all council meetings and provide for mandatory




163 See McConnell letter, supra note 134, at 42; Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, vol. I, at 157-
58 (statement of Rep. McClosky).
164 Again, a shippers' council system modelled upon the domestic labor laws can provide a basis
for the development of this antitrust immunity. Under the labor law exemption, collective bargain-
ing activities are insulated from the antitrust laws in two ways. First, a statutory exemption in the
antitrust laws (sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act at 15 U.S.C. § 17 & 29 U.S.C. § 52) excludes
labor from the definition of "articles of commerce." Second, a judicially fashioned antitrust exemp-
tion stipulates, in essence, that anticompetitive effects that are an ancillary result of the legitimate
primary activity of the negotiation of a mandatory bargaining topic will be excused from a finding of
an antitrust violation. See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steanfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors' Guild, 531 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). But see
Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1287, at 1349-52 (1982). A related
judicially fashioned antitrust exemption of this type is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Eastern Rail-
road President Conference v. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965). A recent regulatory statement of the general principle is contained in the Depart-
ment of Commerce guidelines for antitrust certification under the Export Trading Company Act of
1982. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Guidelines for the Issuance
of Export Trade Certificates of Review, 48 Fed. Reg. 15937 (April 13, 1983) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. § 325) (1984) [hereinafter cited as Certification Guidelines]. See Popper, supra note 71, at
318-24.
165 Provisions for mandatory arbitration, independent accounting procedures, and verbatim tran-
scripts of all council meetings have been proposed in previous shippers' council proposals. See H.R.
4769, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 207(c) (as introduced); H.R. 6899, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 207(c); see
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D. Recent Legislative Proposals
The proposals considered by the 98th Congress prior to the adop-
tion of the Shipping Act of 1984 represent the small shipper joint venture
and export trading company based concepts of shippers' councils
(although it could be argued that the small shipper joint ventures do not
truly represent the concepts underlying the shippers' council concept).16 6
Basically reactions to the conflict between the negotiating and consulta-
tive council concepts, these proposals also had their genesis in a per-
ceived ambivalence on the part of shippers as to their desire to form
shippers' councils. (For example, the House Merchant Marine Commit-
tee reported H.R. 4374 (97th Congress) without its shippers' councils
provisions, because it found that there was a greater shipper interest in
the creation of methods to strengthen individual conference-shipper ties,
such as loyalty and service contracts, than in the creation of shippers'
councils, which are essentially unknown entities that potentially may be
dominated by large shippers.)
167
also H.R. 11422, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.; Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, vol I, at 147-48 (testimony
of Donald Flexner, Department of Justice).
Similar self policing requirements also exist for conference agreements, 46 C.F.R. pt. 528; cf.
Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C.S. § 5(b)(4) (Supp. 1984), and, in the case of tape recorded tran-
scripts, the self-policing requirements are mandated by statute for the activities of antitrust exempt
rate bureaus in the domestic surface transportation industry (but not for the antitrust exempt activi-
ties of shippers in private car hire negotiations). 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(3)(D) (1982). See generally
Note, Self Policing of Ocean Shipping Conferences, 20 STAN. L. REV. 724 (1968).
166 S.47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(d); H.R. 1878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(d) (as reported from
the House Merchant Marine Committee).
167 H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 66, pt. I, at 28-29; McConnell letter, supra note 134, at 43.
Contra GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 26-27. The Justice Department has noted that this per-
ceived lack of interest also is reflected by the results of a recent survey of Canadian shippers' atti-
tudes towards their experience with the Canadian Shippers' council. According to this survey, "13.3
percent of the shippers interviewed indicated that they believed that the Canadian Shippers' council
had enabled them to obtain satisfactory cooperation from the conferences or conduct negotiations
more effectively. In contrast, 22.1 percent of the shippers reported that the shippers' council had not
helped them." (64.6 percent had no opinion.) Id., citing E.M. LUDWICK & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
SHIPPING CONFERENCES: SURVEY OF USERS' VIEWS, table 4.5 (1983). However, the Justice De-
partment's conclusion that there is a lack of shipper support for shippers' councils may be somewhat
ingenuous. First, Professor Garvey cites the same report to the effect that while 85% of the respon-
dents in the Canadian survey were dissatisfied with shipping services, 20% (half of those favoring the
continuation of the conference system) favored a strengthening of the shippers' councils. House
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 9 (testimony of Prof. George Garvey). Second, it is difficult to
reconcile the conclusion that there is limited shipper interest in the council concept with the fact that
the Justice Department recently issued a Business Review Letter for the creation of such a council in
the domestic economy. See Letter from William F. Baxter, Assist. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, to Daniel J. Sweeney (Jul. 19, 1983) (request of National Small Shipments
Traffic Conference for a Business Review Letter on a proposal to form a shippers' council in the
domestic transportation industry) [hereinafter cited as NASSTRAC letter.]. But see infra notes 293-
357 and accompanying text.
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1. S.47 Small Shippers Joint Ventures
The Senate response to these concerns, S.47, proposed that small
shippers (defined as those shipping thirty five, forty foot containers or
less a month) be permitted to form joint ventures in order to obtain the
same benefits that large shippers would receive in the use of the strength-
ened individual shipper-conference ties, e.g., the use of loyalty and ser-
vice contracts. 16 Although this proposal created joint ventures which
would be similar to the shippers associations recognized by the Shipping
Act of 1984, this proposal, even though it protected the interest of the
small shipper (which may arguably be one of the primary purposes of the
concept of shippers' councils), cannot be categorized as creating shippers'
councils, if such councils are defined as a system in which shippers and
conferences exchange information in accordance with a formal procedure
in order to accomplish the rationalization of a particular liner trade.
69
Furthermore, the S.47 proposal did not facilitate the exercise of counter-
vailing power that a negotiating shippers' council could achieve, because
under S.47 conferences still would interact only with discrete shipping
units, which would act without the benefit of mutual information (on an
industry or trade wide basis) necessary to properly evaluate markets and
conference bargaining power.' 70 Accordingly, S.47 preserved the current
system of competitive buyers dealing with a selling cartel. Although
small shipper joint ventures might have protected certain small shipper's
interests from large shippers' and conference market power, they would
not have accomplished the goal of using shippers' councils to achieve
conference efficiency.
17
2. H.R. 1878. Export Trading Company Based Models
A recent shippers' council proposal considered by the House of Rep-
resentatives opted for what may be described as the export trading com-
pany model of shippers' councils. This proposal contemplated a "free
market" development of councils, whereby the Attorney General would
168 S.47 § 8(a)(9), reprinted in 129 CONG. REC. S1830 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983). Non-discrimina-
tion is what underlies this provision. Small shippers often do not ship a sufficient volume to take
advantage of volume discounts represented by the long term tying agreements, such as service and
loyalty contracts. Although such contracts must be offered on an equal basis to all similarly situated
shippers, conferences would probably engage in price discrimination against small shippers in order
to give the large volume discount. Thus, the aggregation of small shipments protects the small
shippers from undue discrimination. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 22-24; 129 CONG. REC.
S 1779-80 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
169 See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text; see also infra note 384.
170 Id.
171 See notes infra 198-211 and accompanying text.
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have certified shippers' council activities, utilizing as certification stan-
dards the criteria of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 and the
Department of Commerce Guidelines promulgated to implement that
Act. 172 In essence, the proposal grafted the certification provisions of the
Export Trading Company Act onto the Shipping Act of 1916. Although
the concept of using export trading companies in lieu of shippers' coun-
cils as a method of achieving conference efficiency is discussed exten-
sively in section IV, infra, the export trading company-shippers' councils
proposals of such bills as H.R. 1878 (98th Congress) and H.R. 4734
(97th Congress) must be criticized briefly here, because the proposals
were essentially superfluous and misconceived. 173 First, this proposal did
not embody a well conceived regulatory scheme for the liner conference
system because it did not establish criteria for the creation of shippers'
councils in the context of specifically dealing with liner conferences, but
instead adopted by reference, a certification procedure which was devel-
oped in the context of the entire export trade. This proposal conceded
that certain small shippers had an interest in participating in shippers'
councils and not in export trading companies and that such participation
would require a separate certification procedure or guidelines within the
Shipping Act.' 74 Second, by placing this certification authority in the
Department of Justice, the House proposal would have transferred the
traditional duties of overseeing the liner conference system, and of pro-
tecting shippers' interests, from the Federal Maritime Commission to an
agency which historically has been opposed to antitrust exemptions in
the shipping industry and whose past activities in regard to liner confer-
ences were largely responsible for the new legislation weakening its role
in regulating the liner industry. It was for very similar reasons that Con-
gress placed the Export Trading Company Act certification responsibili-
ties primarily in the Department of Commerce, and it should therefore
be expected that the Department of Justice would inhibit the formation
of such councils. 175 Finally, H.R. 1878 limited shippers' council certifi-
172 H.R. 1878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(d).
173 See McConnell letter, supra note 134.
174 Id.
175 Cf. EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND TRADE SERVICES, SENATE
COMMITrEE ON BANKING, HOusING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS S. REP. No. 27, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess.
18-19, 22 (1981) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 27]. This expectation is buttressed by the Depart-
ment of Justice's refusal to make favorable conclusions in regard to three requests for Business Re-
view Letters for shippers' councils activities in both the domestic and foreign economies. See
Department of Justice Business Review Letters 77-9 (North African Western Freight Association-
American Beverage Importers); Id. at 77-13 (American Importers Association, Inc.); and NASST-
RAC I letter, supra note 167. See also Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, vol I, at 157 (statement of
Rep. McCloskey); text accompanying notes 253-63.
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cation to the export of goods, and excluded activities related to imports.
As a matter of bargaining power, this would have inhibited shippers'
councils' powers greatly (a fact recognized by the compromise provisions
of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, which permits certification
of both import and export activities).
176
The problems created by the Export Trading Company Act-based
proposed model of shippers' councils could be solved by transferring the
certification authority from the Department of Justice to the FMC and
by establishing some approval standards for council activities. 177 An al-
ternative would have been to rely exclusively on the export trading com-
panies certified by the Department of Commerce to achieve the same
goal. A more comprehensive analysis of this second alternative occurs in
the second half of this article.1
78
3. Shippers' Associations: The Shipping Act of 1984 Approach
Ultimately, Congress decided to look to the domestic transportation
industries to approach the shippers' councils issue. Under section 10562
of Title 49, shippers can join non-profit cooperative associations for the
purpose of consolidating and aggregating small shipments into large
shipments in order to obtain volume discounts in shipping their goods.
179
While these organizations have been recognized in the domestic trans-
portation industry for a number of years, no corresponding right existed
for the international shipment of goods. Under the Shipping Act of
1916, shippers' associations were regarded by the Federal Maritime
Commission as a "stepchild" with little or no rights, and certainly no
recognition, of their non-profit membership status. In the past, the Com-
176 See H.R. REP. No. 924, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2501, 2506 [hereinafter cited as H.1L REP. No. 924]. For these reasons, the House has re-
ceived testimony that it should allow export trading companies to assume the role of shippers' coun-
cils. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 21 (testimony of Prof. George Garvey). Some
shippers have stated that the provisions of H.R. 1878 are totally unacceptable to them because they
do not create a new authorization of countervailing power. Accordingly, they prefer S.47 as a ship-
pers' council bill, even though it embodies a very weak form of the concept. Hearings on H.R.1878
Before the Merchant Marine Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1983) (statement of National Association of Beverage Importers) [hereinafter
cited as Merchant Marine Hearings]; id. at 2-4 (statement of American Association of Exporters and
Importers). See infra notes 168-209 and 358-89 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
178 See infra notes 358-402 and accompanying text.
179 The associations are not common carriers, so, unlike freight forwarders, they are not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. They do not have to accept freight from
the general public, and they do not publish and file tariffs. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 70
(testimony of Ronald N. Cobert, American Institute for Shippers' Associations, Inc.); Southern Pa-
cific Transportation Company v. Continental Shippers Ass'n, 642 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1981); Metro
Shippers v. Life Savers, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J. 1980).
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mission required shippers' associations to file tariffs and act as if they
were non-vessel operating common carriers. 180 The Shipping Act of
1984 changed this status by specifically recognizing the legal status of
such organizations, although the Conference Committee was careful to
note that shippers' associations would continue to be subject to laws
other than the Shipping Act of 1984.181
By definition, under the Act, a shippers' association is "a group of
shippers that consolidates or distributes freight on a non-profit basis for
the membership of the group in order to secure carload, truckload, or
other volume rates or service contracts." '182 A shippers' association
therefore can negotiate service contracts and rates on behalf of its mem-
bers.'83 The Act also prohibits any common carrier from refusing to ne-
gotiate with such an association, although this does not necessarily mean
that the Act dictates that conferences and carriers must enter into agree-
ments with the shippers' associations.' 84 This prohibition, however,
when read in conjunction with the Act's prohibitions against group boy-
cotts and unreasonable refusals to deal, makes it clear that the Congress
intended to put shippers' associations on an equal footing with all other
shippers and that any carrier or conference pattern or practice of refusing
to deal or negotiate in good faith with a shippers' association would vio-
late the Act.'85 This provision alone assures the associations of some
bargaining power.
However, because the Congress failed to confer an antitrust immu-
nity upon shippers' associations, it is doubtful that it seriously intended
that such associations would assume the role of shippers' councils in ex-
180 Senate Hearings supra note 33, at 10 (testimony of Ronald N. Cobert, American Institute for
Shippers' Associations, Inc.) A non-vessel operating common carrier under the new Shipping Act is
"a common carrier that does not operate the vessels by which the ocean transportation is provided,
and is a shipper in its relationship with an ocean common carrier." 46 U.S.C. § 317 (Supp. 1984).
Under the Act, "common carriers" are people who hold themselves out to the general public to
provide transportation by water for compensation. Common carriers also assume responsibility for
the transportation from the points of receipt to destination and utilize vessels operating on the high
seas or the Great Lakes. Id. § 1702(6).
181 H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 27-28.
182 46 U.S.C.S. § 3(24) (Supp. 1984). A "shipper" under the Act is "an owner or person for
whose account the ocean transportation of cargo is provided or the person to whom delivery is
made." Id. at § 3(23). While a literal reading of this definition would permit NVOCCs and other
middlemen entities to participate in shippers' associations activities, an examination of the small
shipper joint venture provisions of S.47 and ICC decisons concerning domestic shipper associations
clearly indicates that this result was not intended by the Congress. See supra notes 168-71 and
accompanying text; Sunshine State Shippers and Receivers Ass'n-Investigation of Operations, 350
I.C.C. 391 (1975).
183 H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 28.
184 Id.; 46 U.S.C.S. § 10(b)(3) (Supp. 1984).
185 Cf H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 38-39.
Liner Conference System
6:373(1984)
ercising countervailing power against conferences. 186 Although the Con-
ference Committee did note that associations desiring antitrust
clarification of their activities could obtain Department of Justice Busi-
ness Review Letters and Federal Trade Commission Advisory Opinions,
there are serious problems with using this approach, especially in the
shippers' association context, as a means of developing countervailing
power exclusively in shippers."8 7 Nevertheless, the conferees also recog-
nized the availability of export trading company certificates of review for
shippers' associations, and, as discussed in section IV, infra, this ap-
proach, combined with the mandatory negotiating provisions of the Ship-
ping Act of 1984, creates interesting possibilities regarding the creation
of countervailing power in shippers in a manner similar to that of ship-
pers' councils."' 8 Accordingly, while it is likely that these associations
were intended as protection for the small and medium sized shippers who
would otherwise have no means by which to obtain volume discounts,
the shippers' association approach to protecting shippers' interests may
have created a mechanism which, if used, will facilitate the development
of shipper countervailing power. 189
III. WILL SHIPPERS' COUNCILS WORK?
On a purely theoretical basis, the goals of shippers' councils-offset-
ting conference rate power-would appear to be more easily achieved
under the negotiating council system. While politically it is difficult to
favor negotiating shippers' councils because of the possible domestic an-
ticompetitive effects that they may entail, many people understand that
efficiency in the conference system will require some price discrimination
and there is evidence that consultative shippers' councils do not address
this problem. Price discrimination can be controlled effectively either by
government imposed sanctions or by free market pressures. Since United
States policy in liner shipping is to reject the former approach, the ques-
tion arises as to whether the ancillary anticompetitive effects of negotiat-
ing shippers' councils are worth the potential benefit of such councils, or
whether consultative councils or other market mechanisms which will
186 See H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 38. While the record suggests that Congress was
interested in allowing small shippers in the international trades to obtain the 20 to 50 percent savings
in transportation costs enjoyed by members of domestic shippers' associations, the mandatory nego-
tiating provisions may indicate an unarticulated interest that the associations develop into more than
mere shipper-owned consolidating organizations. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 70-73 (testi-
mony of Ronald N. Cobert, American Institute for Shippers' Associations, Inc.).
187 H.R. REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 38.
188 Id
189 See infra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
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disseminate information and pressure conference pricing powers will ef-
fectively counter conference market power. An even more basic question
is whether shippers' councils will develop in the United States even if
they are authorized.
A. The Theoretical Predicates of Shippers' Councils
The empirical and theoretical basis for the creation and success of
shippers' councils in the United States is limited. 9 ' As previously
noted, 191 studies of foreign shippers' councils have concluded that these
councils have had a limited effect in countering conference pricing activi-
ties. Furthermore, the United States' domestic economy has had only a
limited experience with sanctioned countervailing bargaining and joint
buying groups, the major examples being labor unions' 92 and agricultural
cooperatives. 193 Given this weak background, the theoretical question
arises as to whether shippers' councils can counter liner conference oli-
gopoly power; i.e., if shippers' councils form, will they have equal eco-
nomic strength with liner conferences therefore allowing them to
negotiate lower rates? Furthermore one must question whether the
structure of the United States economy is such that shippers will form
these groups. Additionally, if such councils are theoretically feasible,
will the United States export industry be amenable to the development of
these organizations? Finally, would the potential benefits of the councils
outweigh the danger of the strong antitrust exemption necessary to fur-
ther their formation?
There is some theoretical and empirical support for a theory of
countervailing bargaining power. The most influential exposition of the
theory can be found in a 1952 book by John Kenneth Galbraith.' 94
190 See infra notes 221-34 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 105. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 3 (statement of Allen Fergu-
son, Chairman of the National Institute of Economics and Law).
192 Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982); see J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE
CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 108-34 (Rev. ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as GALBRAITH].
193 United States v. Nat'l Broiler Mktg. Ass'n, 550 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1977); Capper-Volstead
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1982); Fisherman's Collective Bargainng Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521-522
(1982). See GALBRAITH, supra note 192, at 154. See also supra note 75; Kintner, supra note 159, at
974. But cf., United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981). It should be noted that
there have been numerous legislative attempts to protect small firms from the concentrated power of
larger entities which may exercise a form of buying power. These Acts, in particular the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982), have been criticized for penalizing efficient firms that use their
economies of scale while protecting the inefficiencies of the smaller firms. See infra note 216. The
theory of countervailing power attempts to promote efficiencies among those entities that enjoy con-
centrated power. See also, Davidow, supra note 75, at 279-80; Note, The Applicability of the Anti-
trust Laws to International Cartels Involving Foreign Governments, 91 YALE L.J. 765, 769 n. 18.
194 See supra note 192; See also John Hazard, A Competitive United States Maritime Policy, 22
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Although until the 1970s very little empirical work was performed to test
his theories,' results of recent studies have given some support to the
proposition that the liner conference and export trade systems may be
amenable to a form of countervailing power.19 6 These and other studies
also demonstrate that the nature of the export industry is such that any
form of countervailing power which may develop will not necessarily
benefit small and medium sized exporters.'
9 7
Galbraith asserts that concentrated economic power inevitably leads
to the creation of a countervailing economic power.'98 He elaborates
upon this thesis with two main arguments. First, he states, in oligopolis-
tic industries sellers conform to consumer needs not through interseller
competition but through countervailing power exercised by strong buy-
ers. 199 Second, powerful buyers do not offset the power of concentrated
sellers occasionally or haphazardly. Instead, a systematic propensity for
power on the buyers' side emerges whenever power exists on the sellers'
side."0 °
Galbraith's theory of countervailing power is particularly important
in the context of independent competition and closed conferences in the
liner conference system. In an argument similar to UNCTAD's which
holds that independent liners may not provide effective actual and poten-
tial competition to preclude monopoly pricing, Galbraith argues that the
theory that monopoly power will generate market entry is undercut by
high market entry barriers.2"' He argues that countervailing power must
arise as a matter of self preservation, but that the conditions which foster
its creation will occur only when the oligopoly has monopoly profits and
the industry is not price competitive.20 2 These conditions will exist espe-
cially where sellers experience a strong demand in their acquisition mar-
ket and buyers have a weak demand in their end market and are the only
TRANsp. J. 32, 45 (1982). But see, Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 3 (statement of Allen Fergu-
son, Chairman of the National Institute of Economics and Law).
195 F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 239 (1st
ed. 1970). O.E.C.D., BUYING POWER: THE EXERCISE OF MARKET POWER BY DOMINANT BUy-
ERS 29 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BUYING POWER].
196 See infra notes 221-34 and accompanying text.
197 See infra text accompanying notes 308-25.
198 GALBRAITH, supra note 192, at 110-14; see also Davidow, supra note 75, at 278-81.
199 GALBRAITH, supra note 192, at 113; SCHERER, supra note 195, at 241.
200 GALBRAITH, supra note 192, at 114; SCHERER, supra note 195, at 241.
201 GALBRAITH, supra note 192, at 112-13. However, some opponents of the conference system
have cited the opposite argument as justification for elimination of the conference system's antitrust
immunity. They claim that the shipping industry will never achieve monopoly power because its
entry costs are not so high in relation to demand as to preclude new competitor entry. See 1979
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 11, at 281-82.
202 GALBRAITH, supra note 192, at 118, 128.
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customers of the sellers.2 °3 In such a situation, buyers can obtain price
concessions by utilizing alternative suppliers, conferring exclusive pa-
tronage on one supplier, and in general by maintaining a degree of uncer-
tainty as to buyer activity.2 04
Galbraith's theory does not contemplate perfect equilibrium be-
tween buyers and sellers. Usually, a greater degree of power will exist on
one side or the other. This power distribution will depend on what infla-
tionary pressures exist that will permit one side to pass on increased costs
to consumers. 20 5 Therefore, it is possible that countervailing power
would only be a temporary phenomenon, arising only when a depression
or price competitiveness makes it necessary for one group to offset the
monopoly power of another.20 6 Some economists cite this potentially
temporary nature of countervailing power when criticizing Galbraith's
assertions that such power arises systematically,20 7 but some admit that
there is one situation where concentrated countervailing power may arise
systematically. That situation will arise when bilateral monopoly or oli-
gopoly exists where a few end product sellers have sufficient power as
buyers to hold prices of products at or near competitive levels, while at
the same time being unable to depart from competitive pricing in the end
product market. In this situation, countervailing power could lead to an
allocation of resources that approximates the competitive norm.20 8
The fundamentals of the countervailing power theory appear to be
particularly applicable to the liner conference industry. A condition of
strong demand on the part of corporations which are also weak sellers in
their end product market will always exist in the liner system, since al-
most all exports and imports move by ocean vessel.2° 9 Exporters and
importers have a strong buyer demand for ocean transportation but the
must price competitively with other exporters and domestic manufactur-
ers in their end markets. Thus, although the conferences are in a strong
position because they may control the supply of shipping, they are also in
203 Id. at 130-31.
204 Id. at 121. This is very similar to the shippers' councils proposals. See S.1593, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S9221 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1981), S.47, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), 129
CONG. REc. S89 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983); UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70,
at 8, 19-24.
205 GALBRArrT, supra note 192, at 130-31.
206 Id.; BUYING POWER, supra note 195, at 22.
207 SCHERER, supra note 195, at 241-48.
208 SCHERER, supra note 195, at 245; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 307 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER, 2d ed.]. Cf., Brodley, supra
note 157, at 1569 n.155.
209 Approximately 90 to 98% of all foreign exports and imports move by ocean vessel. Omnibus
Hearings, supra, note 21, at 183 (statement of Hon. John Murphy); Id. at 250 (statement of Hon.
Samuel Nemirow, Maritime Administration).
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a weak position inasmuch as all of their business is derived from export
demand.21 Theoretically, exporters have the potential power to offset
conference activities by utilizing the tools advocated by Galbraith that
are contained in the shippers' council proposals to create market uncer-
tainty. Nevertheless, the end market for exporters is still a price compet-
itive market, because the exporters' competitors include both domestic
producers and other foreign exporters. Thus, the reduction of transpor-
tation costs should provide an important vehicle for obtaining a reduc-
tion in export costs and an increased competitiveness of goods abroad,
thereby leading to an increase in exports and a systematic creation of
211countervailing power.
As conceptually attractive as the theory of countervailing power
may be as a regulatory policy for the liner conference system, the the-
ory's proponents also recognize that it contains some danger of mis-
use.212  Galbraith admits that the theory sanctions the creation of
economic concentration in the economy.213 He reconciles this with the
contemporary bias against concentration by postulating that economic
power may be inherent in capitalism and that it is better to control the
abuses of economic concentration than to inhibit its development, where
that development may have beneficial effects for the economy.214 Never-
theless, Galbraith's analysis fails to address the regulatory problems
which might occur if countervailing power becomes a force in its own
right or if such power serves as a cooperative, as opposed to counter-
vailing, force.215 Examples of the legal difficulties which may be encoun-
tered in establishing a standard to curb potential cooperative activity
between two countervailing oligopolies are contained in the buyers price
discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act. This Act pro-
hibits differences in the prices of a goods sold to two different purchasers
unless the price difference is either cost justified or necessary to meet a
210 Ellsworth, supra note 32, at 509.
211 See, eg., House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 4 (statement of Prof. George Garvey) to
the effect that the eight percent of total export costs represented by ocean transportation can ad-
versely affect the competitive posture of exporters in a market where a one percent variable in the
price of goods makes prices more competitive.
212 See SCHERER, supra note 195, at 242; BUYING PowER, supra note 195, at 31, 34.
213 GALBRATrH, supra note 192, at 152.
214 Id. at 147. Examples of such authorization are the Webb-Pomerene, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66
(1976), and Export Trading Company Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1982). Cf. Gorton Hearings,
supra note 10, at 176 (answers of CASO to questions of Sen. Inouye); Davidow, Cartels, Competition
Laws, and the Regulation of International Trade, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 351, 361 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Davidow, Cartels]; Brodley, supra note 157.
215 Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 152; SCHERER, supra note 195, at 242, 244-45; Omnibus
Hearings, supra note 21, at 159 (testimony of Donald Flexner, Department of Justice); SULLIVAN,
ANTrrRUSr LAW 288-89 (1977).
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competitor's price. The Act also makes it unlawful for any person to
knowingly induce or receive a discrimination in price.2 1 6
Enforcement of this Act by the Justice Department (as opposed to
the Federal Trade Commission) has been limited, because the provisions
of the act tend to deter certain beneficial activities based on economies of
scale because it is very difficult to provide evidence supporting the affirm-
ative defenses contained in the Act.2 17 For example, a powerful counter-
vailing buyer may obtain price reductions because he consumes large
volumes or a predictable quantity of goods which enables his entrance
into a long term contract. Whether this will result in higher prices to
small buyers depends on the degree of their market power. If the conces-
sion was a result of economies of scale or large buyer bargaining power,
the price concessions should not spread throughout the industry.218 A
legal problem arises if the concessions were a result of collusion or other
preferential treatment that discriminated against small buyers.219 It is
very difficult to establish precise legal standards for a burden of proof in
such cases, yet anything less than a precise standard may serve to inhibit
attempts to obtain the benefits of economies of scale.22°
1. Empirical Support
Early studies dismissed the validity of the theory of countervailing
power because little empirical support for the concept could be found in
existing industries. For example, an early Kaysen and Turner study
found that in only twenty out of the sixty five Type I industries which
they surveyed did buyers' concentration approach that of the sellers' in-
dustry.22' More recent studies, however, provide greater empirical sup-
216 Robinson-Patman Act, § 2(b), (1), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982). See, R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
180 (1976); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); Kintner, supra note 159; Mezines, Group Buying-
When is it Permitted Under the Robinson-Patman Act?, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 729 (1969); Selden, An
Analysis of Cooperative Buying Associations-Including New Concerns For Franchise Systems, 37
Bus. LAW. 1569 (1982). Price discrimination is a major concern of federal regulatory activity in all
types of transportation. However, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibitions apply to the sales of
goods, not services, and therefore could not be applied to shippers' councils activities. See Popper,
supra note 71, at 308, 318.
217 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr (1977); BAUM,
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: SUMMARY AND COMMENT 112 (1964).
218 SCHERER, 2d ed., supra note 208, at 310.
219 Scherer argues that this may not occur because price concessions on intermediate goods to
strong buyers in oligopolistic markets invariably will be discovered by small buyers and other indus-
try members. Unless oligopolistic cohesion is strong, notes Scherer, such price concessions may
benefit the ultimate consumer because they will have to spread throughout the industry. Id.
220 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 398-401 (1978). See generally Hay, Oligopoly, Shared
Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 439 (1982).
221 A Type I oligopoly is an industry where eight firms account for at least 50% of the industry's
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port for Galbraith's theories.2 2 2 For example, a 1975 analysis found that
high buyer concentration is a factor which offsets the ability of sellers in
concentrated markets to obtain prices in excess of direct costs. In addi-
tion, the study found that buyer and order size had a similar impact on
sellers' prices and cost margins.2 2
One reason why there may have been so little empirical support for
Galbraith's theory of countervailing power is that there may be no need
for countervailing power in most industries.224 Galbraith postulated that
in inflationary periods there is little incentive for buyers to attempt to
offset oligopoly prices, since higher costs could be passed onto the con-
sumers.22 Indeed, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment ("OECD") has concluded that since the competitive process
would work to the advantage of the large buyer only when demand falls
short of capacity, the exercise of buying power may prove to be a tempo-
rary phenomenon.226 This would be so especially if industries which
have a concentrated economic power hesitate to exercise that power. For
example, a concentrated industry may price competitively in anticipation
of potential competition, to avoid retaliation by concentrated power on
the purchasing side during an economic reversal, or to avoid potential
government intervention or antitrust liabilities.227 Such behavior also ex-
sales, or twenty firms account for at least 75% of market sales. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST POLICY 27-37, 275-313 (1959).
222 SCHERER, 2d ed., supra note 208, at 311. But see Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 3 (state-
ment of Allen Ferguson).
223 Lustgarten, The Impact of Buyer Concentration in Manufacturing Industries, 57 REV. ECON.
& STATmTICS 125, 128 (1975). In addition, the Baba study found that a high and increasing sellers
concentration was associated with an increase in buyer concentration. Baba, Buying Structure and
Market Performance, 64 ECON. ANALYSIS MAG. (1977). However, Guth, Schwarz, and Whitcomb
found weak support for the countervailing power theory in their survey of 53 industries. Guth,
Schwarz, & Whitcomb, Buyer Concentration Ratios, 25 J. INDUs. ECON. 241, 251 (1977). See also,
BUYING POWER, supra note 195, at 29-30.
Although these studies provide mixed empirical support for a countervailing power policy, sev-
eral factors must be considered in applying their results to the concept of shippers' councils. Most of
the studies have focused on the natural creation of oligopolies in markets where dominant or oligo-
polistic firms already exist. The natural creation of countervailing power may be inhibited by the
prohibition embodied in the antitrust laws. Moreover, since the purpose of the shippers' councils
proposal to promote collective action by groups of small exporters and not to facilitate the creation
of countervailing oligopolies, the focus of the empirical studies may differ from the needs of shippers'
councils. See id. at 28-29; supra text accompanying notes 88, 116. But see infra note 235.
224 Judicial antitrust doctrine supports this concept. The section 2 prohibitions on monopoly
power go to its exercise, not to its existence. Therefore, countervailing power should not develop
among customers of an industry whose members have market power but do not exercise such power.
See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
225 GALBRAITH, supra note 192, at 128.
226 BUYING POWER, supra note 195, at 22.
227 SCHERER, 2d ed., supra note 208, at 308.
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plains why countervailing power fails to develop at all, since buyers
would fail to perceive the need for it.2 28
There are two other factors that may explain why countervailing
monopsony power fails to arise. First, industry conditions may be such
that no firm could achieve the economies of scale necessary to success-
fully counteract the power of the opposing group.2 9 Second, in the same
manner in which they may inhibit the exercise of countervailing power
by a buyers' group possessing such power, the antitrust laws may be an
inhibiting factor to any single firm's achieving sufficient size to develop
power or for any group of firms to act collectively.2 3 ° Advocates of the
countervailing power theory address these problems by arguing that if
industry conditions favorable to countervailing power exist,23 1 a legal
analysis of the exercise of market power should favor a suspension of the
antitrust laws if the ultimate consumer is not harmed and if the counter-
vailing power has been exerted as a reaction to a strong market concen-
tration.23 2 Since countervailing power may aid in promoting efficiency,
technological innovation, and lower prices, any group tendency to de-
velop countervailing power should be facilitated by the government, even
if the exercise of this power results in price discrimination. 233 This analy-
sis by the advocates of the countervailing power theory perceives govern-
mental strengthening of countervailing power as a step similar to the
strengthening of competition because the capacity of the industry for au-
tonomous self regulation is increased.
Despite his support for antitrust exemptions for countervailing bar-
gaining groups even in those situations where the only result would be a
redistribution of profits between industries, with no pass-on to consum-
ers, Galbraith emphasizes that official policy should not authorize an ex-
emption or facilitate a creation of countervailing power until the industry
has demonstrated an independent interest or ability to do so. 2 3 4 There-
fore, the issue of what tendency the export industry has demonstrated
towards developing countervailing power must be addressed before legis-
lation conferring an antitrust immunity on shippers' councils as counter-
vailing power groups is adopted.
228 Id.
229 POSNER, supra note 216, at 51-54.
230 GALBRArrT, supra note 192, at 14041.
231 Id. at 143.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 146-47.
234 Id. at 150.
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B. The Practical Predicates for Shippers' Councils
Although some may argue that countervailing power already exists
in the shipping industry because eighty percent of all exports are made by
the one hundred largest exporting firms, thus negating the need for ship-
pers' councils, there is little indication that small exporters have an in-
herent tendency to develop countervailing power.235 Small shippers and
policy makers attribute this failure to develop countervailing power to a
lack of interest in forming such power and to the fact that the antitrust
laws inhibit the development of such councils.236 Both arguments con-
tain some merit.
Small shippers claim that the antitrust laws inhibit both their deci-
sion to export and their formation of shippers' councils. 237 They argue
that the antitrust laws are vague and that many shippers do not have the
financial resources to rely on expensive antitrust counsel to advise them
in their activities. The possibility of criminal and civil convictions under
the antitrust laws is sufficiently real that many small firms claim that it
discourages their entry into the export trade altogether, because it in-
creases the risk of conducting business overseas to an unacceptable
level.
238
This argument should be analyzed in the broader context of the gen-
eral argument that the antitrust laws inhibit the conduct of all United
States originated business overseas.239 American companies frequently
allege that they experience a discriminatory application of these laws
whereas their foreign competitors enjoy a less restrictive legal environ-
235 See supra note 223. The Justice Department implicitly rejected the concept of countervailing
power in the liner industry when it concluded that the European National Shippers Council was not
responsible for the rate differentials in the United States-Europe trades. The Department noted that
if countervailing power was a correct economic theory, the dominant United States exporting manu-
facturers should have been able to exercise their monopsony power to eliminate the rate differentials.
Omnibus Hearings, supra note 21, at 204. See also Kintner, supra note 159, at 983.
236 Letter from Drew Lewis, Secretary of Transportation, to Sen. Slade Gorton (February 5,
1982) reprinted in S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 19; Gorton Hearings; supra note 10, at 411
(statement of National Association of Beverage Importers); see also Merchant Marine Hearing;
supra note 176 (statement of Eugene Milosh, American Association of Exporters and Importers).
237 Gorton Hearings supra note 10, at 411 (statement of National Association of Beverage
Importers).
238 Export Policy, Part 6-U.S. Programs and Facilities Designed to Support Exports: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing & Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18 (1978) (statement of Prof. Frederick W. Huszagh).
239 See generally Ongman, Is Someone Crying "Wolf'?: An Assessment of Whether Antitrust Im-
pedes Export Trade, 1 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163 (1979); Davidow, Cartels, supra note 214; Baker,
Market Definition and International Competition, 15 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 377 (1983); Gold-
sweig, Enborg & Walton, The Impact of United States Antitrust Law on the Balance of Trade, 15
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 751 (1982); Hood, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Anti-
trust Laws: A Selective Bibliography, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765 (1982).
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ment.24° (Indeed, as discussed in section I A., supra, this same argument
has been made by United States liner companies in the context of ship-
ping conference activities and provides one of the primary justifications
for the Shipping Act of 1984.)241
Although the frequency of this argument may merely reflect a pri-
vate industry anathema to the antitrust laws which does not merit serious
consideration, it may also reflect an underlying problem. In the context
of the formation of shippers' councils, the issue presented is really two-
fold. First, do the antitrust laws inhibit the collective action of shippers
in dealing with shipping conferences, if such activity is viewed as a por-
tion of domestic competition? Second, if shippers' council activities are
considered part of export activity, do the antitrust laws still inhibit ship-
pers' council activities? Finally, would either analysis differ if the council
engages in consultative as opposed to negotiating activity?
1. Shippers' Councils as a Domestic Economic Activity
Although any shippers' council's dealings with liner conferences
clearly will affect the United States' foreign commerce, an analysis of
shippers' councils activities under traditional domestic antitrust law,
242
without an initial consideration of additional factors unique to interna-
tional trade, is the proper place to commence an analysis of the legality
of shippers' councils as a form of joint organizational activity. Utilizing
this approach, two different types of activities should be considered: that
of trade association activities on the part of a consultative form of ship-
pers' council and that of collective buying groups for negotiating ship-
pers' councils.
240 Goldsweig, supra note 239, at 752-53.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 33-35; see also S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 6-8. A
similar argument has been made in the area of railroad rate bureaus. Prior to the deregulation Acts
of 1980, some shippers argued that the antitrust laws prohibited their collective discussion of rail-
road freight rates with railroad rate bureaus. The reduction of rate bureau power under section 219
of the Staggers Act renders this argument moot. See, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706 (Supp. 1984). See Kee-
nan, Shipper.Antitnist Immunity When Dealing with Interstate Common Carriers, 47 I.C.C. PRAC. J.
522 (1980). But see, Popper, supra note 71.
242 The Sherman Act applies to activity occurring in the domestic or foreign commerce of the
United States. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). The activities of shippers' councils could, in a technical
sense, be considered solely domestic since such activities would, in a technical sense, be finalized in
the United States. However, since the subject matter of councils' activities also affect foreign com-
merce, the activities would probably fall within the definition of foreign commerce activity as well.
Thus, given the existence of certain antitrust exemptions for foreign commerce activity, the classifi-
cation of shippers' councils activities as part of domestic or foreign trade is important. As the dis-
cussion in this section indicates, perception often accounts for more than reality in the context of the




Antitrust doctrines applicable to trade associations may provide a
basis for the formation of consultative shippers' councils organized to
exchange production and service information with shipping conferences
and to aid in the rationalization of services. The cases that form the basis
for this doctrine provide that activities of trade associations which result
in a wide spread exchange and dissemination of information in an uncon-
centrated market are perceived as aiding efficiency and are thus permit-
ted under a rule of reason analysis, provided that collusive activity which
facilitates predatory acts or market foreclosure is avoided.243 Under this
analysis, the answer to the question of whether the activity is illegal will
often depend on the membership and market power of the group and the
degree to which the activity is related to price stabilization or price fixing
as opposed to information dissemination. Recent Department of Justice
Business Review Letters support this analysis. 2'
The membership and non-discrimination provisions of the council
agreement will be crucial to a determination of the legality of a consulta-
tive shippers' council. Because a shippers' council will affect the eco-
nomics of at least two industries-both the industry or industries
represented by the council members and the liner conference industry-
the consultative council, by definition, differs from that of a traditional
trade association, which is usually composed of members of only one
industry dealing with that industry's mutual problems. Recognizing that
trade associations experience a greater exposure to antitrust liability
when they are either overly exclusive as to participation or when their
activities affect a diversity of related markets or industries, a consultative
shippers' council may have to analogize its functions to those of a stock
exchange or a railroad terminal and provide for membership across a
broad spectrum of industries on a national or trade by trade basis in
order to comply with the antitrust laws prohibiting competitive discrimi-
nation.245 Without open membership, competitors of the conference, a
limited member shippers' council, or the council members, could argue
that in exchanging and acting upon information as to service (and cost)
243 See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 588 (1925); United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). See Selden, supra note 216, at 1580.
244 See SULLIVAN, supra note 215 at 265-311.
245 See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945);
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); See generally Davidow, supra note 75, at
284-85. Cf. Popper, supra note 71, at 319 n.226; Selden, supra note 216, at 1582; Brodley, supra note
157, at 1551-52, 1563-66; United States v. Sugar Inst., 15 F. Supp. 817, at 839-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1934),
affid 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
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needs, the conference, council, or some combination thereof, are engag-
ing in competitive market foreclosure activities, perhaps through the ve-
hicle of exclusive or preferential treatment constituting a group boycott,
price or service discrimination, horizontal market or customer alloca-
tions, or even through the establishment of a de facto vertical integration
between shippers and conferences for the provision of export shipping
services.2 46
Accordingly, even if a standard antitrust analysis under trade asso-
ciation doctrine leads to the conclusion that consultative councils can
organize in the domestic economy, the presence of the antitrust laws may
still inhibit the small and medium sized shipper from forming such
groups, because the activities of such groups, especially in the exchange
of information with liner conferences, are susceptible to expensive litiga-
tion initiated by non-council shippers. 4 7 It is the possibility of liability,
not the success of the arguments, that may inhibit the formation of ship-
pers' councils.
Case law and commentary applicable to the antitrust authorization
of negotiating shippers' councils is limited. The few commentators who
have addressed the issue of group buying power generally have con-
demned it as being highly prone to anticompetitive collusive activity
while providing only speculative potential benefits. In general, these
commentators have stated that, because they involve combinations of
horizontal competitors exchanging cost data and making arrangements
concerning prices and marketing, such groups should be found to have
violated the antitrust laws unless they lack market power, provide for
independent action and price competition, and are economically justified
as a method of achieving economies of scale necessary to meet the com-
petitive advantage of large buyers.24
Case law and the enforcement policies of the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission reinforce this conclusion. Whereas
the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have left undisturbed pos-
246 Letter from Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States, to Rep. Peter W.
Rodino (June 1, 1983) reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 3, at 49. Cf. Carr, Railroad-
Shipper Contracts Under Section 208 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980: An Antitrust Perspective, 50
I.C.C. PRAc. J. 29, 39 (1982); Popper, supra note 71, at 293-97; Peippo, supra note 89, at 517, 521;
Selden, supra note 216, at 1579; Mezines, supra note 181, at 751; Brodley, supra note 157, at 1530-
34.
247 Cf. Carr, supra note 246, at 3841.
248 Popper, supra note 71, at 298-300; Selden, supra note 216; Mezines, supra note 216; Brodley,
supra note 157, at 1534, 1569-73. Brodley recommends that the membership of such groups be
limited to permit their achievement of economies of scale but not of monopsony power. See also
Davidow, supra note 75, at 272-74, 284. Market power has been defined at 10 to 15% market share.
Id. at 273 n.27; Brodley, supra note 157, at 1553 n.102.
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sible group buying activities where the group lacked market power and
merely aggregated purchases in order to obtain the benefits of a quantity
discount, the courts have been quick to condemn any activity approxi-
mating collective negotiation of such discounts on the grounds that the
activity constitutes both a group boycott and an attempt to fix prices in
restraint of trade.249 The fact that such activity is engaged in by purchas-
ers as opposed to sellers in order to lower, rather than stabilize or raise,
prices has been deemed irrelevant by the courts.250
While the pro-competition considerations reflected in the group
buying cases and the commentators' analysis (and also contained in the
Congressional proposals to authorize shippers' councils) may protect
against any potential ancillary anticompetitive effects of such joint activ-
ity, they also mitigate against the very purpose of negotiating shippers'
councils, which require market power and group cohesion as tools for
establishing countervailing power.251 Nevertheless, even assuming that a
rule of reason analysis would apply to negotiating shippers' councils
lacking market power and providing for open membership and independ-
ent action, it is still uncertain whether such a council could effectively
negotiate transportation rates and contracts without potential antitrust
exposure.25 2
Recent Business Review Letters issued by the Department of Jus-
tice, however, have stated that the Department will not object to joint
ventures between shippers in the domestic transportation industry to dis-
seminate price information, cost information, or to negotiate volume dis-
count rates on behalf of members of the joint venture, but only if specific,
cohesion-defeating safeguards exist.253 In one such letter, the Depart-
249 Live Poultry Dealers Protective Ass'n v. United States, 4 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1924); Brodley,
supra note 157, at 1569; Fugate, The Export Trade Exception to the Antitrust Laws." The Old Webb-
Pomerene Act and the New Export Trading Company Act, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673, 694
nn.121-22 (1982); Mezines, supra note 216, at 746-47; Cf. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
596, 598-99, 605 (1972); National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 345 F.2d 421
(7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Sugar Inst., 15 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), affid, 297 U.S. 553
(1936). But see, Kintner, supra note 159; Selden, supra note 216, at 1570-71. See generally Klors,
Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945); Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Davidow, supra
note 75, at 285-87.
250 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948); Live Poul-
try Dealers Protective Ass'n, 4 F.2d at 842-43.
251 Cf. S. REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 19, 29; Brodley, supra note 157, at 1552.
252 Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 606; Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). But see Catalano Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980);
United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Medical Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 518 F. Supp. 1100, 1106 (D. Conn. 1981); Selden, supra note 216, at 1580.
253 See Letter from J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Depart-
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ment sanctioned the creation of a "shippers' council" in the domestic
trucking industry whereby a representative of the council contacts indi-
vidual carriers to negotiate, on behalf of all council members, across-the-
board discounts from existing less-than-truckload rates. The council at-
tempts to obtain discounted rates on a broad territorial basis and does
not negotiate freight rates on specific commodities. (In this context it
functions much like an automobile rental group discount for professional
organizations.) Each council member is advised by mail of the resulting
discounts, and no member is required to use a discount or a particular
carrier, nor is any member prohibited from individually negotiating its
own freight rate with any carrier. Similarly, neither the council nor its
members may collectively agree to tender a particular volume of traffic to
any carrier.254
In a similar proposal, the Department has stated that it will not
challenge a joint venture by shippers' associations whereby the venture,
acting independently, seeks additional freight from non-members in or-
der to facilitate the member shippers' associations' ability to obtain vol-
ume discounts. The joint venture for this group, however, would not
negotiate freight rates, each member would be individually responsible
for the rates charged to non-members.255
ment of Justice, to Joe G. Fender, Esq. (February 15, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Freightcon letter];
Letter from William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Jus-
tice to Daniel J. Sweeney, Esq. (November 28, 1983) [hereinafter cited as NASSTRAC II letter];
Letter from William F. Baxter to Herbert 0. Whitten (November 30, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Whitten letter]; Letter from William F. Baxter to Mark M. Levin, Esq. (October 23, 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Western Railroad Traffic Association (WRTA) letter]; Letter from Ronald G. Carr,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Patrick M. Byrne, (February 4, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as National Tank Truck Carriers (NTCC) letter]; Letter from Helmut F. Furth,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division to J.N. Baker and Bruce B. Wilson, (May 22,
1984) [hereinafter cited as Inflation Cost Recovery Railroad Rate Adjustments (or RCCR) letter].
But see NASSTRAC I letter, supra note 167. (Business Review Letters available upon request from
the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Offices.)
254 NASSTRAC II letter, supra note 253. The NASSTRAC members are diverse companies that
ship less-than-truckload cargo. Some members compete directly with each other in the goods they
ship. Members ship about 15% of the less-than-truckload traffic carried by general freight motor
carries. Such traffic generates over $10 billion in freight revenues yearly. To a large degree, the
NASSTRAC II letter creates a shippers' association. Whereas domestic shippers' associations have
functioned more on the basis of consolidating freight to secure generally available volume discounts,
the NASSTRAC II letter will permit NASSTRAC to negotiate discounts for non-aggregated goods
as well as aggregated volume shipments. Given the service contract and shippers' associations provi-
sions of the Shipping Act of 1984, it can be anticipated that this approach will be utilized in the
international ocean shipping industry. But see NASSTRAC I letter, supra note 167; infra notes 260-
61.
255 Freightcon letter, supra note 253. The Freightcon approach differs from that of NASSTRAC.
Whereas NASSTRAC is interested in securing actual rate discounts for all of its members, and seeks
to develop bargaining power through an implied guarantee that NASSTRAC members will direct
their cargo to carriers negotiating discounts with NASSTRAC, Freightcon is interested in securing
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Although these Business Review Letters permit certain joint activi-
ties by groups of shippers, they also inhibit group action. First, partici-
pation in the group is voluntary, with no right to exchange cost
information or to agree on rates.256 Negotiation of rates is conducted by
an independent third party, who, at best, can arrange merely for a broad,
geographic discount in rates. Second, and more importantly, each
favorable letter has dealt with groups that represent only fifteen percent
(or less), of the relevant transportation market. This fact, combined with
the prohibition against committing specific volumes of cargo to identified
carriers, diffuses much of the negotiating power of said groups. 257 This
latter point is particularly important in the context of the Shipping Act
of 1984's failure to confer an antitrust immunity on its shippers' associa-
tions provisions, because the associations, while permitted to enter into
service and volume contracts with specific carriers, may lack individual
market power. Combined groups of shippers' associations may need to
form in order to obtain market power and to assume the contemplated
role of shippers' councils in the conference system. However, the De-
partment of Justice's Business Review Letters on this type of activity
(specifically referenced in the Conference Report to the Shipping Act of
1984) indicate that such a group would be limited to the activities dis-
cussed above, and would be allowed to represent no more than fifteen
percent of the relevant market.2"' In addition, while the Department has
additional volumes of cargo for its member shippers' associations. Freightcon members have previ-
ously attempted to broaden their traffic bases by individually soliciting the membership of shippers
located in the various locations from which the associations receive cargo. These attempts have been
unsuccessful because no single association provides service to more than one destination area; the
shippers would have had to become members of numerous associations. Freightcon thus embodies a
broad geographic area from which shipments of non-members may be solicited and shipments be-
longing to members of the participating shippers' associations may be consolidated. Although this
will not lower rates charged to shipper association members, it will reduce administrative and trans-
action costs, including freight consolidation and distribution costs. It will also permit member ship-
pers' associations to take greater advantage of existing volume shipment rate discounts. Id.
256 See NASSTRAC II letter, supra note 253, Freighton letter, id. This emphasis on confidenti-
ality and independent action is not limited to the freight consolidation proposals but has also been
emphasized in other Department of Justice Business Review Letters involving the transportation
industry. Eg., Whitten letter, supra note 253, permits motor, rail, and other carriers to participate in
a nationwide organization for the computerization of rate and tariff information that third parties
could subscribe to and access. The organization also will perform computerized pricing based upon
mathematical formulae. However, each subscribing carrier will set rates independently and will
keep its cost information confidential. The WRTA letter, supra note 253 (rate dissemination with no
interaction between competing carriers), NTTC letter, id. (compiling and aggregating confidential
cost data for comparison of members' operating efficiencies) and RCCR letter, id. (collect, dissemi-
nate, an file inflation cost recovery railroad rate and joint rate adjustments) will have a similar effect.
257 See NASSTRAC II letter, supra note 253 and Freightcon letter, id. NASSTRAC I letter,
supra note 167.
258 See infra note 261.
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stated in these letters that it would not challenge the status of the joint
ventures, it has declined to state its enforcement intentions in regard to
the shippers' associations participating in these ventures. The absence of
such a guarantee may serve as a deterrent to shippers participation in
such ventures.2 59
Finally, in an earlier version of the domestic trucking industry ship-
pers' council Business Review Letter, the Justice Department refused to
state that it would decline from prosecuting the proposed shippers' coun-
cil if it were formed to consolidate small shipments and negotiate specific
contracts in the domestic trucking industry.2 "° Even assuming the lack
(or intent to achieve) market dominance or monopsony power, the De-
partment stated that the uniformity of transportation rates achieved by
the council members would restrict their price competition with one an-
other and other competitors in the resale market where the shipped
goods are sold. 26' Accordingly, the Department stated, the council
259 See Freightcon letter, supra note 253.
260 NASSTRAC I letter, supra note 167. See also the WRTA letter, supra note 253, where the
Department of Justice approved a proposal to collect, list, and disseminate deregulated transporta-
tion rates for all domestic modes of carriers. These activities closely resemble those of a domestic
consultative shippers' council. See also NITC and RCCR letters, id., and Brodley, supra note 157,
at 1569-70; Davidow, supra note 75, at 277. See also supra note 71.
261 Under the NASSTRAC I letter, the council would have formed a shippers' council to negoti-
ate (1) flat discounts on less-than-truckload and volume shipments with motor carriers and motor
carrier rate bureaus; (2) point-to-point commodity rates with motor carrier rate bureaus; and
(3) contracts with railroads and contract motor carriers. While noting that the agreement could
reduce price competition, or facilitate price collusion, in the final product market, the Department of
Justice found that the agreement would not be anticompetitive, because the council would not have
limited the quantity of goods that its members could ship, and because it represented less than 15%
of the relevant market and also allowed its members to negotiate individually with carriers. NASST-
RAC I letter, supra note 167; NASSTRAC II letter, supra note 253.
There are several reasons why this analysis arguably would not apply to the same organizational
structure acting as a shippers' association under the Shipping Act of 1984. First, end market compe-
tition may be less important in foreign commerce than in its domestic counterpart, although this
conclusion would be difficult to support under the Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 if
the shippers' council (or shippers' association) activity reduced competition between exporters or
gave a competitive advantage to some exporters over others. Second, the joint negotiating activities
of shippers' associations are explicitly authorized by §§ 3(24) and (10)(b)(12) of the Shipping Act of
1984. Under proposed FMC regulations, this authorization would extend to specific commodity,
geographic, volume, and revenue-based service contracts. Thus, the NASSTRAC letters' concern
over specific, as opposed to generalized, group activity may be obviated by the specific provisions of
the Shipping Act.
Under a Shipping Act/Business Review analysis, however, the 15% market power rule, dis-
cussed in the NASSTRAC and Freightcon letters, would become important. The ability of shippers'
associations to affect freight rates becomes crucial because the Act specifically defines such associa-
tions as groups which consolidate small volume shipments to obtain volume discounts, and specifi-
cally denies shippers' associations an antitrust immunity. Under the NASSTRAC letters, joint
activities appear to become suspect when they occupy 15% of the market. However, this figure
could vary depending on the specific commodities shipped through an association. An association
Liner Conference System
6:373(1984)
would unreasonably restrain competition among horizontal competitors
and could be prosecuted, if not on a per se basis, under a rule of reason
analysis.262 Therefore, it must be presumed that a negotiating shippers'
council of the type necessary to significantly counterbalance conference
power would be subject to extensive potential antitrust liability. Indeed,
most of the membership and negotiating requirements necessary for a
strong bargaining council would probably be held to be per se illegal.
263
2. Shippers' Councils as Engaged in Foreign Activity
The analysis of antitrust liability for shippers' councils perceived to
be engaged primarily in foreign trade is very similar to that outlined
above for the domestic industry, the major distinction in analysis being
the existence of additional guidelines for exporters as to the scope of the
antitrust laws. Opponents of antitrust exemptions for exporters argue
that both the Department of Justice guidelines for joint ventures con-
tained in the Department of Justice International Guideline, Business Re-
view Procedures,264  and the antitrust effects doctrine of the Alcoa
265
decision adequately inform United States companies as to whether their
activities are permitted.2 66 Nevertheless, even if the permissible scope of
export activities is broader under the Alcoa and Department of Justice
guidelines, the key factor in the analysis is still whether the antitrust laws
are so vague as to inhibit the formation of councils. Although there
that represents a large percentage of particular goods could achieve suspect market power, even if it
represents less than 15% of the market. In such a case, the NASSTRAC II approach arguably
would be necessary to resolve the antitrust problem. The same analysis would, of course, apply to
negotiating shippers' councils, whether or not they seek recognition under the shippers' associations
provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984.
262 The situation may be analogous to the use of a delivered pricing base point formula. Cf. Hay,
supra note 220, at 462-69; Cement Mfr& Ass'n, 268 U.S. at 597-99; Maple Flooring Mfrs Ass'n, 268
U.S. at 572; Sugar Inst., 15 F. Supp. at 841-57.
263 Live Poultry Dealers' Protective Ass'n, 4 F.2d, at 843; Brodley, supra note 157, at 1552-53;
Davidow, supra note 75, at 274; Kintner, supra note 159, at 1000-03, 1005; Popper, supra note 71, at
302-05; Selden, supra note 216, at 1581-82.
264 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1982); see Goldsweig, supra note 239, at 755-56. Normally, the Department
will prosecute only those offenses that injure consumers in the United States or restrain the export
opportunities of United States residents. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRusT DIVISION, ANTI-
TRusT GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, 4-5 (rev. March 1, 1977). See generally Fox,
Updating the Antitrust Guide for International Operations-A Greener Light for Export and Abroad,
15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 709 (1982).
265 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also National Bank
of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3rd Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, Nat'l Trust
and Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,
383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
266 Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, 14 L. & PoL'Y. INT'L Bus. 1,
6. But cf. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:373(1984)
reasonably would be less official concern whether shippers' councils
members engaged in price competition in their ultimate foreign market
(as opposed to the domestic shippers' council situation discussed, supra),
this inhibition has created a very real concern for shippers. This concern
has been exhibited by the fact that the Congress has received testimony
from at least one organization that was seeking to develop a shippers'
council that it was deterred from further activity when the Department
of Justice issued a Business Review Letter which was overly vague as to
its enforcement intent as to shippers' councils activities in the export
shipping industry.26 7 Similarly, the European National Shippers Council
has testified that it no longer consults with liner conferences in the
United States trade because it is afraid of potential liability. 6 In re-
sponse to this testimony, every regulatory reform bill introduced to the
Congress has contained provisions specifically exempting foreign ship-
pers' councils from an application of the United States antitrust laws,
although such a provision was ultimately not included in the Shipping
Act of 1984.269
In addition, although many commentators have rejected the argu-
ment that the antitrust laws are overly vague, recently enacted legislation
has sought to clarify these laws by making it explicit that their applica-
tion will apply only to conduct that will have a "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce and domestic ex-
ports.270 Unfortunately, it is doubtful that such expanded general re-
statements of the antitrust laws will aid the formation of shippers'
councils, because the councils' activities entail aspects of both domestic
and international commerce and the 1982 amendments do not afford pro-
tection for exporters who adversely affect the competitive position of
other exporters.271 Unless a clarification as to the specific activity and
267 Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 187 (testimony of Edwin A. Elbert, American
Importers Association); cf S. REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 19.
268 Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 257 (statement of J.F. Muheim, European National Ship-
pers Council); cf. Davidow, Cartels, supra note 214, at 362-63, which contains other examples of
how the Justice Department has acted towards foreign buying cartels.
269 See S. 47, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 8(a)(6); H.R. 1878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a)(5); H.R.
REP. No. 600, supra note 44, at 37.
270 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
271 The 1982 clarifying Acts were oriented merely towards export activity and did not apply to
import activity. Under these new Acts, trade associations, such as the National Industrial Traffic
League and the American Association of Importers, would remain inhibited from using the Acts as
an umbrella for shippers' councils, because some of their members import activities would not be
exempt. Similarly, the Act does not extend to the issue of intermodalism because it is a domestic
activity outside the scope of the Export Trading Company Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1982). See
infra notes 330-40 and accompanying text. See also Bruce & Peirce, Understanding the Export Trad-
ing Company Act and Using (or Avoiding) Its Antitrust Exemptions, 38 Bus. LAW. 975, 990-92
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group exists, small and medium sized shippers are likely to use the same
arguments as the United States flag ships make in arguing for a stronger
conference system and will refuse to form shippers' councils because they
are inhibited by the potential for liability.272 It is therefore probable that
the uncertainties existing under the antitrust laws and continuing under
the recently enacted foreign trade amendments to the antitrust laws may
preclude the formation of shippers' councils.273
3. 4 Webb-Pomerene Act Analysis
Of course, the foregoing analysis ignores provisions of the export
laws that create a specific antitrust exemption for certain export activi-
ties. At issue is whether the antitrust exemptions contained in the Webb-
Pomerene Act of 1918274 and the Export Trading Company Act of
1982275 could be used to justify the creation of shippers' councils. If re-
course to the Webb-Pomerene Act has been available, then the question
arises as to whether the export industry's failure to use the Act is a reflec-
tion of inadequacies in the Act or a reflection of structural aspects of the
industry. If the failure reflects statutory inadequacies, then the role of
the Webb-Pomerene amendments and the other provisions of the Export
Trading Company Act of 1982 must be examined in the context of ship-
pers' councils.
The Webb-Pomerene Act may serve as a vehicle for the creation of
shippers' councils. The Webb-Pomerene Act was enacted in 1918 to spe-
cifically facilitate the creation of countervailing power in United States
export trade,276 because Congress perceived small and medium sized ex-
porters as being at a competitive disadvantage in dealing with foreign
buying cartels and in need of an exemption from the antitrust laws to
facilitate their achieving the economies of scale necessary to counterbal-
ance this perceived power.27 7 An explicit purpose of the Act was to en-
able small and medium sized shippers to collectively negotiate rates with
(1983); Davidow, Cartels, supra note 214, at 359-60; Hawk, supra note 34, at 241; Unkovic & La-
Mont, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Invitation to Aggressive Export Expansion, 87
DICK. L. REv. 205, 214-15 (1983).
272 See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
273 Some commentators believe that the Antitrust Improvements Act will also inhibit the devel-
opment of Export trading companies. Garvey, The Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, 14
L. & POL'Y. INT'L BUS. 1 (1982).
274 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976).
275 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1982).
276 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT ON WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS:
A 50 YEAR REVIEW, 3-4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 50 YEAR REVIEW]; see also FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION STAFF UPDATE: 10 YEARS LATER (1978) [hereinafter cited as 10 YEAR REPORT].
277 50 YEAR REVIEW, supra note 276, at 67.
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shipping conferences, but the Act has been used for this purpose on only
a very limited basis.278
The Webb-Pomerene Act creates an antitrust exemption for export
associations "entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export
trade and actually engaged solely in such export trade",2 79 provided that
the association does not act "in restraint of trade within the United
States' or "in restraint of the export trade of any domestic competitor of
such association".28 ° In addition, no association may, "either in the
United States or elsewhere, enter into any agreement, understanding or
conspiracy, or do any act which artificially or intentionally enhances or
depresses prices within the United States or commodities of the class ex-
ported by (the association) or which substantially lessens competition
within the United States or otherwise restrains trade therein." '281 The
Act further provides that export associations must be registered within
thirty days of creation with the Federal Trade Commission to be entitled
to the Act's antitrust exemption2 82 and that the FTC monitor the as-
sociations and make suggestions for the adjustment of any business activ-
ity in which they engage.28 3 An association's failure to comply with these
suggestions may result in the Commissions' referring the issue to the De-
partment of Justice for prosecution of the activity as a violation of the
antitrust laws.28 4
Judicial decisions interpreting the Webb-Pomerene Act have been
limited.28 5 The Act has been interpreted as not permitting joint licensing
activities,2 86 joint bidding on United States government financed
projects, 287 restrictions on use of members' patents, 2 88 export marketing
agreements with non-association member United States and foreign com-
petitors, 28 9 and the establishment of joint foreign subsidiaries. 290 Never-
theless those activities which may inevitably result in a restraint of trade,
including the use of an association as an exclusive foreign outlet, refusals
of an association to handle the exports of American competitors, deter-
278 Id. at 4; 10 YEAR REPORT, supra note 276, at 11, 16; Fugate, supra note 249, at 686-87.
279 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976).
280 Id.
281 Id.; United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 67 (S.D.N.Y., 1949).
282 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1976).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 11, at 297.
286 United States v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
287 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
288 Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 92 F. Supp. at 964.
289 United States Alklai Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. at 74.
290 Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 92 F. Supp. at 963.
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mination of quotas and marketing policies, establishment of resale prices
at which foreign distributors should sell, and limitations on the number
of distributors permitted to handle members' products are permitted by
the Act.2 91 In essence, if the restraints are minimal and ancillary and are
the inevitable consequences of the actions necessary to achieve associa-
tion cohesion in the export trade, the activity is permissible under the
Webb-Pomerene Act. z92
a Success of the Act
After 64 years of existence, the Webb-Pomerene Act is generally
perceived to be a failure.2 93 Currently, fewer than two percent of all ex-
ports utilize Webb-Pomerene associations, 94 and fewer than 19 percent
used the associations during its peak use in the 1930s.295 In 1979, there
were only 33 Webb-Pomerene associations in existence.2 96 Despite re-
cent studies which concluded that the Act should be revoked because it is
more effective in facilitating domestic restraints of trade than it is in pro-
moting exports,2 97 last year President Reagan signed the Export Trading
Company Act of 1982,298 which created a second, similar antitrust ex-
emption for export associations.
299
The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 addresses several criti-
cisms raised in studies on the failure of the Webb-Pomerene Act to pro-
mote exports by small and medium sized shippers. One is the by now
familiar argument that the Webb-Pomerene Act's antitrust exemption is
vague and inhibits the development of associations.3" Another is the
Act's alleged failure to provide sufficient incentives, especially financial
and information related resources, to enable small and medium sized ex-
porters to use the act.3"' Several recent studies addressed these issues by
291 Id. at 965.
292 Id.; See generally Fugate, supra note 249, at 689-92.
293 Larson, An Economic Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 13 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1970).
294 S. REP. No. 97, supra note 175, at 18.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Larson, supra note 293, at 497-99.
298 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1982).
299 Id. See generally Bruce & Peirce, supra note 271; Fugate, supra note 249; Golden & Kolb,
The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: An American Response to Foreign Competition, 58 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 743 (1983); Unkovic & LaMont, supra note 271; Williams & Baliga, The United
States Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 224 (1983); Note, The Export
Trading Company Act of 1982: Export Trade Comes ofAge in the United States, 34 S.C. L. REv. 757
(1983).
300 S. REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 19; see also, McDermid, The Antitrust Commission and the
Webb-Pomerene Act, A Critical Assessment, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 105, 119-24 (1980).
301 Williams & Baliga, supra note 299, at 225. Cf. S. REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 6. But see
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recommending that the certification procedure for export trading compa-
nies and associations be transferred from the Federal Trade Commission
to the Department of Commerce and that the antitrust exemption be ex-
panded to encompass services." 2 Although the Export Trading Com-
pany Act did not amend the Webb-Pomerene Act, it did embody many
of these proposals in the antitrust exemption that it created for export
trading companies. In addition, a fundamental purpose of the new Act is
to permit bank holding companies to own a percentage of trading compa-
nies established to promote export trade.30 3 The Act contemplates that
small and medium sized exporters can effectively utilize the expertise and
existing international financial and information networks available to the
banks. 04
Although the dual purposes of the Export Trading Company Act of
1982 of strengthening the antitrust exemptions for export associations
and promoting the creation of new export brokerage firms are comple-
mentary, there is also a fundamental contradiction inherent in these
goals. The Act implicitly recognizes that the existence of an antitrust
exemption for combined export activities is not a sufficient incentive for
the promotion of collective activity by small and medium sized exporters
and therefore creates an alternative method to facilitate exports from this
segment of the economy. 0 ' This inherent contradiction is not inadver-
tent but would instead appear to reflect economic studies of the Webb-
Pomerene Act which demonstrate that the nature of the export industry,
not the vagueness of the Act's antitrust exemption, is responsible for its
failure to promote small and medium sized manufacturer's exports.30 6
These studies imply that an antitrust exemption to promote collective
activity by exporters must fail because small and medium sized exporters
do not exhibit tendencies to develop either concentrated or counter-
vailing power. Therefore, although the Export Trading Company Act
embodies concepts similar to the Webb-Pomerene provisions for export
associations, the Act really represents an alternative to export promotion
which incorporates the results of the export industry studies.30 7 In the
HAYS ASSOCIATES, REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (Mar. 1977) reprinted in Export
Trading Companies and Trade Associations: Hearings on S.864, S.1499, S.1663, and S.1744, Before
the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 423-625 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HAYS REPORT].
302 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTrrRusT LAWS, supra note 11, at 304.
303 15 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (1982).
304 S. REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 6; see also Ferchill, Banks and the Export Trading Com-
pany Act of 1982, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 265 (1982-83).
305 Cf. Williams & Baliga, supra note 299, at 233-34.
306 50 YEAR REVIEW, supra note 276, at 61.
307 Id. at 58; S. REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 4-5.
Liner Conference System
6:373(1984)
context of the creation of shippers' councils, the factors underlying this
shift in export policy may also dictate the failure of such councils and the
need to explore alternative methods to strengthen shippers' bargaining
power.
b Federal Trade Commission Studies: Countervailing Power in the
Export Trade
Federal Trade Commission reports released in 1967 and 1978 are
the most influential studies of the Webb-Pomerene Act.3" 8 These studies,
in conjunction with a 1977 Department of Commerce sponsored study
on the feasibility of export trading companies 09 and an OECD report on
export cartels, 310 demonstrate that although the theory of countervailing
and concentrated power is applicable to some segments of the export in-
dustry, it is not a factor in the behavior of small and medium sized firms.
The failure of Webb-Pomerene associations is reflected by the fact
that they handled only two to twelve percent of total U.S. exports be-
tween 1920 and 1965.311 In addition, fewer than 25 percent of all Webb-
Pomerene associations lasted longer than ten years3 12 and only 36 per-
cent lasted longer than five years.3 13 The basic cause for this instability
has been a lack of cohesion among members of export trade associa-
tions.314 Frequently cited reasons for the dissolution of associations in-
clude internal member dissension, poor management, preferences for
export trading companies, lack of any advantage in belonging to an asso-
ciation, and changing export markets, which place the individual firm in
a better position than the export association to negotiate prices and sales
terms.315 Dissolved Webb-Pomerene associations often re-form as ser-
vice organizations providing ancillary assistance to exporters.316
The Federal Trade Commission's conclusions as to the traits neces-
sary for successful Webb-Pomerene associations also support the coun-
tervailing power theory. Successful Webb-Pomerene associations tend to
develop in Kaysen-Turner Class I oligopolies,317 since the ability to
maintain group cohesion in the division of markets, setting of prices, and
308 See supra note 276.
309 HAYs REPORT, supra note 301.
310 O.E.C.D., EXPORT CARTELS, A REPORT OF THE COMMrrEE OF EXPORTS ON RESTRCTIVE
BuswNEss PRAcTcEs (1974).
311 50 YEAR REvIEw, supra note 276, at 23.
312 Id. at 24.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 26-27.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 27.
317 Id. at 45-46.
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in other joint activities requires an association composed of large firms
but limited in membership to less than ten firms.318 In addition, since
product differentiation is not susceptible to joint marketing activities, the
successful association also markets a homogenous product, such as basic
commodities and raw materials.31 9 Usually, this product already enjoys
the advantage of a dominant world position before the association is
created.32°
The conclusion that only leading firms in concentrated markets can
create successful Webb-Pomerene associations has led the FTC to recom-
mend that the antitrust exemption be repealed or that a needs test be
created in order to preclude conferring an antitrust exemption on corpo-
rations which could easily export on their own.321 Many of the basic
information dissemination functions of the Webb-Pomerene associations,
often the only true service that they perform, could be performed easily
by trade associations.322 In addition, there has been little empirical sup-
port for the proposition that an antitrust exemption is needed to counter-
act foreign buying cartels. 323 Not only have few Webb-Pomerene
associations cited the existence of foreign buying cartels as a reason for
their creation,324 but one commentator has implied that the attraction of
an antitrust exemption, not the need to develop countervailing power,
underlies the creation of these associations. 325 As would be expected,
since the majority of exporters who participate in a Webb-Pomerene as-
sociation are competitors in the domestic economy, the associations also
have a tendency to have their anticompetitive activities spill over into
their domestic markets.3 26
4. Application of the Webb-Pomerene Experience to Shippers' Councils
The argument may be made that the failures of the Webb-Pomerene
associations would not necessarily be repeated by shippers' councils. For
example, if the activities of shippers' councils were to be strictly confined
to the consultation or negotiation of rates, group cohesion should not be
318 Id. at 33.
319 Id. at 32.
320 Id. Essentially, these are the requirements for a successful cartel. Cf. Hay, supra note 220.
321 50 YEAR REVIEW, supra note 276, at 67-70.
322 Cf Id. at 49; Larson, supra note 293, at 466-68.
323 Note, The Webb-Pomerene Act: A Re-examination of Export Cartels in World Trade, 19 VA. J.
INT'L L. 151, 164 (1978).
324 50 YEAR REVIEW, supra note 276, at 58; Larson, supra note 293, at 485-86.
325 50 YEAR REVIEW, supra note 276, at 10; cf. Larson, supra note 293, at 497-99; REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 11, at 299-300.




as difficult to obtain as in the case of an association, where a broad range
of activities is contemplated.327 Similarly, if the activity is limited solely
to arranging the shipment of goods overseas, there should be a much
more limited opportunity for the domestic spillover of anticompetitive
effects.
328
Unfortunately, these arguments tend to ignore the fact that ocean
transportation is only one segment of the total exporting process. It is
highly probable that successful shippers' councils will be similar to suc-
cessful Webb-Pomerene associations, because the ability to successfully
negotiate rates, consolidate shipments, or exchange service information
would require a thorough disclosure by all participants of their total mar-
keting strategies, cost structures, and export pricing. 329 In addition to
being superfluous in the context of the existing Webb-Pomerene exemp-
tion, a new antitrust exemption which limited shippers' councils rate ne-
gotiations and information exchange solely to matters affecting
international ocean transportation costs would still present the danger of
anticompetitive collusion in the negotiation of intermodal rates.
a The Domestic Spillover Problem of Intermodal Rates
Whether liner conferences are authorized to establish the ocean seg-
ment for intermodal land-ocean rates has presented a complex legal and
political issue in international shipping during the past decade.330 In-
ermodalism arose with the "container revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s
and is a term which describes the joint movement of cargo by rail and
water carriers.33 One rate is quoted for the whole movement, although
each carrier establishes the rate for his portion of the movement and then
negotiates with the other participating carriers to establish their respec-
327 See Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 176, at 8 (statement of Thomas O'Neill, National
Association of Beverage Importers).
328 Early proposals to authorize export trading companies contained a similar purpose, Le. the
promoting of exports as opposed to both imports and exports. These proposals often required that
all of the export trading company's activities be in the exporting of goods. A recognition of the
commercial necessity of importing goods resulted in the final Act's emphasis on exporting as the
"principal" activity of the organization. See H.R. REP. 629, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982). H.R.
REP. No. 924 supra note 176, at 2506.
329 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 8 (statement of James C. Miller, III); Senate
Hearings; supra note 33, at 9-10 (statement of Peter Klein, Sea-Land Industries).
330 United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 655 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980), pet. for rehearing
en banc dismissed as moot, decision vacated in part, (No. 79-1299, November 16, 1982); House
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 5-6 (testimony of C. Jonathan Benner, General Counsel, Fed-
eral Maritime Commission).
331 See generally Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the Container Revolution, 1 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 203 (1970); Tombari, Trends in Oceanborne Containerization and its Implications
for the U.S. Liner Industry, 10 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 311 (1979).
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tive portions of the entire rate.332 The legal problem in the context of the
shipping industry is twofold because the domestic transportation indus-
tries have been deregulated and competition has been reintroduced:
could liner conferences establish intermodal rates to be charged by their
members for intermodal movements involving railroads and trucks, and
must conferences publish their portion of the rate in a tariff,3 3 3 in effect
also publishing the unpublished domestic portion of the intermodal
rate?334 Although these legal issues were the subject of both litigation
335
and a joint agreement between the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the Federal Maritime Commission,336 they were resolved by the Shipping
Act of 1984.337
This article has emphasized the fact that ocean transportation costs
must be considered in the context of the total export of goods. If ship-
pers' councils are created on a regional trade basis, as would appear
likely for purposes of cohesion, then the issue of intermodal rates will be
particularly important to their members, because most exporting of
goods from the United States requires some intermodal transportation.338
332 See H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 3, at 12-13.
333 Initially, the issue was whether the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Mari-
time Commission exercised independent, concurrent or exclusive jurisiction over such agreements.
See Pennsylvania v. I.C.C., 561 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ex Parte 261, Tariffs Containing Joint
Rates andThrough Routes for the Transportation of Property Between Points in the United States
and Points in Foreign Countries, decisions contained at 337 I.C.C. 625 (1970), 341 I.C.C. 246
(1972), 346 I.C.C. 688 (1974), 350 I.C.C. 361 (1975), 351 I.C.C. 490 (1976), 355 I.C.C. 913 (1977).
The issue later evolved into whether the Federal Maritime Commission had jurisdiction to approve
such rates. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 655 F.2d at 247. See generally O'Neill, Jurisdictional Con-
flicts Between the Federal Maritime Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, 6 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 51 (1981).
334 Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat.
1895 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.) (1984), contract rates and non-tariff
rates are confidential and generally are not published, under a theory that competition is enhanced if
competitors are ignorant of each others prices. By contrast, conference tariffs currently are filed and
are published by the Federal Maritime Commission. A joint movement is one which is part tariff,
part contract. If the rail carrier's portion is subsumed in the contract, but is separated out for tariff
purposes, then there is the possibility that the purposes of the domestic deregulation Acts will be
circumvented, since domestic surface carriers could reasonably estimate the rates of their competi-
tors. For the related problem of how this has affected the setting of joint rates by Canadian rail-
roads, see generally Peippo, supra note 89.
335 See United States v. F.M.C., 655 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also United States v. F.M.C.,
No. 80-1251 (D.C. Cir.) (Feb. 29, 1980).
336 See 18 C.F.R. § 341.67 (1984); 46 C.F.R. § 536.8(c) (1984); see also Revision of TariffRegula-
tions, All Carriers, 49 C.F.R. § 1312.38 (1984).
337 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701(a) (1982).
338 The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 recognizes the importance of intermodal activity
by permitting export trading companies to provide insurance on ocean cargo "warehouse to ware-




Indeed. the ability of shippers' councils to negotiate total intermodal
rates may be essential to their success, since many potential members
may choose not to join a council if it is limited to issues affecting only the
water portion of the rate. However, council members will have to ex-
change information concerning their domestic transportation costs in or-
der to effectively negotiate intermodal rates, even if the council is not
permitted to discuss or negotiate these rates with domestic transportation
companies. This information dissemination may severely interfere with
the free competition policies promulgated under the domestic transporta-
tion deregulation acts.339 It would therefore be especially unfortunate if
shippers' councils providing intermodal services created a forum
whereby shippers could exchange the competitively sensitive cost and
price information which domestic transportation law is currently seeking
to keep confidential in order to promote competition in the domestic
transportation industries.340 In the domestic surface transportation in-
dustries, surface carriers have been able to participate in the rate bureau
system, whereby groups of carriers have been able to meet with immu-
nity from the antitrust laws in order to establish uniform rates and serv-
ices offered to shippers in a manner analogous to the ocean conference
system. In order to promote competition in the domestic surface trans-
portation industries, the legislative trend to deregulate these industries
has resulted in a reduction, and most probably will result in an eventual
elimination of the antitrust-immune rate bureau system, accompanied by
an increased emphasis on the confidentiality of sensitive economic cost
and pricing data. Indeed, this has been a primary concern of the Justice
Department in its Business Review Letters on domestic shippers'
councils.
b Council Cohesion and American Entrepreneurism
An additional obstacle to the formation of shippers' councils may
339 Cf. Davidow, supra note 75, at 277. previous shippers' councils proposals have contained
provisions prohibiting the negotiation of intermodal services by shippers' councils. See H.R. 6899,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 206 (1980), H.R. REP. No. 935, supra note 8, at pt. 3, 27 (1980), but the most
recent proposals are unclear on the issue. H.R. 4374 merely permitted activity that was "solely
export conduct", which, broadly read, could include intermodal activities. Although S.1593 and
S.47 authorized conference power over rate setting, they prohibited collective conference negotiation
of rate agreements with inland carriers, while failing to specify whether conferences could discuss
such rates with shippers' councils. See S. REP. No. 414, supra note 35, at 28; S. REP. No. 3, supra
note 2, at 22.
340 Senate Judiciary Hearings supra note 31, at 13, 15, 22-24 (statement of Thomas J. Campbell,
Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission). Cf. Supplemental Brief for the
United States at 16-28, United States v. F.M.C., 655 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cf. 149 CONG. REC.
S1813-14 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
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exist. Studies on successful Webb-Pomerene associations suggest that
large shippers with homogeneous products may dominate shippers'
councils, thus aiding in the discriminatory use of conference rates against
small and medium sized shippers.341  The Webb-Pomerene studies also
indicate, however, that small and medium sized exporters would not util-
ize shippers' councils even if the large exporters were excluded from
membership in the councils 34 2 because the small and medium sized ship-
pers are not a cohesive group.343 There must be both a perceived need
and an inclination by industry members to form a group which has coun-
tervailing power. These factors also must be accompanied by a mutuality
of interest strong enough to support the exercise of coordinated activ-
ity.3" Nevertheless, studies that have considered the potential success of
export trading companies indicate that the small and medium sized ex-
porters who are responsible for the twenty percent of the total United
States exports will not be able to use those groups because they do not
export homogeneous products, a presumed requisite for any successful
group activity.345 Instead, these manufacturers produce highly techno-
logical, differentiated products which are the least susceptible to joint
marketing.346
(1) Use of Middlemen
Small and medium size manufacturers also exhibit a strong disincli-
nation to export goods. 347 The primary focus of these producers, both
historically and today, is on the domestic market and it is difficult even to
develop their interest in export markets.348 The neophyte exporter, most
likely a small shipper, has a tendency to use middlemen, primarily export
brokerage companies, export management firms, distributorships, non-
vessel operating common carriers, and freight forwarders; and it is likely
that the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 will further this proclivity
through its authorization of bank ownership and participation in export
341 50 YEAR REVIEW, supra note 276, at 32-34.
342 HAYS REPORT, supra note 301, at 552.
343 See, GALBRAITrrH, supra note 192, at 150.
344 HAYS REPORT, supra note 301, at 554-56. The Report noted a definite tendency on the part
of U.S. exporters to "go it alone" once the export trade was sufficiently developed. Id. at 456.
345 See, eg., R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX, 435-36 (1978). A similar concern is evi-
denced by the Senate's authorization of small shipper joint ventures and the shippers' associations
provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 23; see also supra text
accompanying notes 168-171.
346 HAYS REPORT, supra note 301, at 470-71.
347 Id. at 433.




In general, the use of middlemen does not constitute countervailing
power in the sense that a shippers' council would .3 " Although the Ship-
ping Act of 1984 has revoked the prior prohibition on freight forwarders
and middlemen having a beneficial interest in the goods they ship, they
may still fail to negotiate lower conference rates because forwarders act-
ing without a beneficial interest in the goods they ship will continue to
lack incentives to negotiate lower rates and forwarders who also ship
their own goods will either negotiate lower rates only to the extent that
the discounts they obtain exceed the fees that they receive from other
shippers, or to the extent available to other similarly situated shippers.3
In addition, small and medium sized exporters may use middlemen only
for a short period of time.352 Small and medium sized exporters act in a
highly independent and entrepreneurial fashion which may inhibit the
development of long term, stable relationships between councils and con-
ferences and may inhibit the ability of a council to develop cohesive or
uniform positions.353
349 HAYs REPORT, supra note 301, at 473; 15 U.S.C. § 4001 (1984). See generally 46 C.F.R.
§ 510.2(O-(I); Note, supra note 299, at 773-75.
350 UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 3-4. But cf Senate Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 31, at 26-27 (statement of Thomas Campbell, Federal Trade Commission); id.
at 90-95 (statement of Raymond P. de Member, The International Association of NVOCCs).
351 "[The term] 'beneficial interest' includes any lien or interest in a right to use, enjoy, profit,
benefit, or receive any advantage, either proprietary or financial, from the whole or any part of a
shipment of cargo where such interest arises from the financing of the shipment or by operation of
law, or by agreement, express or implied. The term "beneficial interest" shall not include any obliga-
tion in favor of a freight forwarder arising solely by reason of the advance out-of-pocket expenses
incurred in dispatching a shipment." 46 CFR § 510.2(b) (1983). Licensed and bonded by the FMC,
an "independent ocean freight forwarder" is a person "performing freight forwarding services for a
consideration, either monetary or otherwise, who is not a shipper or consignee or seller or purchaser
of property in commerce from the United States." 46 CFR § 510.10) (1983). See generally,
LLHLMAN, THE OcEAN FREIGHT FORWARDER, THE EXPORTER, AND THE LAW (1967).
352 Cf. HAYS REPORT, supra note 301, at 456-58. This conclusion was reached after considering
that this prohibition strictly limited any incentives for freight forwarders to negotiate significantly
lower rates, or to pass on these savings to shippers. Although the prohibition was temporarily re-
moved by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1608(c) 95 Stat. 357
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 801, 841b (1982)), and has been permanently removed by the
Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. § 841b (1982), repealed by Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
237, § 20(a), 98 Stat. 88 (1984), the question as to what degree freight forwarders will significantly
create countervailing power in the shipping industry still remains. See infra note 372. The long
term stable relationships export trading companies developed with shippers but should apply equally
to the development of strong shippers' councils.
353 The strong entrepreneurial nature of the small and medium sized American businessman has
been cited as only one reason why the United States economy has failed to develop export trading
companies, despite consistent conclusions that pre-Export Trading Company Act laws permitted the
development of such companies. As with studies of the Webb-Pomerene associations, export trading
company studies noted that increased experience, information and confidence on the part of export-
ers results in a lessened reliance on middlemen associations. Indeed, this is one reason why cartel
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(2) Government Information
The studies on the Webb-Pomerene Act also indicate that small and
medium sized shippers may not utilize consultative shippers' councils be-
cause the purpose of these councils, information exchange, may be ade-
quately performed by the government.3  Exporters frequently cited the
Department of Commerce's information services, used in conjunction
with middlemen, as a major reason why they did not utilize Webb-
Pomerene associations.3 5 Both Galbraith's theory and the UNCTAD
proposals give government information agencies a strong role in the de-
velopment of countervailing power and it is conceivable that a strength-
ened clearinghouse role for the Federal Maritime Commission might
eliminate the need for many of the functions of a shippers' council. 6
Although a proposal to strengthen a federal agency's powers in an era of
deregulation may sound unusual, deregulation of the ocean shipping in-
dustry, with its strengthened antitrust exemption, may warrant such an
approach.357
IV. THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ALTERNATIVE
Policy makers who seek to protect shippers' interests while strength-
ening conference activities face difficult choices when authorizing ship-
pers' councils in the United States. Portions of this article have indicated
that legislation with the purpose of obtaining lower shipping rates
theory precludes the formation of cartels in non-concentrated industries. The desire to act independ-
ent of group action, especially when the shipper has a substantial quantity of goods to ship, will be
an important factor in the development of an individual's position in the export trade. POSNER,
ANTrrRusT LAW 53-54 (1976); supra note 346.
354 50 YEAR REvIEw, supra note 276, at 61.
355 Id.
356 UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, Part III. But cf Omnibus Hear-
ings, part 1, supra note 21, at 514 (statement of Honorable Paul McCloskey); supra note 113. In-
deed, many opponents of a continuation of the conference system recommend that a continuation of
the system should be accompanied by an elimination of the requirement that tariffs be filed with and
published by the FMC. They contend that this filing merely increases conference cohesion by dis-
seminating information necessary for the monitoring of cartel activities. Whatever the validity of
this argument proponents of the conference system may argue that the existence of this information
does protect shippers and provides much of the information contemplated by the shippers' councils.
The fact that shippers may be reluctant to utilize this information and the protective provisions of a
federal agency does not indicate that they also would hesitate to use a shippers' council. Indeed, it is
rather anomalous that while the strengthening of the conferences' antitrust exemptions would reduce
the role of the FMC, the FMC's role in regulating the activities of shippers' councils would increase,
therefore offsetting any potential governmental cost saving resulting from deregulation. See, House
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 14-15 (statement of John H. Shenefield).
357 In those industries where antitrust exemptions exist, the responsible agency usually plays the
role ensuring and protecting the consumer's interests. Cf H.R. REP. No. 935, supra note 8, at 25
(statement of Andrew Popper, Dean of the American University School of Law).
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through the use of shippers' councils will have to be very detailed and
provide specific guidelines for exporters. This legislation, however, has
the potential of being either superfluous or subject to abuse by large spe-
cial interests because studies also have demonstrated that the intended
beneficiaries of the councils may not use them.
Given that continued federal regulation appears to be unfeasible po-
litically, export trading companies authorized under the Export Trading
Company Act of 1982 might have to be used as an alternative means of
offsetting liner conference pricing power." 8 Assuming that the problems
of international shipping essentially are merely one aspect of the general
issue of international trade, that international liner conferences' econo-
mies constitute merely a derived demand from overall foreign trade de-
mand, and that the solution to economic problems in the industry will
have to be in the context of larger international trade issues, the success
of shippers' councils will only be derived from the general economic via-
bility of exporters. Since the obstacles to the creation of shippers' coun-
cils also have inhibited the development of exports by small and medium
sized manufacturers, legislation which aims to promote the exports of
these businesses also may remove the obstacles to the creation of the
councils, thus accomplishing the goals of the councils and eliminating
the need for any special shipper council legislation.359
A. Advantages to Exclusive Reliance on Export Trading Companies
as a Form of Countervailing Power in the Conference Liner
System
Currently, there are only two serious proposals for protecting small
and medium sized shippers from the strengthened conference system.
Neither of these proposals are promising. Inasmuch as continued federal
358 Cf. Letter from Allen Green, Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, to Sen. Slade
Gorton Dec. 1, 1981), reprinted in Gorton Hearings, supra note 10, at 149-52 [hereinafter cited as
Green letter]; see also House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 21 (proposed shippers' council
amendment of Prof. Garvey). But see Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 176, at 156-59 (state-
ment of Eugene Milosh, American Association of Exporters and Importers). A similar suggestion
was made by the Federal Trade Commission for recourse to Webb-Pomerene associations. 10 YEAR
REPORT, supra note 276, at 11; see also H.R. 4374, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1982) (proposed
section 15a) reprinted in Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 26.
359 See Green letter, supra note 358. This argument has been anticipated even in the context of
domestic transportation rates. The Interstate Commerce Commission recently deregulated the
movement of export coal by railroads. They relied, in part, upon the rationale that the railroad
industry will be aware that the demand for its services is derivative of the demand for exported
United States coal and will therefore not price the coal at uncompetitive levels. See Interstate Com-
merce Commission, Ex Parte No. 346 (Sub-7), Railroad Exemption-Export Coal at 15 (May 26,
1983), summary reprinted in 48 Fed. Reg. 26822 (1983) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1039 (1984)).
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regulation is unfeasible 3 ° and shippers' councils present problems of or-
ganization and anticompetitive spillover, export trading companies pres-
ent a non-government method of concentrating the economic power of
small and medium sized shippers without engendering the dangers of
horizontal combinations of competitors. 36' Because the Export Trading
Company Act permits export trading companies to act principally as ex-
porters of their own goods and of the goods of unaffiliated individuals,
362
these companies will not present the problem of middlemen forwarders
who, not having a beneficial interest in the goods they ship, lack an in-
centive to exercise countervailing power against the conferences. In-
stead, export trading companies with beneficial interests in their own
goods will realize a greater profit from reduced costs, so they will have an
incentive to negotiate lower rates with liner conferences.
3 63
Export trading companies also may be structured to provide the in-
formation and negotiating mechanisms of a shippers' council. While fo-
cusing on the overall export transaction, the financial information, 316
bank participation, 365 and antitrust certification 366 provisions of the Act
360 See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 11-13 (testimony of Prof. George Garvey).
361 The Act authorizes the formation of a single joint venture which would acquire title to the
goods exported. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982). Compare this approach with section 3(24) of the Shipping
Act of 1984, which permit the creation of shippers' associations and joint ventures by small shippers
for the aggregation of goods to be shipped by ocean carrier. This approach provides the advantage
of avoiding the problems that shippers' councils would face as to whether they should be treated as a
corporation or as an association. Cf. Kintner, supra note 159, at 981-83; Brodley, supra note 157, at
1544-47. See notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
362 15 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(4) (1982).
363 The Senate version of the Export Trading Company Act would have ensured that all export
trading companies would have had a beneficial interest in some of the goods they shipped, inasmuch
as it required that the export trading company be engaged both in the export of its own goods and in
the export of the goods of other, unaffiliated individuals. S. REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 8.
However, the compromise version of this definition, as enacted, permits the creation of export trad-
ing companies which export only their own goods. 15 U.S.C. § 4002(a) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 924,
supra note 176, at 2502-03. This change does not affect the analysis of the potential utilization of the
Export Trading Company Act, inasmuch as export trading companies will either develop as large
corporations exerting countervailing power, or as mixed organizations which will be permitted to
"take title" to the exported goods of unaffiiated organizations with the incentive to negotiate lower
rates. See H.R. REP. No. 924, supra note 176, at 2507.
364 See H.R. REP. No. 637, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2431, 2433-34; S. REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 6.
365 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14) (1982); Export trading companies that include investments of bank
holding companies may not engage in agricultural production activities or in manufacturing, except
to the incidental degree required to conform export products to the needs of foreign countries. 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(C) (1982). It also should be noted that the antitrust exemption created under
the Act applies to any "persons", whether or not they are export trading companies as defined under
section 203(3) of the Act. Certification Guidelines, supra note 164, at 15938; see also Federal Re-
serve System, International Banking Operations; Export Trading Companies, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,445
(1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.31-211.602).
366 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1982). This certification procedure provides for Department of
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provide export trading companies with the opportunity to develop and
exercise bargaining power against the liner conferences.
While the Export Trading Company Act has liberalized both the
Sherman Act and the antitrust certification standards it borrowed from
the Webb-Pomerene Act, there is no guarantee that the Act will increase
United States exports. It may be that the antitrust certification provi-
sions of the Act will deter new exporters,3 67 and that banks will be unable
to adapt their financial expertise to commercial transactions.3 68 It is too
Commerce review of the proposed activities delineated in the application. Upon determination that
the company will adhere to the guidelines outlined in the Act, and upon concurrence of the Attorney
General, the Department of Commerce is authorized to issue a certificate of review. 15 U.S.C.
§ 4013 (1982). A holder of such a certificate is immune from criminal and civil antitrust action for
conduct which is specified in and complies with the terms of the certificate. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(a)
(1982). Any private party who brings a civil action against a holder of such a certificate has the
burden of proving that the conduct complained of was outside of the scope of activities authorized
by the certificate, 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(3) (1982) and any award against the holder of a certificate will
be limited to actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(1) (1982). Section 4016(b)(4) in addition to being
the exclusive remedy for violations of the Act, provides that any plaintiff who loses a claim against a
certificate holder on the basis that the conduct complained of was within the scope of the exception
shall be responsible for the certificate holder's litigation expenses. See Certification Procedures, 48
Fed. Reg. 10595 (1983) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325).
367 Certification Guidelines, supra note 164. These guidelines primarily follow the provisions of
the Act. They extend antitrust immunity to activities of exporters of goods and services and include
the allocation of export quotas and the entering into of price, pooling, and distributorship agree-
ments as long as the conduct would not violate certain articulated criteria. The criteria include a
substantial lessening of competition in the United States or among competing exporter, an unreason-
able effect on domestic prices, unfair competition, and an effect on goods to be resold within the
United States. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a) (1982). The criteria are illustrated in the Department of Com-
merce Guidelines by cases interpreting the Webb-Pomerene Act. 48 Fed. Reg. 15939, et. seq. There-
fore a question arises as to what additional degree of certainty will be obtained by the export trading
company antitrust immunity. In addition, the unfair competition element, which, in essence, per-
mits section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to apply to export trading company activities,
does not exist in the Webb-Pomerene Act.
Furthermore, the Act's opponents criticize its antitrust exemption procedure. They argue that
the Act increases the inhibiting effect of the antitrust laws on small and medium sized exporters by
imposing a burdensome multi-agency certification procedure and by implying that an antitrust ex-
emption is needed when existing regulations already adequately provide for exporting. In addition,
they argue that the inhibiting effect of the antitrust laws is increased by the incorporation of the
already prone to abuse Webb-Pomerene provisions into the Act and by the creation of a false illusion
of certainty in the antitrust laws, because the certifications will be read narrowly by the courts and
because they preclude any party from initiating litigation. See Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1981, 14 J. L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1 (1982). But see H.R. REP. No. 637, supra
note 364, at Pt. II, 2447-54; Davidow, Cartes, supra note 214, at 359. Griffin, Antitrust Issues in
Countertrade, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 236, 246-48 (1983); Golden & Kolb, supra note 299, at 780-
81; Bruce & Peirce, supra note 271, at 1014-17. Notwithstanding these criticisms, recourse to the
certification provisions still may be desirable in order to gain the protections of the single damages
provisions of Title III. Hawk, supra note 32, at 218-19.
368 Ferchill, supra note 304, at 283. Opponents express the concern that the financial stability of
the banking system will be undermined by breaking the tradition which prohibited banks from en-
gaging in commercial activities. See Financial Institutions and Export Trading Companies, Hearing
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early to ascertain whether these criticisms will prove to be true,36 9 Nev-
ertheless, in the context of current exporters utilizing export trading
companies (or export trading company certificates) as alternatives to
shippers' councils, the 1982 Act provides as much of an incentive for
joint action as would any specific amendment to the Shipping Act. The
Export Trading Company Act permits any person, group, association, or
corporation to obtain an antitrust certification for any activity related to
export trade. H.R. 1878 (and arguably the Conference Committee Re-
port to the Shipping Act of 1984) recognized the similarities between the
two concepts and that the 1982 Act's certification provisions are suffi-
ciently broad to permit a variety of shipper-based transportation activi-
ties. 370 There is no reason why an export trading company could not be
used to consolidate differentiated products, bulk goods, charter ships,
search for alternative transportation routes, obtain and analyze general
shipping and exporting information, and generally perform the functions
of shippers' councils.371 Even without explicit Shipping Act recognition,
such organizations should be able to use existing provisions of the Act to
exercise countervailing power, including the loyalty and service contract
provisions authorized by the Shipping Act of 1984 as a method of in-
creasing conference tying power.37 2
B. Examples: Ports and Domestic Cooperative Associations-
Opportunities Created by the Shipping Act of 1984
Two examples illustrate how export trading companies could utilize
on S.2718. Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, 1-2 (1980) (statement of Senator Proxmire). But see Cole, Establishing American Trading Compa-
nies, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 277 (1980).
369 HAYS REPORT, supra note 301, at 562-63. The first applications for Export Trading Com-
pany Certificates were accepted on June 9, 1983. Initial applications included antitrust certification
requests for sporting goods, catfish farmers, health care goods and services. See International Trade
Administration, Notice of Applications, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,034, 29,035, 29,934 (1983). As least one of
the initial applicants intends to offer freight forwarding services. See Application 83-0002, 48 Fed.
Reg. 29,035 (1983).
370 See notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
371 See notes 88-116 and accompanying text.
372 The elimination of the beneficial interest prohibition on freight forwarders under the Shipping
Act of 1984 enables export trading companies which "take title" to their own goods to aggregate
additional goods of other exporters to obtain the volume and service discounts permitted under the
Act. Regulations under the Shipping Act of 1916 prohibited shippers from acting as forwarders of
other shipper's cargo. Thus, an export trading company which took title to its own goods, could not
aggregate additional goods of other exporters in order to obtain volume or service discounts. See S.
REP. No. 27, supra note 175, at 9; Joint letter from Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, and
Alan Green, Jr., Chairman of the Federal Maritime Comm. to members of Congress, summarized in
Traffic World, June 13, 1983 at 49; HAYS REPORT, supra note 301, at 517; Regulatory Reform
Hearings, supra note 26, at 274 (testimony of Edward Schmeltzer). See also infra note 385.
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existing and proposed Shipping Act provisions to exercise countervailing
power in a manner similar to the power advocated by proponents of ship-
pers' councils. First, the Congress contemplated ports and port authori-
ties as forming or participating in export trading companies. 373 This
would be a logical role for ports in the context of the shippers' councils
concept, since they act both as gateways for the overall export trade and
as countervailing power sources against the liner conference systems. In-
deed, the Shipping Act of 1984 retains the 1916 Act's provisions which
protect ports from regional discrimination and grant them a limited anti-
trust immunity to negotiate with other ports and conferences concerning
services and rate levels.374 Furthermore, some shippers' council propo-
nents have contemplated port participation in the activities of various
shippers' councils.3 75  Therefore, the existing antitrust immunity com-
bined with export trading company immunity may be used with the same
effect as the proposed shippers' councils antitrust immunity inasmuch as
it would enable ports to exchange information relevant to conference
rates and services, and would permit the export trading companies to
utilize the same information in making export decisions.376
Ports, if they were to engage in export trading company activities,
would gain the additional benefit of resolving their concern that the em-
phasis on intermodalism arising from the container revolution, the
strengthening of conferences, and the authorization of shippers' councils
could result in discrimination against certain ports, which might eveitu-
ally result in their decline and a concommitant adverse effect on the eco-
373 H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 364, at Pt. I, 2438; H.R. RaP. 924, supra note 176, at 2506.
Unkovic & LaMont, supra note 271, at 245-46; Golden & Kolb, supra note 300, at 770 n.88. Even
affiliates of railroad companies were contemplated as being entitled to function as export trading
companies, as long as a separate identity and managed operations existed. H.R. RP. No. 637, Pt. I,
supra note 364. See generally Kursar, U.S. Businesses Making Plans for Export Trading Companies,
Traffic World, September 26, 1983, at 53.
374 Section 4(b) of the Shipping Act of 1984, grants an antitrust immunity for both port associa-
tion agreements and agreements between ports and shipping lines or terminal operators directly
serving the shipping lines. See generally 46 C.F.R. §§ 533.1-.6 (1983). Buchwald, Federal Maritime
Commission Jurisdiction over Terminal Operators, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 209 (1981); Lidinsky &
Colson, The Federal Regulation of American Port Activities, 7 INT'L TRADE L. J. 38 (1981-1982).
375 Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 22, at 110-11 (testimony of Martin C. Pilsch, Massa-
chusetts Port Authority; Richard A. Lindsky, Jr., Maryland Port Administration); House Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 28 (statement of Stanley P. Hebert, American Association of Port Authorities);
see also UNCTAD, Protection of Shipper Interests, supra note 70, at 8-10 (statement of Thomas
Wilcox, National Association of Stevedores).
376 For example, section 4(b) of the Shipping Act of 1984 permits marine terminal operators to
enter into agreements among themselves and with conferences to discuss, fix, or regulate rates or
other conditions of service, and to engage in exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrange-
ments. The availability of port authority facilities makes the port-export trading company combina-
tion particularly attractive in the context of accomplishing shippers' councils goals.
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nomic status of their region.37 7 Furthermore, a policy of free domestic
competition could be preserved and a strengthening of port's competitive
positions ensured if the goals of shippers' councils are realized through
the use of export trading companies with port authority membership.
For example, port authority participation in export trading companies
may result in broader service competition between ports, because the
ports will want to persuade shippers, conferences, and surface transpor-
tation carriers to use the port's export trading company related services
by offering additional port services.3 78 In addition, the antitrust exemp-
tions of the Shipping and Export Trading Company Acts should be suffi-
cient tools to enable the exercise of countervailing power by ports
because the ports/export trading companies would have an incentive to
obtain the lowest possible conference rates to attract shippers. 379 Since
the 1984 Shipping Act's antitrust immunity would extend only to the
discussion of common issues affecting ports' relationships with confer-
ences, any potential abuses which might arise in a port to port or export
trading company to export trading company context should be curbed,
377 This problem is better known as cargo diversion. Under sections 16 and 17 of the Shipping
Act of 1916, ports which are "naturally tributory" from the original points of shipment for goods
were protected from conference-port agreements which conferred discriminatory advantages to ports
which might be a greater distance from the original shipping point. A similar prohibition on dis-
crimination between ports exists in section 10(b)(10) of the Shipping Act of 1984.
As some ports modernized into containerized terminals, conferences were willing to absorb
some of the overland transportation rates in order to secure the faster turn-around time of the con-
tainerized facilities. The Federal Maritie Commission generally has upheld this cargo diversion ac-
tivity where it has been found to be cost justified. See Overland and OCP Rates and Absorptions, 12
F.M.C. 184 (1969); Pacific Westbound Conference-Equalization and Absorption Rules and Prac-
tices, No. 78-32 (Served May 25, 1984). See also Boston Shipping Association, Inc. v. Federal Mari-
time Commission, 706 F.2d 1231, 1237-40 (1st Cir. 1983). Recently, however, cargo has been
diverted from U.S. ports to Canadian ports because the Canadian railroads and conferences have
been subject to less restrictive laws and regulations regarding tariff filings. This activity hasled to the
introduction of several bills before Congress which would require the filing of tariffs for goods ex-
ported through Canadian ports, and port authority requests for continued Shipping Act statutory
protection from unjust discrimination. See, Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 176, at 4-7 (state-
ment of Massachusetts and Virginia Port Authorities); H.R. 1511, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
While the discrimination provisions ostensibly have been retained in section 10 of the Shipping Act
of 1984, Congress has not yet acted on the cargo diversion issue.
378 Spokesmen for port authorities argue that the antitrust immunity for marine terminal opera-
tors is necessary in order to ensure that conferences do not discriminate in rates and services with
ports by permitting rate negotiations, but that in other respects, the agreements encourage other
forms of service competition, especially through use of the exclusive and cooperative work arrange-
ments. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28 at 3-6 (testimony of American Association of
Port Authorities). Contra Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 31, at 7 (statement of Thomas
Campbell, Federal Trade Comm.); House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28 (testimony of James C.
Miller III); id. (testimony of Prof. George Garvey).
379 The Hays Report estimated that export trading companies could increase their profitability six




since the export trading company antitrust certification would not au-
thorize cooperative arrangements among ports in the context of export
trading company issues and anticompetitive actions would therefore be
subject to antitrust prosecution.380 In addition, ports still would need to
utilize their Shipping Act authority to meet with other ports to provide
conferences with information as to their service needs because they
would remain subject to their legal obligations to provide non-discrimi-
natory service to shippers who choose not to use the export trading com-
pany. Both of these activities should facilitate the rationalization of the
conference system. Port participation in export trading company activi-
ties, however, may eventually lead to an elimination of the 1984 Shipping
Act's port authority antitrust immunity, as the protection of ports from
conference power is achieved through the countervailing power of export
trading company/port combinations. This also would facilitate in-
creased competition among ports.38'
Another advantage to port authority participation in export trading
companies would be a reduction in the potential conflict between ship-
pers' negotiating the ocean portion of intermodal through rates, while
maintaining competition in the domestic surface transportation indus-
tries, because only one entity (the export trading company) would engage
in the negotiation of rates and the shipment of goods, and would limit
discussion to topics of export transportation importance. This approach
is consistent with the concerns expressed by the Department of Justice in
its domestic shippers' council Business Review Letters. Finally, ports/
export trading companies would be regional in nature. In contrast with
shippers' councils, which for cohesion purposes may need to be based on
basic commodities or similar products, ports/export trading companies
may become effective in developing costing information on a broad mix
of goods. This, in turn, could result in a countervailing pressure on con-
380 On advantage of having ports act as export trading company members is that any cooperative
agreements among ports should be offset by the need to lower rates for the shipper. In other words,
countervailing power would not result in an increase in costs to consumers because the negotiating
partners, i.e., ports, would also be consumers. Similarly, because the Export Trading Company Act
prohibits export trading company activity which would restrain competition in the domestic econ-
omy or export trade, any competitive advantages emanating from port antitrust exemptions still
would have to reflect economies of scale. This type of protection from abuse of an antitrust exemp-
tion exists under case law interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist
Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967); Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association, Inc. v.
United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); Pacific Coast
Agricultural Export Association v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975). But see
Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 31, at 14 (testimony of Thomas J. Campbell).
381 46 U.S.C. § 816 (1982); see H.R. REp. No. 53, supra note 3, at Pt. 2, 21-22; Federal Maritime
Commission, Inquiry and Intent to Review Regulation of Ports and Marine Terminal Operators, 48
Fed. Reg. 41199 (1983) (Notice of Inquiry); Buchwald, supra note 374, at 216-17; supra note 378.
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ferences which would more accurately reflect real shipping costs rather
than the bargaining power of a particular good. It also would spread the
benefits of such power to more types of goods, perhaps indirectly increas-
ing the interest of small and medium sized manufacturers in exporting.
382
Nor is it necessarily true that a regionally based port/export trading
company would export only those items produced in that company's re-
gion, and lead to a market dominance in particular types of goods or
regional market power dominance. Intermodalism has already demon-
strated that the services and overall package offered to a manufacturer
can divert his shipment of goods from a "naturally tributory" port (that
is, a port that is geographically or regionally nearby) to one which is
further away or even in a foreign country. Thus, port authority partici-
pation in export trading companies should not only preclude a form of
regional or product dominance in the context of shipping, but it should
promote service and rate competition between ports, in conference ship-
ping, and, to an ancillary degree, in domestic intermodal rate
competition.3 83
A second example of export trading companies acting as shippers'
councils are organizations, such as shippers' associations or cooperative
associations,3 84 that exist in the domestic economy but may use existing
statutory tools to facilitate their negotiating power with conferences.
These organizations, which often used the Webb-Pomerene Act or
freight forwarder provisions of the Shipping Act in the past,385 can be
expected to utilize the certification provisions of the Export Trading
Company Act in order to more effectively accomplish the goals contem-
plated by the shippers' councils proposals, now that the Shipping Act of
382 See Bruce & Peirce, supra note 271, at 997 n.129. But see supra note 236.
383 See supra note 377.
384 Commodity Associations perform functions similar to those performed by shippers' associa-
tions for a specific product. See 49 U.S.C. § 10562(3) (1982); Agricultural cooperatives, authorized
under 12 U.S.C. § 1141(j)(a) (1982), may act asjoint purchasers and marketers of farm products and
supplies. They also are exempt from Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C.
§ 10562(1) (1982) and are allowed to consolidate transportation. These organizations also may en-
joy immunity from application of the antitrust laws under the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291
(1982), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
385 While these organizations currently are exempt from Interstate Commerce Commisson juris-
diction as private, non-profit cooperative shippers' associations (49 U.S.C. § 10562(3) (1982)), they
were subject to Federal Maritime Commission jurisdiction as non-vessel operating common carriers
and were subject to a common carrier status and tariff filing requirements of the Commission. 46
U.S.C. § 814 (1982). They are, however, also entitled to enter into agreements as "other persons"
under section 15 of the Act. Id. These provisions allegedly inhibited these organizations from utiliz-
ing the legal tools which would permit them to consolidate goods for foreign transport, a situation
which would be alleviated by the Shipping Act of 1984's recognition of shippers' associations. See
Senate Hearings, supra note 33 (testimony of Ronald N. Cobert, American Institute of Shippers'
Associations); see also supra note 372.
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1984 has recognized their legal status.3" 6 Shippers' associations have be-
come an increasingly dominant force in the domestic surface transporta-
tion industries and they probably will assume a greater role in
international shipping. Indeed, the 1984 Shipping Act, with its prohibi-
tions on conferences and common carriers' refusals to negotiate with
shippers' associations, has the potential of accomplishing as much as any
United States shippers' council would in the context of controlling con-
ference economic power or in protecting the interests of small shippers.
This result will only occur, however, if such organizations actively and
creatively utilize the export trading company certificates of review to
achieve market power, or if they combine with organizations such as
ports to creatively market their services. The use of the Export Trading
Company Act certification provisions would appear to be especially use-
ful for those basic commodities which would not be expected to use prod-
uct differentiated export trading companies or would provide the natural
foundation for commodity based shippers' councils. 387 These organiza-
tions would also have the additional flexibility of choosing both their do-
mestic and international routing of traffic, as opposed to port based
export trading companies which would have an interest in shipping
goods through their particular member port.
C. Criticisms
A proposal to permit export trading companies to assume the role of
shippers' councils is subject to several criticisms. First, this indirect
method of achieving countervailing power does not explicitly recognize
shippers' rights to exercise the tools needed to achieve this power on a
group (or combination) basis.388 Second, the proposal relies heavily on a
"free market" of export trading company development, with no guaran-
tees that export trading companies will be seriously interested in negoti-
386 Cf Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 71-73 (testimony of Ronald N. Cobert). An especially
important advantage to the shippers' association approach is that it eliminates the middlemen associ-
ated with freight forwarders and NOVCCs. Id.
387 For example, these provisions would be useful for commodity groups which have proven to be
successful Webb-Pomerene associations. Examples of these commodities groups include agricultural
export associations for rice, lumber, and fruit. See 10 YEAR REPORT, supra note 276, at 10; Omni-
bus Hearings, supra note 21, at 526 (testimony of Peter Klein, Sea-Land Industries). See notes 306-
26 and accompanying text.
388 See Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 176 (statement of American Association of Ex-
porters and Importers), stating that the use of export trading companies as an alternative to shippers'
councils is unacceptable to importers and exporters. They appear to object because a specific anti-
trust exemption, exclusively for negotiation with conferences, does not exist. In part, this objection
reflects the interests of the small importers and exporters who are not interested in the services
offered by export trading companies, and perhaps the interests of the umbrella organizations repre-
senting their interests.
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ating lower conference rates (as opposed to absorbing cost differences).
There also is no guarantee that small or medium sized shippers will use
export trading companies, or that export trading companies will even
develop. Third, an export trading company could act anticompetitively,
in a manner akin to potential anticompetitive aspects of shippers' coun-
cils discussed in section III. Any one of these hypothetical developments
may place exporters in a worse position than they would have been in
had a shippers' council, even a consultative shippers' council, existed to
represent their interests.
However, these arguments are not persuasive. There is no guarantee
that a shippers' council will be able to develop properly or that it could
develop lower rates.3" 9 Indeed, due to the necessary characteristics of a
successful council, there is the potential that a negotiating shippers'
council would be more prone to anticompetitive activity than an export
trading company, and it is fairly certain that an export trading company
would be more effective than a consultative shippers' council would be in
lowering rates.390 Similarly, the fact that a small exporter who declines
to utilize export trading companies (especially shippers' association based
export trading companies) and decides to ship on his own may be put in
a worse position than he would be placed in under the shippers' council
concept is an unfortunate side effect of economic life. Recourse to the
Export Trading Company Act in lieu of an additional, and duplicative,
exemption for shippers' councils, is warranted under the presumption
that only a minimum number of restraints should be placed upon a free
market economy.
D. Contract Rate Advisory Boards
The government information provisions contained in the UNCTAD
proposals and a concept embodied in the Staggers Railroad Deregulation
Act of 1980 may be borrowed to aid the small exporters who choose not
to use export trading companies.391 The UNCTAD proposals sought to
protect small shippers by creating government investigation units which
would consolidate information concerning the shipping industry for the
use of shippers' councils and all shippers.392 A variation on this idea is
contained in the Staggers Act, which provided for the creation of a rail-
road contract rate advisory board within the Interstate Commerce
389 See notes 191-329 and accompanying text.
390 Id.
391 Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.).




The goal of protecting shippers' interests in the railroad industry is
very similar to the goal of protecting shippers' interests in the ocean con-
ference system. As previously noted, although the concept of rationaliza-
tion in the liner conference system is to be accomplished through a
strengthening of an antitrust exemption while in the railroad industry it
is achieved through competition, both forms of regulatory reform con-
template the use of contract rates to promote competition and the devel-
opment of shipper loyalty to the individual carrier. 394  As discussed
earlier, the effective use of contracts will occur primarily through those
shippers who have a sufficiently large volume of goods as to be able to
negotiate effective rates.395 These shippers will either be large firms or
middlemen such as freight forwarders or export trading companies. In
the railroad industry, as in the liner conference system, contract conces-
sions by carriers are often compensated for by a corresponding increase
in the stated tariff for the carriage of a good, and although both the ICC
and the FMC have the jurisdiction to review certain posted tariffs for
reasonableness and antidiscrimination purposes, a certain degree of price
discrimination is anticipated in the transportation industries in order to
achieve rationalization.3 96 Congress, in order to create some protection
393 49 U.S.C. § 10713(m) (1982).
394 The touchstone of the Staggers Act was to eliminate the total reliance on common carrier
concepts of competition in the railroad industry. Instead, the Act authorized railroads and shippers
to enter into contracts which are approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 49 U.S.C.
§ 10713 (1982). (Compare this with the loyalty and service contract provisions of sections 7 and
sections 6 and 8(c) and section 8(c) of the Shipping Act of 1984. Under the Staggers Act, shippers'
protections against abuse of contract power include guarantees of common carrier service through
statutory limitations on the percentage of rail equipment that can be allocated to contract service,
§ 10713(d)(2), a requirement that similarly situated shippers not be unreasonably discriminated
against in the opportunity to enter into a contract service, and prohibitions on destructive competi-
tion. Provisions concerning railroad market dominance and limited zones of rate flexibility provide
an alternative check on railroad power 49 U.S.C. §§ 10713(0, 10707a., 10709 (1982); see also H.
REP. No. 1035, 96th cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3978. See
also Gorton Hearingx supra note 10, at 232 (answers of the National Industrial Traffic League to
questions of Sen. Inouye); Carr, supra note 246. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION
ON REGULATORY REFORM UNDER THE STAGGERS RAIL Acr OF 1980 (1983).
395 See supra notes 87-90; H.R. REP. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4110, 4130-33.
396 See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 13-14 (statement of Prof. George Garvey).
Although the I.C.C.'s regulatory review role recently was limited to determining whether filed tariff
rates are unreasonable, it still retains much greater authority to disapprove fied rates. This power
distinguishes it from the F.M.C.'s power which dates back to the original 1916 Shipping Act. Com-
pare, for example, the Commission's jurisdiction to review and suspend tariff rates under Chapter
107 of Title 49 with the Federal Maritime Commission's authority to disapprove any rate or charge
"so unreasonably high or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States", 46 U.S.C.
817(b)(5) (1982). This latter power seldom has been exercised and was eliminated by the Shipping
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for smaller shippers who do not know or cannot effectively utilize con-
tract rates, included section 208(a)(m) in the Staggers Act. This section
authorized the creation of a railroad contract rate board within the ICC
which would summarize contract rates for small shippers. The purpose
of this service is not only to compile and disseminate to interested parties
non-confidential summaries of the provisions of individual contract infor-
mation relating to provisions of contracts entered into under section 208
of the Staggers Act, but also to provide interested parties with advice
regarding contracts and to enable the government to assess the impact of
variations between contract rates on competition among shippers.39 7 In
essence, this provision provides some market information to the govern-
ment on the effectiveness of contract rate competitiveness as well as pro-
viding the small shipper information as to his competitive posture in the
area of shipping rates. Thus, it is very similar to the UNCTAD govern-
ment information board proposals.39 8
It is proposed that a similar structure could be created within the
Federal Maritime Commission to monitor contract rates in the liner in-
dustry and to provide contract information to those small shippers who
choose not to utilize export trading companies. Such a provision exists in
section 8(c) of the Shipping Act of 1984 which, in addition provides that
"similarly situated" shippers be eligible to enter into contracts containing
the same "essential terms" with the same carriers. However, while these
provisions aid in the dissemination of contract service terms, they do not
establish a government service which would render advice to parties con-
cerning contract rates. Such advice is especially important for small
shippers who are not "similarly situated" to contracting shippers and
who may not have any means by which to evaluate the published "essen-
tial terms" of a filed service contract in terms of their economic situation
and needs. This latter approach would be similar to the governmental
investigation unit functions of the UNCTAD proposals with the addi-
tional benefit of providing information for the use of export trading com-
panies and providing some form of protection to small exporters.
Although not a strong form of protection, such a method of information
dissemination may aid the goal of rationalization in the liner conference
system.3 99
The current system of filing conference tariffs with the Federal Mar-
Act of 1984. H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 3, at Pt. 2, 2-3. See generally Farris, Discrimination in
Transportation and the Antitrust Laws, 46 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 509 (1979).
397 See H.R. REP. No. 1430, supra note 394, at 4132-33.
398 See supra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
399 See notes 97-107 and accompanying text. The Shipping Act of 1984 requires that each con-
tract entered into pursuant to the Act be
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itime Commission should be preserved as a final protection for small
shippers.4' Although the Shipping Act of 1984 ultimately preserved
tariff filing, many critics of the conference system have proposed that the
tariff filing system be eliminated if the antitrust exemption for liner con-
ferences is to be retained. These critics reason that a system of tariff
filing merely strengthens the conferences' ability to maintain cartel cohe-
sion and that a system without tariffs would encourage independent ac-
tion by conference members, thus undermining conference stability.4'
However, this argument cannot be reconciled with a conscious policy
decision to promote rationalization through antitrust exempt cooperative
arrangements. An elimination of tariff filing in order to undermine con-
ference cohesion will merely serve to injure smaller shippers in a regula-
tory system which contemplates a system of countervailing power based
on large volume shippers armed with such negotiating tools as loyalty
and service contracts. While these large shippers will have the power to
develop the information necessary to protect themselves in a tariff free
environment, it is doubtful that small shippers will be able to protect
themselves against discriminatory rebating and pricing against them.4°2
In an economic system dominated by concentrated buyers and sellers,
the proper role of government is to ensure that the weak are not unfairly
precluded from the opportunity to compete.
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting the Shipping Act of 1984, the 98th Congress imple-
mented liner conference regulatory reform in the form of strengthened
filed confidentially with the Commission, and at the same time, a concise statement of its
essential terms shall be filed with the Commission and made available to the general public in
tariff format, and those essential terms shall be available to all shippers similarly situated. The
essential terms shall include-
(1) the origin and destination port ranges in the case of port-to-port movements, and the
origin and destination geographic areas in the case of through intermodal movements.
(2) the commodity or commodities involved;
(3) the minimum volume;
(4) the line-haul rate;
(5) the duration;
(6) service commitments; and
(7) the liquidated damages for non-performance, if any.
46 U.S.C.A. § 1707(c) (1984). While these provisions clearly provide a depository of information
concerning service contracts that shippers can refer to, it is not the same as an advisory board that
can provide additional assistance to shippers, as exists under the Staggers Act.
400 § 18, Shipping Act 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1982).
401 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 28, at 4-5 (testimony of James C. Miller III); Regulatory
Reform Hearings, supra note 26, at 510 (testimony of Drew Lewis, Secretary of Transportation);
Senate Judiciary Hearing supra note 31, at 11-12, 19-22 (testimony of Thomas Campbell, Federal
Trade Comm.).
402 See Regulatory Reform Hearings supra note 26, at 375-83.
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conference antitrust exemptions. This approach was accompanied by
some protections from the strengthened conference power for shippers.
However, the very fact that the Congress has authorized a five year re-
view of the new Act is an indication that (as with other industries facing
the realities of international economic conditions) there are doubts as to
whether the Shipping Act of 1984 goes far enough in reforming United
States regulation of the liner conference system or in protecting shippers'
interests. It can be expected that over the next five years, the advocates
of shippers' councils will certainly continue to present the concept to pol-
icy makers, whether it be the Congress in oversight hearings or before the
Presidential Advisory Commission. Whether they argue for shippers'
councils as distinct entities or for an antitrust exemption and stronger
negotiating tools for shippers' associations remains to be seen. 4 3
Whatever its guise, given the nature of the United States' export trade
and domestic competition policy, it is doubtful that shippers' councils,
either consultative or negotiating, will be accepted in the United States as
a method of economic regulation. If some form of "social justice" is
needed to protect small shippers, recourse to export trading companies
and the shippers' associations provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984 will
provide adequate safeguards for small exporters and importers to offset
conference power and protect themselves from conference discrimina-
tion. To do otherwise would be to ignore the warnings of F.A. Hayek:
Misinterpretation of market order as an economy that can and ought
to satisfy different needs in a certain order of priority, shows itself particu-
larly in the efforts of policy to correct prices and incomes in the interest of
what is called "social justice." Whatever the meaning social philosophers
have attached to this concept, in the practice of economic policy it has al-
most always meant one thing, and one thing only: the protection of certain
groups against the necessity to descend from the absolute or relative mate-
rial position which they have for some time enjoyed. 40 '
403 See supra text accompanying note 44.
404 F.A. von Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in NEw STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY,
POLrIcs, ECONOMICS, AND THE HIsrORY OF IDEAS 186 (1978).
